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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

GARY C. JACOBSON examines the effect of electoral politics on U.S. budget policies in 1990 and the effect of the unpopular October budget legislation on the 1990 congressional elections. He finds that members of both houses were acutely sensitive to the very real electoral risks faced in trying to reduce the deficit by raising taxes and cutting programs. The legislation passed only because a great majority of members were safe enough electorally to absorb the political damage without risking their careers.

CHRISTOPHER HOWARD shows how tax expenditures, a major form of indirect social spending in the United States, substantially increase the size and alter the structure of the American welfare state. He also shows how tax expenditures challenge widely held beliefs about the origins of U.S. social programs.

SHIBLEY TELHAMI argues that on issues of foreign policy, Arab public opinion has a discernible impact on the policies of Arab states. He shows that upheavals in the Middle East following the Gulf War were contained, partly because Saddam Hussein failed to deliver what he promised and partly due to the fact that the allies took seriously the predictions of public upheaval.

MARK J. ROZELL examines the Ford presidency press strategy with respect to its ability to mold a favorable presidential image. Interviews with White House communications advisers reveal the limitations that events such as the Nixon pardon and terHorst resignation had on the successful implementation of this strategy.

JOHN BLANEY and MICHAEL GFOELLER analyze Gorbachev's attempts to check Soviet economic decline, pointing to the underlying political design of the Soviet economy and resulting weaknesses as the key factor causing the USSR's disintegration. They warn that the wreckage of the old command system continues to cause regional instability.

TIMOTHY A. BYRNES examines the political role of the American Catholic hierarchy. He argues that the decay of the Democrat New Deal coalition and the major parties' subsequent attempts to build a new electoral majority placed the bishops near the center of American electoral politics in the 1970s and 1980s.

JORGEN RASMUSSEN and JAMES M. McCORMICK analyze the British public's views of Anglo-American relations and find the "special relationship" to be largely a myth. The British public, in contrast to the political elite, does not feel any affinity with the United States. As a result, firm support for U.S. international policies can prove costly in domestic popularity for a prime minister.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Deficit-Cutting Politics and Congressional Elections

GARY C. JACOBSON

In October 1990, less than two weeks before election day, Congress passed and President George Bush signed a landmark deficit reduction package that raised taxes, imposed new user fees, and cut entitlements. The action was as conspicuous as it was unpopular. Both the contentious and confusing process that produced the bill and the bill itself left voters manifestly angry with the Congress and the president. Yet only a handful of incumbents—fifteen representatives, a single senator—were denied reelection, and only a fraction of the losers could plausibly blame their defeat on voters' anger over budget politics.[1]

Superficially, both the decision to raise taxes and cut entitlements and the absence of widespread retaliation by irate voters would appear to violate the logic of the "electoral connection."[2] Most members of Congress put themselves on record only days before an election in support of legislation that promised immediate and palpable pain for

[1] Gary C. Jacobson, "Divided Government, Strategic Politics, and the 1990 Congressional Elections" (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 18–20 April 1991), 6.

[2] David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

GARY C. JACOBSON chairs the political science department at the University of California, San Diego. His most recent books are *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988* and the third edition of *The Politics of Congressional Elections.*

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large segments of the public in order to achieve the more distant and uncertain benefits of lower deficits. The electorate, despite hostility to the legislation and overwhelming disapproval of Congress's performance, meted out precious little punishment. We might be tempted to conclude that majorities in the House and Senate did not worry about the electoral consequences of supporting the deficit reduction bill (rightly, as it turned out), and voters did not bother to express their anger with it at the polls.

On a closer inspection, of course, neither conclusion holds up. Congressional action to rein in the deficit was permeated by electoral considerations, and budget politics had a major impact on voting in the election. Members displayed acute sensitivity to the electoral implications of their actions, which helps to explain why the electorate's wrath, though clearly expressed at the polls, cost only a handful of members their seats. Indeed, the bill passed only because few members faced opponents who posed a serious electoral threat; most were in a position to absorb the anticipated political damage without risking their careers.

The events of October and November 1990 offer unusual insight into the complex linkages between electoral and legislative politics. The research reported in this article is designed to take advantage of the unique opportunity these events present for enriching our understanding of budget politics and the electoral connection.

The Electoral Connection

In the domain of policy, discussions of the electoral connection commonly focus on how electoral considerations shape the policy choices of individual members of Congress and how in turn the policy choices of individual members affect their electoral support. This, as R. Douglas Arnold points out, by no means exhausts the possible linkages. Arnold distinguishes four decision rules that congressional voters might use in responding to policy issues, depending on the basis of choice (policy positions or policy effects) and the object of choice (parties or candidates). Voters may decide on the basis of the parties' positions on policy issues; the candidates' positions on policy issues; the governing party's (that is, the president's party's) performance in office; or the incumbent's performance in office.[3] As we shall see, the

[3] R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 37–57.

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events of 1990 require that we add a fifth potential decision rule to Arnold's list: Voters may also use an institutional performance rule, voting for or (more to the point for 1990) against individual incumbents on the basis of their evaluation of Congress's performance.

Members of Congress may find reason to adjust their behavior on account of any or all of these potential decision rules when making policy choices. They are, to be sure, most sensitive to choices that might affect voters' ratings of their own performance, not only because their personal standing with constituents is crucial to survival in a predominantly candidate-centered electoral process, but also because it is the only part of the action fully under their control. But because voters' decisions may also be influenced by the issue positions associated with parties and by assessments of the president's performance on policy issues, members of Congress have reason to consider how their actions might affect these things as well. All else equal, they prefer to do things that make their party and their leaders look good and to avoid doing things that have the opposite effect. Similarly, it may serve their electoral interests to embarrass the other party and its leaders.

Naturally, members are happiest when they can adopt positions on issues that enhance their own and their party's standing simultaneously, especially if the other party is thereby put at a disadvantage. The tough choices come when alternative electoral considerations pull in opposite directions. For reasons inherent in the politics of budgets and deficits during the Reagan-Bush years, the various collective components of the electoral connection assumed a far larger role in budget politics in 1990 than is probably typical. This is one reason why the case rewards close scrutiny.

The Electoral Origins of the Deficit Issue

The first step in understanding how electoral politics shaped the battle to tame the deficit monster in 1990 is to recognize that the monster is itself a creature of electoral politics. During the 1980 campaign, Republicans discovered the political magic of the supply-side economics. The magic lay in its claim that the government could reduce taxes without reducing spending or adding to deficits, because lower taxes would stimulate so much economic growth that revenues would not decline. Republicans could thus promise to reduce taxes without having to concede that programs would also have to be slashed or red ink would flow.

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Upon taking office, the Reagan administration duly proposed large supply-side tax cuts. Congressional Democrats quickly surrendered to the political appeal of reducing taxes and even sought to outbid the administration by offering additional tax breaks. The administration also attracted enough Democratic votes to impose cuts in domestic social programs to go along with the tax cuts in 1981, but these reductions were more than offset by increases in defense spending. When a sharp recession hit in 1982 and the supply-side dividend fell short of optimistic projections, large budget deficits began to accumulate. Faced with growing economic distress, Congress resisted further reductions in domestic spending. The recession also emboldened Democrats to attack the equity and efficacy of Republican economic policies, and this became the main theme of their 1982 congressional campaigns. The 1982 election enlarged the Democratic House majority by twenty-six seats, stiffening congressional opposition to further domestic cutbacks.

The experience of the early 1980s taught Republicans that opposition to taxes was good politics, but attacking popular domestic programs was not. Democrats learned that most large domestic programs were indeed popular, but people did not like paying for them. In ensuing campaigns, voters were thus offered the opportunity to declare themselves simultaneously for both low taxes and generous domestic spending. They could and did elect Republican presidents on a promise of "no new taxes" and Democratic majorities in Congress committed to maintaining or increasing their favorite domestic programs.[4] Neither side was candid about the price. Republicans insisted that economic growth would provide sufficient revenues to maintain popular government programs and shrink the deficit without additional taxes. And, taking Walter Mondale's fate in 1984 as an object lesson, Democrats continued to champion popular domestic programs and initiatives without mentioning that the money to finance them would have to be borrowed or raised through higher taxes.

Budget action faithful to these electoral stances guaranteed continued deficits. Republican administrations accepted large deficits rather than raise taxes to pay for government programs that Democratic Congresses refused to cut; and Democratic Congresses accepted large deficits rather than reduce government programs when Repub-

[4] Gary C. Jacobson, *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 106–119.

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lican presidents refused to initiate tax increases to pay for them. There is nothing mysterious about the continuing budget deficits; they were the product of a compelling political logic and were the predictable outcome of conflicting party preferences under divided partisan control of the federal government.[5] But the deficits also became a major political headache, in part because the mythical analogy to the family budget remains strong in the popular imagination and in part because most informed observers regarded the growing mountain of government debt as a serious threat to the economy's long-term vitality. Persistent deficits quickly became Exhibit A in every indictment of national politics and its practitioners.

The principal attempt to cope with the deficit problem politically during the 1980s was embodied in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings scheme enacted in 1985, which required Congress to achieve a balanced budget by meeting a series of progressively lower yearly deficit targets. If Congress and the president did not agree on where to make the required cuts, they were to occur automatically across the board on all programs not explicitly exempted. In effect, Congress tried to force itself and the president to chose between automatic cuts certain to be painful to important constituencies and making hard but more considered choices on programs and revenues themselves. The political logic of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is transparent: instead of having to go on record as voting for cuts in specific programs, members of Congress could support deficit reduction in general while taking credit for fighting to prevent cuts that would otherwise occur automatically.

The initial deadline for reaching a balanced budget was 1991. When Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was revised in 1987, the deadline was extended to 1993. Each year it became more difficult to reach the deficit targets, as the easy moves—changes in accounting procedures and other tricks commonly dismissed as blue smoke and mirrors—were exhausted. Both the Democratic Congress and the Republican White House remained strongly disposed to resist spending cuts or tax increases that would impose immediate and palpable costs on their core constituencies to achieve the more indirect and distant benefits of a smaller deficit. As long as both sides saw smaller political damage in deficits than in what they would have to give up to cut a deal, no

[5] Mathew McCubbins, "Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits under Divided Government" in Samuel Kernell and Gary W. Cox, eds., *The Politics of Divided Government* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 138–141.

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solution was possible, and most of the maneuvering went into avoiding partisan blame for failure to reach agreement.

This last observation underlines the central point of the narration thus far: both sides displayed acute concern for their party's image on budget issues – in Arnold's terms, voters' perceptions of their party's position. The reasons are obvious. Republicans had made opposition to taxes the centerpiece of their strategy for becoming the majority party. Democrats sought to avoid the tax-and-spend brand while burnishing their image as defenders of education, the environment, old people, poor people, farmers, working people, and so on. But some members on both sides also wanted their party to assume the mantle of fiscal responsibility. And Republicans had an additional concern: perceptions of their party's position and performance would be shaped largely by what the Republican president was able to accomplish. To be sure, members still had to look out for their own reputations on budget issues – hence, for instance, the overwhelming support for Gramm-Rudman-Hollings once the bill became a test of fiscal responsibility. But they also recognized an important individual stake in their party's collective image on budget issues.

This put all participants in a serious bind when leaders on both sides finally decided that large, permanent deficits were too destructive economically (and, eventually, politically) to be tolerated further. The only feasible outcome was a compromise that included both spending cuts and tax increases. But such a compromise required that both parties betray campaign promises made to their core supporters, abandoning positions that were central to the images they sought to project. It also meant that many individual members of Congress would be pressed to betray their own personal campaign promises. If either side balked, however, it could be branded as irresponsible and unfit to govern. Failure to do something about the deficit after it had become the dominant domestic political issue could damage everyone, especially if the draconian automatic cuts mandated by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings were allowed to take effect.

There is more than a touch of poetic justice in this turn of events. Republican presidents and congressional Democrats prospered politically during the 1980s by pandering to their respective constituencies, promising something for nothing, benefits and programs without the taxes to pay for them. When leaders of both parties finally felt compelled to take on the deficit, they found themselves menaced by the political wrath of an indignant public that they had left quite unprepared to face fiscal reality.

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Budget Action in 1990

In May 1990, President Bush sought to break the budget stalemate by inviting congressional leaders to a budget summit with no preconditions, implying that tax increases were on the table. Democratic negotiators, however, feared a trap, and little progress was made until the president explicitly agreed that tax revenue increases would be part of the package. After much additional haggling, the negotiators cut a deal to reduce the projected deficit by nearly $500 billion over the next five years through a combination of tax and fee increases and caps on benefits. Both the unedifying process (which included months of unproductive closed-door negotiation, numerous leaks, trial balloons, false starts, and a brief shutdown of some federal agencies when a deadline was not met) and the product (an agreement that raised taxes and cut back on some popular social programs) angered large segments of the public.

The politically painful compromise was not reached easily. The initial package, negotiated in secret between the White House and Democratic congressional leaders, was rejected by majorities on both sides of the aisle. Many members were angry at having been left out of the process, but what really killed the bill was its content. The attempt to find a middle way out of the impasse alienated majorities on both ends of the ideological spectrum. Conservative Republicans refused to join Bush in breaking the talismanic pledge of no new taxes. Liberal Democrats, who objected to its regressive taxes on alcohol, gasoline, and tobacco and its cuts in Medicare, felt free to vote down the package once Republican leaders had failed to deliver their promised majority. (Part of the deal had been that leaders on both sides would deliver majorities for the bill so that blame for the pain would be bipartisan.)

Opposition to the bill was solidified by its manifest unpopularity. President Bush went public with a televised appeal for citizens to lobby their representatives to support the package, but this only stimulated more opposition. The more people learned about the bill, the less they liked it.

Members who faced an appreciable electoral risk in 1990 were especially sensitive to the package's liabilities. A moment of introspection told them how their challengers would handle the issue. The advantage to be taken from attacking a package that satisfied no one was too obvious to ignore; every challenger could claim to favor a better combination of elements, with "better" defined in whatever terms would sell locally. As Vic Fazio, a House Democrat, put it, "most challengers

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TABLE 1

Electoral Risk and House Voting on the Fiscal 1991 Budget Resolution: Conference Report (H Con Res 310, 5 October 1990)

Electoral Risk	*Probability of Voting for H Con Res 310*
Seeking higher office	.16
"Tossup" or "Leaning"	.14
"Favored"	.41
"Safe"	.58
Unopposed	.69
Retiring	.94

Source: Estimated from the probit equation in Table A1 of the Appendix.

will simply bash the institution. If they're conservative they'll talk about no new taxes and if they're liberals they'll talk about no cuts in popular programs."[6] In other words, challengers were free to pander as usual, and they did. A survey conducted by *Congressional Quarterly* found every challenger save one opposed the initial deficit-reduction legislation.[7]

Voting on the First Budget Proposal

Only House members voted on the first deficit reduction proposal; senators were excused from taking a stand when it failed to pass in the House. Representatives plainly concluded that supporting the bill was politically dangerous and acted accordingly. Other things equal, the greater electoral risk they faced, the less likely they were to vote for it. This is clear from the entries in Table 1, which lists a representative's estimated probability of voting for the bill (designated H Con Res 310) according to the level of risk faced, taking party and ideology into account.[8] The measure of electoral risk is taken from *Congressional Quarterly*'s classification published in October; *CQ*'s "tossup" and "leaning" categories are combined because of the small number of cases involved. I also separated unopposed incumbents from those also considered "safe" but who did have a major-party challenger.[9]

[6] Robin Toner, "In Budget Chaos, Democrats See Chance of 'Normal' Off-Year Victory," *New York Times*, 14 October 1990.

[7] Janet Hook, "Budget Ordeal Poses Question: Why Can't Congress Be Led?" *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 20 October 1990, 3473.

[8] These estimates were computed from the probit equation in Table A1 of the Appendix.

[9] "1990 Candidates for Senate and House," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 13 October 1990, 3359–3371.

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FIGURE 1

Ideology and the Vote for Deficit-Reduction Legislation in the House



Source: Probit Equation in Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix.

Clearly, electoral risk had a major effect on the probability that a member would support either proposal. Other things being equal, those House members most at risk (those seeking higher office or in the tightest House races) were least likely to vote for the bill, while those facing no electoral risk at all (because they were retiring) were most likely to vote for it.[10] Probabilities across the other categories arrange themselves as we would expect. The differences are remarkably large, with values ranging from .14 to .94 across the risk categories.

The vote on the first budget package was also influenced by ideology, but not, independently, by partisanship. Support was heaviest among moderates and thinnest among the ideological extremists in each party. This is apparent from Figure 1, which shows how the expected probability of voting for deficit reduction varies over the ideological spectrum (with other variables in the model set at their means). Insofar

[10] Other plausible measures of electoral risk—the incumbent's vote margin in 1988, the amount of money raised and spent by the challenger—support the same substantive conclusions.

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TABLE 2

Electoral Risk and House Voting on the Fiscal 1991 Budget Reconciliation Act/Conference Report (HR 5835, 27 October 1990)

	Probability of Voting for HR 5835	
Electoral Risk	*Democrats*	*Republicans*
Seeking higher office	.44	.27
"Tossup" or "Leaning"	.42	.25
"Favored"	.52	.34
"Safe"	.72	.55
Unopposed	.76	.59
Retiring	.95	.89

Source: Estimated from the probit equation in Table A2 of the Appendix.

as ideological stances embody explicit or implicit promises to voters, ideological voting is itself a manifestation of the electoral connection.

The bill's failure sent the negotiators back to work following a brief shutdown of the government after Bush vetoed a continuing resolution meant to keep things going while negotiations continued. A period of confusion ensued, fed by the president's indecision about what tax increases he would accept as part of a revised package; by one count Bush took six positions in four days.[11] The debate allowed Democrats to resurrect the fairness issue by charging that Bush and his party were not opposed to new taxes, but merely to new taxes on the very rich. Boxed into this losing position, the Republican administration capitulated. The final outcome was a deficit reduction package far more congenial to Democrats than the initial proposal, and it represented a clear political defeat for the president.[12]

Voting on the Second Budget Proposal

The Democrats' victory was reflected in congressional voting on the legislation. The House vote on the second budget package (HR 5835) was partisan. But again, level of electoral risk was strongly related to support for the bill by members of both parties (see Table 2). Opposition to the second package also increased with conservatism; the slight

[11] Christopher Matthews, "Bush, GOP in Vulnerable Position for Midterm Vote," *San Francisco Examiner*, 14 October 1990.

[12] George Hager, "Deficit Deal Ever So Fragile As Hours Dwindle Away," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 27 October 1990, 3575.

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decline in support among the most liberal members (see Figure 1) reflects the Black Caucus's protest vote against the bill in retaliation for Bush's veto of a civil rights bill.[13]

Electoral considerations were even more important in shaping senators' votes on the second package. Senators up for reelection in 1990 were less likely to vote for the bill than those whose terms were not up, though the difference is not great (46.7 percent compared to 61.5 percent). Far more striking electoral effects appear *within* these two categories.

Senators facing reelection divided sharply on the budget vote according to the magnitude of the threat represented by their opposition, as Table 3 demonstrates. The table lists these senators in ascending order of their opponent's campaign expenditures (in dollars per voting-age individual in the state). Only one of the thirteen senators whose opponents spent less than 5.8 cents per voting-age citizen voted against the bill; only two of the remaining nineteen senators whose opponents spent more than this amount voted for the bill. These two exceptions prove the rule. One of them, Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota, was the only senator to lose in 1990. The other, Daniel Akaka of Hawaii, was free to vote for the bill because his opponent, Representative Patricia Saiki, had voted for it in the House eleven hours earlier.

No consideration other than electoral risk appears to have entered their calculus. A quick review of the list confirms that neither ideology nor partisanship divided this set of senators; Jay Rockefeller and Strom Thurmond voted for the bill; Tom Harkin and Jesse Helms voted against it.[14]

This is decidedly not the case for senators whose seats were not at stake in 1990. Ideology had a strong effect on their votes. More conservative members were more likely to oppose the bill. Curiously, although Democrats were more inclined to vote for the bill than were Republicans (76.3 percent to 40.7 percent), once ideology is taken into account, Democrats were actually less likely to support the bill.

More significant for our purposes, however, is evidence that electoral considerations influenced even those senators who did not face reelection in 1990. Respondents in the 1990 Senate Election Study were asked to rate senators not up for election on the 100-point "feeling

[13] *Ibid.*, 3574.

[14] On the other hand, ideology appears to have determined the votes of the three retiring senators, all of whom were conservative Republicans and all of whom voted against the bill.

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TABLE 3

Challengers' Spending and Senate Voting on the Fiscal 1991 Budget Reconciliation Act/Conference Report (HR 5835, 27 October 1990)

Member	*Party*	*Challenger's Spending*	*Vote on HR 5835*
D. Pryor	Dem.	.000*	for
T. Cochran	Rep.	.000*	for
J. Warner	Rep.	.000*	for
S. Nunn	Dem.	.000*	for
B. Johnston	Dem.	.000*	against
T. Stevens	Rep.	.001	for
A. Gore	Dem.	.002	for
S. Thurmond	Rep.	.003	for
N. Kassebaum	Rep.	.009	for
J. Rockefeller	Dem.	.015	for
A. Simpson	Rep.	.017	for
P. Domenici	Rep.	.037	for
D. Boren	Dem.	.058	for
B. Bradley	Dem.	.138	against
P. Gramm	Rep.	.141	against
D. Coats	Rep.	.267	against
S. Levin	Dem.	.365	against
R. Boschwitz	Rep.	.433	for
J. Biden	Dem.	.513	against
P. Simon	Dem.	.580	against
H. Heflin	Dem.	.629	against
M. Hatfield	Rep.	.734	(absent)
M. McConnell	Rep.	1.073	against
J. Kerry	Dem.	1.144	against
J. Exon	Dem.	1.234	against
M. Baucus	Dem.	1.257	against
J. Helms	Rep.	1.645	against
W. Cohen	Rep.	1.866	against
T. Harkin	Dem.	2.392	against
L. Pressler	Rep.	2.600	against
C. Pell	Dem.	2.743	against
D. Akaka	Dem.	3.068	for

Note: The challenger's spending is in dollars per voting age individual in the state.

Sources: Vote on HR 5835: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 3 November 1990, 3769; Challenger's spending: Federal Election Commission, "1990 Congressional Election Spending Drops to Low Point," news release, 22 February 1991.

* Unopposed in the general election.

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FIGURE 2

Popularity and the Vote for Deficit-Reduction Legislation in the Senate
(Senators Not Up for Re-election in 1990)



Source: Probit Equation in Table A3 of the Appendix.

thermometer" scale.[15] The mean thermometer rating gives us a serviceable measure of each senator's current level of popularity in the state; the means ranged from 38 to 78, with a grand mean of 61. This measure was strongly related to the budget vote (see the equation in Table A3 of the Appendix); Figure 2 illustrates its effect on the probability of voting for the bill (with other variables in the model set at their means).

Using the thermometer rating as an independent variable raises the question of causation, because the rating was given after the election and hence after the senator voted on the budget. It might be argued that the budget vote affected the thermometer rating rather than the reverse. But the bill itself was opposed 3–1 by respondents in the 1990

[15] Warren E. Miller, Donald R. Kinder, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies, *American National Election Study, 1990: Senate Election Study* [computer file] (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer], 1991. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]), variables 2187 and 2188.

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Post-Election Study, and large majorities in both the Post-Election Study and the Senate Election Study opposed raising taxes to reduce the deficit.[16] So it is most unlikely that voting for the bill would have produced higher ratings for senators.

A much more plausible interpretation is that stronger support back home made it easier for senators to vote for an unpopular bill; senators viewed more critically by their constituents were less inclined to risk casting an unpopular vote. Support for the bill was negatively related to the per capita tax burden borne by citizens of a state, indicating that senators representing taxpayers already facing large tax burdens were more reluctant to go on record for increasing them (see Table A3). Here is intriguing evidence that prospective electoral considerations may shape decisions even when election day is two or more years away. Nonetheless, the protection afforded two-thirds of the senators by the six-year term was essential to the bill's passage, for it was opposed by a majority of members seeking reelection in 1990.

In sum, electoral expectations strongly shaped the budget votes of both senators and representatives. They clearly recognized that raising taxes and cutting benefits would be unpopular, and so action to reduce the deficit depended on the votes of those members who were sufficiently secure to absorb some political damage without risking their seats. The deficit reduction bill was passed with the votes of members in both houses who faced no serious, immediate electoral threat.

The Public Responds

Members of Congress were well advised to fear the public's reaction to having taxes increased and benefits reduced. Polls taken at the time indicate that the events of October were politically damaging to all involved. Both the president and Congress immediately suffered a serious loss of public esteem. Bush's approval ratings, already sliding from the high level stimulated by his response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (76 percent approving in a late September Gallup Poll) dropped

[16] Ibid., variables 735 and 1019; Warren E. Miller, Donald R. Kinder, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies, 1991a, *American National Election Study, 1990: Post-Election Survey [CPS Early Release Version]* [computer file] (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer], 1991. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]), variable 499. See Gary Jacobson, "Deficit Politics and the 1990 Elections" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 3-6 September 1992), tab. 5.

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sharply. The proportion of Americans approving his job performance fell from 66 percent to 54 percent between early and late October Gallup surveys, and other national polls showed nearly identical declines.[17] Reviews of Bush's budget performance were decisively negative: 64 percent of the respondents in the 28–31 October *New York Times*/CBS News Poll disapproved of his handling of the budget; only 27 percent approved.[18]

The president suffered further embarrassment when the press got hold of a memo written by Edward Rollins, cochair of the National Republican Congressional Committee, advising Republicans to run against the White House's position on the budget. Rollins justified his action by arguing that "my job today is to help House Republicans survive and help other Republican candidates. I have to give the best political advice I can and in this case, it is to run away from the budget package."[19]

They could run, but they could not hide. Republican pollsters reported the "bottom dropping out" in late October.[20] Questioned in August on their intended House vote, *New York Times*/CBS News Poll respondents favored Republican candidates over Democrats 41 percent to 37 percent; by the late October poll, Republicans had fallen behind 38 percent to 45 percent.[21] Though most congressional Republicans opposed the budget package, opposition could not insulate them from the political heat it generated.

The president did not get all the blame, to be sure. The public's view of Congress was even more negative. A *Wall Street Journal*/NBC poll reported that 71 percent of respondents disapproved of Congress's handling of the budget, and two separate polls taken in late October found only 23 percent approving Congress's overall performance.[22] As usual, individual members were rated much higher than the Congress, but even their level of approval was by some accounts abnormally low. The *New York Times*/CBS News survey found only 51 percent approving of their own representative's performance, with 30

[17] Karlyn Keene and Everett Carll Ladd, "Public Opinion and Demographic Report," *The American Enterprise* 2 (January/February, 1991): 96.

[18] *New York Times*/CBS News Poll, Second October Survey, 28–31 October 1990, 6.

[19] Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Mounts Effort to Quell G.O.P. Rebellion Over Taxes," *New York Times*, 26 October 1990.

[20] R. W. Apple, Jr., "Government Itself Is the Big Casualty," *New York Times*, 25 October 1990.

[21] *New York Times*/CBS News Poll, Second October Survey, 28–31 October 1990, 8.

[22] Janet Hook, "The Public's Patience Wears Thin As Congress Winds Down," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 27 October 1990, 3569; Keene and Ladd, "Report," 84.

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percent disapproving; two months earlier, the respective figures were 60 percent and 21 percent, with 40 percent also approving of Congress's performance.[23] The parallel decline in popular approval of the institution and its members is consistent with Richard Born's demonstration that evaluations of Congress strongly affect evaluations of its members, though the latter maintain a much higher average level of approval.[24]

Election Day

The electorate's wrath at elected officials (especially Republicans) was also clearly visible in the aggregate vote cast on election day. The average vote for House incumbents was 3.9 percentage points lower than it had been in 1988, reaching its lowest level—64.5 percent—since 1974. Almost three-quarters of the House incumbents who were not freshmen won a smaller share of the votes in 1990 than they had in 1988. This is the highest proportion of such incumbents suffering a decline in support in any postwar election and is more than three standard deviations beyond the mean for the period.

Most striking, though, for the first time in any postwar election the mean vote for incumbents of *both* parties fell. Normally, the aggregate House vote reflects a national partisan tide. The average vote for one party's incumbents increases; the average vote for the other party's incumbents decreases. Before 1990, this pattern was broken only twice in postwar elections—1968 and 1988—when incumbents of both parties increased their average vote. Uniquely in 1990, the swing against incumbents exceeded the partisan swing, so both parties' incumbents typically lost support.

An anti-Republican tide was also evident in the aggregate House vote. The average Republican incumbent's vote fell more (−3.7 points) than that of the average Democratic incumbent (−2.0 points).[25] But the clearest sign of the anti-Republican trend showed up in open seats, where Republicans lost 6 of the 17 seats they were defending, while taking none of the 12 seats held by Democrats. Republican officials

[23] *New York Times*/CBS News Poll, Second October Survey, 28–31 October 1990, 6.

[24] Richard Born, "The Shared Fortunes of Congress and Congressmen: Members May Run, But They Can't Hide," *Journal of Politics* 52 (November 1990): 1230–1235.

[25] Based on incumbents who ran and faced major party opposition in both elections. Comparing averages for all opposed incumbents in both elections, Democrats were down −3.1 percentage points; Republicans, down −5.6 percentage points.

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tried to claim a victory of sorts by pointing out that their party's loss of seats in the House was well below the midterm average for the president's party (26 in elections since 1946); but Republicans went into the election with the smallest share of seats ever held by a president's party at the midterm. In fact, Republicans entered the 102nd Congress in 1991 with precisely the same number of House seats they had held after losing 26 seats in 1982 (167 seats, 38.4 percent of the total, after Phil Gramm had switched parties) and with their smallest Senate contingent (44) in a decade.

The anti-incumbent and anti-Republican trends are more difficult to discern in the 1990 Senate elections, yet traces of both appear in Senate voting as well. The net outcome—one incumbent defeated, a single seat changing party control—represents the smallest change since senators have been elected directly by voters. This result is all the more remarkable because Senate incumbents have been on average three times as vulnerable as House incumbents over the past half-century and because both parties are now competitive in virtually every state.[26] Moreover, in contrast to other recent Senate elections, 1990 produced relatively few close contests. Only 4 seats were won with less than 53 percent of the two-party vote, and 22 of the 35 winners received more than 60 percent.

Some signs of the national trends identified in the House elections nonetheless surfaced. Minnesota Senator Rudy Boschwitz's defeat at the hands of Paul Wellstone, a political novice who spent only $1.3 million against Boschwitz's $6.2 million, was a surprise. So was New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley's narrow victory despite an ever greater spending advantage ($9.5 million to $801,660). In both cases, many voters appeared to be venting their disgust with other politicians and with politics in general on the most available target, a complacent incumbent.[27]

The trend against Republicans is also evident—in what the party did not achieve. Republicans had hoped to make inroads into the Democratic majority, positioning themselves to retake the Senate in 1992, when the Democrats would have to defend twenty seats. Five

[26] Thirty-two states have chosen senators from both parties in elections since 1978, and all but one of the remaining states—Hawaii—have elected governors of the party opposite their senators' during this time.

[27] Bob Benenson, "Republicans' Net Loss: One Seat and Many Expectations," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10 November 1990, 3824–3825; New Jersey voters evidently turned on Bradley in part because a Democratic administration had raised state taxes.

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Republican House members gave up safe seats to run against Senate Democrats thought to be vulnerable; all of them lost, and three of their House seats were taken over by Democrats. As members of the House, they were, of course, unable to derive much benefit from whatever anti-incumbent sentiment prevailed in their states. The average Republican incumbent's vote fell by 6.2 percentage points compared to 1984, while the average Democrat's vote increased by 3.7 percentage points; but keep in mind that 1984 had been a rather good Republican year.

Considering the aggregate results, it appears that voters angered by the budget battles and their resolution did desert incumbents in general and Republicans in particular, especially in House elections. On the other hand, the average vote loss was not by itself large enough to defeat more than a few incumbents. The incidence of victory or defeat depended on how the vote loss was distributed, leading to some obvious questions: Did voters discriminate? Did a vote for the deficit reduction package cost additional votes on election day? Were members in danger able to protect themselves by voting against the unpopular measure? These questions are not easily answered, because voting on deficit reduction legislation was so strongly conditioned by electoral expectations. Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests that some voters did discriminate, although only among Democratic House incumbents and only under certain conditions—those under which these members were least likely to take the unpopular stance. Republicans suffered the same negative consequences regardless of how they voted.

Voting in House Elections

Did voting for the deficit reduction bill reduce a representative's vote on election day? Regression analysis suggests that it did, but only among Democrats and only to the degree that the challenger had the resources to exploit the issue. Table 4 displays the estimated effects of the budget vote at several levels of challenger spending on the vote for incumbents of each party.[28] These results suggest that voting for the bill cost Democratic incumbents support, but only to the extent that the Republican challenger had the money to exploit the issue. Another way of putting it is that the impact of the Republican chal-

[28] Calculated from the regression equation reported in Table 4A of the Appendix; the estimates are computed with the incumbent's previous vote set at 60 percent.

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TABLE 4

Estimated Effects of the Incumbent's Position on HR 5835 and the Challenger's Spending on the House Incumbent's Vote Share in 1990

	Vote on HR 5835					
	Democrats			*Republicans*		
	For	*Against*	*Difference*	*For*	*Against*	*Difference*
Challenger's Spending						
$10,000	64.3	63.9	.4	64.9	64.6	.4
$100,000	58.9	61.3	−2.6	57.6	58.5	−.9
$250,000	56.8	60.4	−3.6	54.7	56.0	−1.3
$500,000	55.1	59.6	−4.5	52.5	54.2	−1.7
Difference between						
$10,000 and $500,000	−9.2	−3.3		−12.4	−10.1	

Note: Entries are the percent of the two-party vote the incumbent is predicted to win, estimated from the third and fourth equations in Table A4 of the Appendix.

lenger's expenditures more than doubled if the Democrat created an exploitable issue by voting for the bill. Republican incumbents suffered generally no matter how they voted (see the first two equations in Table 4A), with the extent of their problems varying strongly with the Democratic challengers' campaign expenditures either way. Despite running away from Bush on the issue (three-quarters of them voted against the second package) House Republicans evidently could not escape guilt by association when the president betrayed his no-new-taxes pledge.

Survey data reinforce both of these conclusions. The 1990 Post-Election Study asked respondents if they approved or disapproved of the deficit reduction package. We can thus determine whether the respondent agreed or disagreed with the incumbent's vote. Analysis of the data shows that agreement or disagreement was significantly related to the individual vote for House candidates only in cases where the incumbent voted for the bill and the respondent could spontaneously recall the name of the challenger; and only a tiny proportion of respondents (3.7 percent of the self-reported voters) fall into this category. Furthermore, when Democrats and Republicans are treated separately (in cases where the incumbent voted for the bill and the respondent recalled the challenger's name), agreement or disagreement had a very strong effect on voting for the Democratic incumbent (91.4 percent if in agreement, 26.2 percent if not), but not on voting for the Republican.[29]

[29] These latter figures are from data in the 1990 Senate Election Study, which requires a more indirect measure of agreement: whether the respondent approved or disapproved of raising taxes

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Thus we find that only Democratic incumbents who voted for the deficit reduction bill were rewarded or punished for their vote, and only by voters who were able to recall the challenger's name (and thus could be expected to have comparatively high levels of information on other aspects of the House campaign). But, as we would surmise from our earlier analysis of electoral risk, where campaigns were vigorous enough to etch the Republican challenger's name in voters' memories, Democrats were much less likely to have voted for the bill. In the 224 Democratic districts where the Republican challenger spent less than $300,000, only 5 percent of the respondents could recall the challenger's name; in the 23 districts where the challenger's spending exceeded this threshold, 40 percent could do so. Seventy-three percent of the Democratic districts with low spending challengers voted for HR 5853, compared to 44 percent in those with high spending challengers. When faced by an opponent capable of exploiting the budget issue in the election, Democratic incumbents were much less likely to leave themselves vulnerable. For this reason, although the deficit reduction vote cost individual House Democrats some votes, it rarely cost them their seats.[30]

The individual vote for House Republicans was not related to their vote on the budget. It was, however, related to the respondent's approval of George Bush's performance as president. The Post-Election Survey asked whether voters approved or disapproved of Bush's handling of the economy, foreign policy, the environment, and the situation in the Persian Gulf as well as his overall performance in office. The president was rated lowest on his handling of the economy (40 percent approving, 53 percent disapproving), and this rating was most strongly related to the House vote in Republican districts. Furthermore, ratings of Bush's economic performance were strongly conditioned by budget politics as well as by respondents' economic experiences and perceptions. People who disapproved of the budget deal were significantly more likely to disapprove of Bush's economic performance. Respondents who considered the deficit or taxes to be the most important issue in the election (14 percent of the sample) were also much less likely to approve of the president's handling of the economy.[31]

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to reduce the deficit and whether the House incumbent voted for the bill. See Jacobson, "Deficit Politics," tab. 7.

[30] Ibid., tab. 8.

[31] Ibid., tab. 9

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Thus the damage the president suffered in his performance ratings, especially on the economy, cost Republican incumbents votes, and it cost them votes whether they ran from the president's package (as Rollins had recommended) or not. Evaluations of Bush's handling of the economy had no significant effect on the vote for House Democrats.

Senate Elections

The budget vote in the Senate was so completely determined by electoral conditions (recall Table 3) that it is futile to try to measure its effect on the aggregate vote with available data. Survey data provide some evidence that voting for the bill cost a senator votes on election day, but the results are highly sensitive to the circumstance that Rudy Boschwitz underestimated the threat he faced and voted for the bill. Taking the challenger's level of spending into account, voters had a significantly lower probability of voting for a Senate incumbent who voted for the deficit reduction package. But when Minnesota respondents are removed from the data set, the effect of the budget vote shrinks to insignificance. The most plausible interpretation of these results is that with the exception of Boschwitz any senator with sufficiently active opposition to suffer any appreciable damage from voting for the bill did not vote for it.[32]

The budget issue had an impact on the Senate vote independent of the behavior of individual senators. Respondents' views on "which party worked hardest to produce a fair solution to reducing the deficit" were strongly related to the vote (even with party identification controlled); and respondents who mentioned the deficit or taxes as the most important national issue were less inclined to vote for the incumbent. In an equivalent equation for House voters, the party performance variable was significantly related to the House vote, but identifying the budget as the most important national issue was not. Some voters in both kinds of contests were evidently guided by Arnold's "party performance" criterion on the deficit issue. Both the aggregate and survey evidence show that Republican Senate incumbents were at a general disadvantage in 1990. Again, it appears that Republicans were hurt by the events of October regardless of their personal responsibility for them.[33]

[32] Ibid., tab. 10.
[33] Ibid.

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Constituents' views of senators not up for election may also have been influenced by the vote on the second deficit reduction package. Because the more popular senators were more inclined to vote for the bill, the mean thermometer rating for senators not facing reelection was significantly higher (by about 5 degrees) among those who voted for the bill. But in rating senators who voted for the budget package, those respondents who strongly favored raising taxes to reduce the deficit rated the senator about 5 degrees higher than those who strongly opposed doing so. In rating senators who voted against the package, the order was reversed; respondents who strongly favored raising taxes to reduce the deficit rated the senator about 5 degrees lower than those who strongly opposed doing so. In both cases, the differences are statistically significant.[34]

The Outcome

Despite the abundant evidence of anti-incumbent sentiment, few incumbents actually lost. Part of the reason is that most of the vulnerable incumbents—those with formidable opponents—voted against the bill, so it could not be used against them personally. Equally important, however, was the fact that so few members faced opponents who were capable of exploiting the opportunity that deficit-reduction politics had handed them by raising public ire at incumbents as a class.

In general, incumbents lose only with the confluence of an issue giving voters a good reason to desert the incumbent, an acceptable replacement, and enough money to acquaint voters with both. Each component is necessary; none is sufficient by itself. Without exploitable issues, even experienced, well-financed challengers can expect to make little headway. And, more to the point for 1990, even incumbents vulnerable on the issues are returned to office if they avoid a challenger with the skill, appeal, and resources to exploit their vulnerability.

Deficit reduction politics had produced issues that offered considerable leverage against incumbents of both parties, but remarkably few incumbents faced challengers capable of exploiting them. Eighty-four House incumbents had no major-party opponent at all; five senators were also unopposed in the general election. The number of uncon-

[34] I derived these estimates by regressing the thermometer rating of senator in each category on party identification, how well the respondent thought the senator kept in touch with constituents, and the respondent's views on raising taxes to reduce the deficit.

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tested House seats has not been so high since the 1950s, before partisan competition had spread to the South.

Those House incumbents who were opposed faced the weakest collection of challengers in any postwar election. A simple index of a challenger's quality is prior political experience; those challengers who have previously held elective office are classified as high quality challengers; those who have not, are not. Though obviously crude, this measure of quality is strongly related to various indices of electoral success.[35] By this standard, both parties fielded an extraordinarily small number of high-quality challengers in 1990. Only 10 percent of incumbents of either party faced opponents who had ever won any elective office, a proportion falling more than two standard deviations below the postwar mean (compare, for example, 1982, when 40 percent of the Democratic challengers had held elective office). Not surprisingly, little money flowed into the coffers of such an unpromising lot; they raised and spent less in real terms than any class of challengers since 1974.[36]

More than a few postelection analysts argued that the 1990 election underlined the decisive power of incumbency, because so few incumbents were defeated even though the public's disgust with government was at a peak.[37] Measured against the weakness of their opposition, however, the overall performance of House incumbents was unimpressive. A statistical model based on elections from 1972 through 1988 predicts the average challenger in 1990 to win 30.6 percent of the vote, much lower than the 35.5 percent the average challenger actually won.[38] In other words, incumbents did much worse on election day than the quality and vigor of their opposition warranted. A more formidable set of challengers might well have sent a lot more incumbents packing.

Why Were Challenges So Feeble?

What accounts for the extraordinary weakness of both parties' challengers in the 1990 House elections? A good part of the explanation lies in the timing of emerging trends. The events that left voters angry

[35] Jacobson, *Electoral Origins of Divided Government*, 52–57.

[36] Gary C. Jacobson, "The Misallocation of Resources in House Campaigns" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), 121.

[37] Nancy Gibbs, "Keep the Bums In," *Time*, 19 November 1990, 32–34.

[38] Jacobson, "1990 Congressional Elections," 4.

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with the Congress and the president took place late in the election year. National conditions early in the election year, when final decisions about candidacy must be taken, were far less promising to challengers of either party.[39] The prospect of redistricting after 1990 also probably deterred experienced potential challengers of both parties. Why endure the hard work, expense, and risk to one's political future by mounting a full-scale campaign to capture a district that may change drastically or even disappear before 1992? It made more sense to wait a couple of years until the new boundaries were in place and the new districts, along with anticipated retirements, produced a bumper crop of open seats. This kind of thinking would be reinforced by the overblown depictions of the incumbency advantage that now permeate media coverage of congressional elections (and help to make the notion that incumbents are untouchable a self-fulfilling prophecy).

Thus when the public mood turned hostile to officeholders as a class and incumbency itself became a potential liability, relatively few challengers of either party were poised to exploit their windfall. While most House incumbents saw their vote drop, often sharply, only a small number were turned out of office. Most of the House incumbents who did suffer defeat were identified as vulnerable well before the events of the fall and so attracted formidable opposition quite apart from anyone's reading of national trends. Four could be tied directly to the savings-and-loan debacle; three were beset by ethics scandals; several others held marginal seats or had shown other individual signs of vulnerability. Only a couple—Doug Walgren of Pennsylvania and Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin—can be considered surprise victims of anti-incumbent sentiment, though a score of others, most notably Newt Gingrich, the minority whip, had close calls.[40]

Conclusions

Electoral politics had a powerful effect on budget politics in 1990, and budget politics had a powerful effect on voting in the 1990 election, though the ultimate impact on election outcomes was muted by the defensive behavior of those members most at risk and by the absence of effective opposition in so many districts and states.

Members of Congress were acutely conscious of the political risks posed by enacting a highly salient and unpopular piece of legislation

[39] Ibid., 4–6.
[40] Ibid., 6.

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just before the election. But they were able to do so—and by and large get away with it—by engaging in a kind of division of labor. A large majority of members who faced an appreciable electoral threat opposed the legislation and thus could duck personal responsibility for it. Most of those who could hazard the politically dangerous work involved in "making good public policy" did so. Indeed, because the action imposed short-run costs designed to produce long-term benefits, anyone not at risk in 1990 was better off making the hard, unpopular choices now rather than later. Members who faced feeble opposition or did not have to run in 1990 had ample incentive to try to get the issue behind them before their next campaign, when they might not be so fortunate.

Moreover, even those members at electoral risk who opposed the bill may still have benefited politically from its enactment, because all of the alternative outcomes promised to make voters even angrier. The automatic sequestration required by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings would have devastated important government agencies and programs.[41] Failure to do something about the deficit after staking so much on the issue would have opened all sides to charges of cowardice, irresponsibility, and incompetence. The deficit issue had evolved to a stage where every outcome promised to be politically painful. Incumbents who voted against the bill could at least deny personal responsibility for the outcome that did occur. The deficit reduction package, unpopular as it was, may still have minimized the damage for all concerned.

The bill passed because enough senators and representatives felt safe enough to risk voting for it. In the Senate, this was an effect of constitutional design: the winning votes came from senators who were not up for election in 1990. In the House, it was an effect of unusually weak challengers, which reflected in part the timing of budget action. It is axiomatic that raising taxes during an election year is bad electoral politics. But a corollary suggested by 1990 is that if you must raise taxes during an election year, be sure to do it so late that your opposition has no time to mobilize and exploit the issue effectively.

The president was in the same strategic position as members of Congress who faced no serious electoral threat in 1990; it made political sense to take the heat by cutting a deal now in hopes (ultimately dashed) of making life easier for himself in 1992. But it left congressional

[41] Aaron Wildavsky, *The New Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 478–481.

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Republicans to absorb more than their share of the immediate political damage. House Republicans had little opportunity to influence the outcome, and a large majority of them opposed the bill; but voters nonetheless took their anger at the legislation and the Republican president out on them. Indeed, Republicans suffered doubly, when Bush betrayed his no-new-taxes pledge, diminishing his popularity and staining his party's image, and when Democrats were able to resurrect the fairness issue.

The electorate expressed its anger at deficit reduction politics in several ways. There was some electoral penalty for members who voted for the bill, but it was limited largely to House Democrats who faced well financed opponents, and most of them had taken care to vote against the bill. With a few exceptions—four of the six House Democrats who lost had voted for the second package, as had Senator Boschwitz—incumbents ducked individual responsibility for inflicting pain in any circumstance where it might have cost them reelection.

They were less successful in escaping collective responsibility for Congress's actions. The general decline in support for incumbents of both parties is indicative. Divided government diffuses responsibility for unpopular policies, leaving voters bereft of partisan cues for assigning blame. The simplest alternative is to turn on incumbents as a class. The popular enthusiasm for term limits is another expression of this response. Republicans also suffered collectively through guilt by association with the Republican president even though most of them had refused to join his retreat on no new taxes. Voters plainly did enforce collective responsibility in 1990, though the impact of their reaction was muted by the dearth of challengers capable of building on voters' anti-incumbent sentiments. Members of Congress should not count on being so fortunate in the future.

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Appendix

TABLE A1

Probit Estimates of House Voting on the Fiscal 1991 Budget Resolution: Conference Report (H Con Res 310, 5 October 1990)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*t-statistic*
Constant	−1.734***	−3.08
Democrat	−.067	−.30
ACU Rating	.035***	4.14
ACU Rating, squared	−.0004***	−4.52
Electoral risk:		
"Tossup" or "Leaning"	−.071	−.11
"Favored"	.775	1.36
"Safe"	1.203**	2.31
Unopposed	1.477**	2.77
Retiring	2.562***	3.82
Log Likelihood (N = 433)	−260.43	
Percent correctly predicted (null = 58.7)	64.7	

Note: The dependent variable is 1 if the member voted for the bill, 0 if the member voted against the bill; American Conservative Union (ACU) ratings are for 1989; the categories of electoral risk are from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 13 October 1990, 3359–3371; I separated unopposed incumbents from those designated "safe" but who had major-party opponents; the omitted category is "seeking higher office"; "Democrat" is scored 1 if the member is a Democrat, 0 if Republican. The ACU score is entered in quadratic form because the budget package was attacked from both ideological extremes.

** $p < .01$, one-tailed test; *** $p < .001$, one-tailed test.

TABLE A2

Probit Estimates of House Voting on the Fiscal 1991 Budget Reconciliation Act/Conference Report (HR 5835, 27 October 1990)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*t-statistic*
Constant	−.610	−1.22
Democrat	.467*	2.07
ACU Rating	.011	1.18
ACU Rating, squared	−.0003**	−2.87
Electoral risk:		
"Tossup" or "Leaning"	−.028	−.05
"Favored"	.238	.46
"Safe"	.779*	1.70
Unopposed	.881*	1.85
Retiring	1.867***	3.02
Log Likelihood (N = 433)	−229.97	
Percent correctly predicted (null = 53.2)	74.7	

Note: See Table A1.

* $p < .05$, one-tailed test; ** $p < .01$, one-tailed test; *** $p < .001$, one-tailed test.

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TABLE A3

Probit Estimates of Voting by Senators Not up for Reelection on the Fiscal 1991 Budget Reconciliation Act/Conference Report (HR 5835, 27 October 1990)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*t-statistic*
Constant	6.111	1.57
Democrat	−4.575**	−2.80
ACU Rating	−.115***	−3.50
Mean Thermometer Score	.126**	2.65
Tax Burden Per Capita	−.006**	−2.47
Log Likelihood (N = 65)	−16.8	
Percent correctly predicted (null = 61.5)	87.7	

Note: The dependent variable is 1 if the senator voted for the bill, 0 if the senator voted against the bill; "Mean Thermometer Score" and "Tax Burden Per Capita" are from the American National Election Study, 1990: The Senate Election Study, variables 72 and 5487; ACU are the American Conservative Union's ratings for 1989; "Democrat" is scored 1 if the senator is a Democrat, 0 if Republican.

** $p < .01$, one-tailed test; *** $p < .001$, one-tailed test.

TABLE A4

The Effects of the Deficit Reduction Vote on the Incumbent's Vote Share in the 1990 House Elections

	All Candidates (N = 277)		*Democrats (N = 167)*	*Republicans (N = 110)*
Variable	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*
Constant	59.82	56.15***	44.16***	75.41***
	(1.11)	(9.60)	(5.15)	(9.01)
Incumbent's Vote, 1988	.40***	.40***	.50***	.23**
	(8.01)	(8.04)	(7.87)	(2.84)
Democratic incumbent	2.87***	2.79***		
	(3.31)	(3.22)		
Voted for HR 5835	−.99	6.86	11.81*	5.25
	(−1.16)	(1.36)	(1.69)	(.57)
Challenger's spending	−2.26***	−1.91***	−1.11*	−2.67***
	(−8.27)	(−5.49)	(−2.01)	(−6.18)
Challenger's spending X		−.74	−1.24*	−.53
Voted for HR 5835		(−1.58)	(−1.92)	(−.62)
Adjusted R^2	.40	.51	.52	.47

Note: The dependent variable is the incumbent's percentage share of the two-party vote; "Democratic incumbent" is 1 for Democratic incumbents, 0 for Republican incumbents; challenger's spending is the log of expenditures (a minimum $5,000—the reporting threshold—is assumed); t-statistics are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, one-tailed test; ** $p < .01$, one-tailed test; *** $p < .001$, one-tailed test.

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The Hidden Side of the American Welfare State

CHRISTOPHER HOWARD

Students of the American welfare state have regularly invoked comparisons with European welfare states. These comparisons, seldom flattering, have contributed to a portrait that is by now quite familiar to academics and policy makers. The American welfare state is smaller than most of its European counterparts, based on the percentage of gross national product (GNP) devoted to social welfare. It is less inclusive, less generous, and more fragmented. Core social programs generally developed later in the United States and in a few notable cases, like national health insurance, never materialized. On any number of counts, the American welfare state appears exceptional.

Social scientists have been trying to explain the reasons for the peculiar structure and development of the American welfare state for the better part of three decades. The number of explanations offered has been impressive, the intensity of scholarly debate often high. Nevertheless, virtually all of these studies have been hampered by a narrow conception of governmental capacity. By equating the welfare state with direct spending programs like Social Security, scholars have neglected indirect tools of social policy such as loans, loan guarantees, and tax expenditures. This oversight has meant that scholars have

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ignored dozens of indirect spending programs costing hundreds of billions of dollars.[1]

The exclusion of indirect spending is impossible to justify. Every commonly accepted definition of the welfare state makes room for both direct and indirect social spending. It does not matter whether one defines the welfare state as an instrument of social control or social betterment; as a part of the state or a particular stage in the development of capitalist states; as a minimal safety net for those in need, social insurance for the middle classes, or everything the government does to improve the well-being of individuals and families.[2] None of these definitions stipulates how these various goals are to be accomplished or what form these goods and services must take. Scholarly convention, not reality, dictates that we equate the welfare state with direct spending. In fact, governments can and do use a variety of direct and indirect tools for promoting social welfare. Some welfare states, notably the United States, rely heavily on indirect spending, and the vast majority of welfare states rely to some degree on indirect spending.

This article explores the implications of indirect social spending for our understanding of the American welfare state. It is designed to be suggestive and provocative but by no means definitive. It focuses on only one indirect tool, tax expenditures. While tax expenditures are the most important form of indirect social spending in the United States, one can easily imagine parallel studies of loan guarantees for education and housing.[3] In particular, this article indicates how tax expenditures alter the size and structure of the American welfare state, and how they challenge widely held beliefs about the origins of U.S.

[1] This problem is common to comparative policy studies. "Many sophisticated efforts to explain public policy focus far more attention upon the independent variables deemed to cause policy variation than upon the definition and measurement of that which is to be explained." Richard Rose, "Comparative Policy Analysis: The Program Approach" in Mattei Dogan, ed., *Comparing Pluralist Democracies* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 221.

[2] For a good discussion of various definitions of the welfare state and the resulting theoretical muddle, see John Carrier and Ian Kendall, "Categories, Categorizations and the Political Economy of Welfare," *Journal of Social Policy* 15 (July 1986): 315–35; and Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 18–26.

[3] Based on figures supplied by the Congressional Budget Office, I calculate that the subsidy costs of loan and loan guarantee programs with social welfare objectives equalled approximately $8 billion in fiscal year 1990, a small fraction of the cost of tax expenditures. Congressional Budget Office, *Credit Reform: Comparable Budget Costs for Cash and Credit* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1989), 44–45. Still, it is quite possible that loans and loan guarantees have societal impacts that cannot be measured by their subsidy costs alone.

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social programs. If the U.S. case is any indication, modern welfare states are larger and their formation more complex than previously thought.

The first section of this article introduces readers to the concept of tax expenditures and summarizes what little is known about tax expenditures with social welfare objectives in the United States. Although scholars have been aware of the connections between social policy and tax policy for decades, few have chosen to investigate this relationship in any detail. This section is intended to support as expeditiously as possible my claim that indirect social spending is largely unexplored territory.

The second section provides an aerial overview, so to speak, of the "hidden welfare state" of tax expenditures.[4] This broader view of social spending is rather eye-opening. Taking into account conceptual problems of measuring and aggregating tax expenditures, it appears that the true size of the American welfare state is considerably larger than the sum of direct spending programs. The hidden welfare state is roughly one-third to one-half the size of the visible welfare state of direct spending.

Tax expenditures reinforce some beliefs about the structure of the American welfare state and challenge others. On the one hand, once tax expenditures are included, known strengths in retirement security become more pronounced. Programmatic fragmentation appears more pervasive. The distribution of benefits toward the middle- and upper-middle classes is even more exaggerated. On the other hand, perceived gaps in housing and family policy begin to disappear. Agencies thought to be irrelevant to social policy, notably the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service, emerge and take center stage. The two-tiered image of the American welfare state begins to break down.

The third section compares the origins of tax expenditures with the origins of direct spending programs. What is most surprising is the relative ease with which new tax expenditures are enacted relative to new direct spending programs. The United States, previously known for its numerous barriers to welfare state formation, now appears quite receptive to a certain kind of social program. As soon as we see

[4] This phrase is from Jeffrey P. Owens, "Tax Expenditures and Direct Expenditures as Instruments of Social Policy" in Sijbren Cnossen, ed., *Comparative Tax Studies* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1983), 171–97.

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how often new tax expenditures have been created, we become less interested in determining which barriers are decisive. Instead, we start to search for those features of the American polity that create possibilities for programmatic innovation. That search reveals an interesting paradox: some of the key features that inhibit the creation and expansion of traditional social programs unintentionally promote the hidden welfare state.

The most important of these features is Congress, which has typically been portrayed as an impediment to the American welfare state. This barrier results partly from the fragmentation of authority within Congress and partly from the historical prominence of conservative southern Democrats, who often block or dilute social welfare legislation.[5] I plan to argue that Congress has in several respects been better designed to enact new tax expenditures than new direct spending programs, and that the same legislators who have opposed appropriations often have supported tax expenditures. The structure of Congress has also increased the importance of party competition to the hidden welfare state, though party competition is usually considered irrelevant to the development of national social programs in the United States.

While this article focuses principally on the United States, investigation of indirect social spending in other nations could and probably should be undertaken. My hope is that other researchers will be so struck by the implications of tax expenditures for the American welfare state that they will investigate indirect spending in other welfare states. In the fourth and final section of this paper, I suggest a couple of avenues for crossnational research.[6]

[5] See the essays by Ann Shola Orloff, Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, Margaret Weir, Kenneth Finegold, and Jill Quadagno in Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). The power of southern Democrats in Congress for much of the twentieth century was due to their seniority, which was in turn a product of congressional rules and the absence of party competition in the South.

[6] Initial forays include Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,* chap. 4; Arthur Gould, "The Salaried Middle Class in the Corporatist Welfare State," *Policy and Politics* 9 (October 1981): 401–18; Brian Hogwood, "The Hidden Face of Public Expenditure: Trends in Tax Expenditures in Britain," *Policy and Politics* 17 (1989): 111–30; Michael O'Higgins, "Public/Private Interaction and Pension Policy" in Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, *Public/Private Interplay in Social Protection* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), 99–148; Owens, "Tax Expenditures and Direct Expenditures as Instruments of Social Policy"; Kenneth Woodside, "The Political Economy of Policy Instruments: Tax Expenditures and Subsidies in Canada" in Michael M. Atkinson and Marsha A. Chandler, eds., *The Politics of Canadian Public Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 173–97; Frances Woolley and Julian Le Grand, "The Ackroyds, the Osbornes, and the Welfare State: The Impact of the Welfare State on Two Hypothetical Families over their Lifetimes," *Policy and Politics* 18 (1990): 17–30.

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Previous Studies

Tax expenditures, popularly known as tax loopholes, are "departures from the normal tax structure . . . designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons."[7] They can take the form of tax deductions, tax credits, preferential tax rates, tax deferrals, or outright exclusion of income from taxation. They subsidize a broad range of activities in the United States from oil exploration to the rehabilitation of historic buildings. The focus of this article is tax expenditures with social welfare objectives, meaning those which parallel direct spending for income security, housing, health care, education, employment and training, and social services. Familiar examples include tax deductions for home mortgage interest, child care, and charitable contributions.

Intuitively, it may seem strange to equate the failure to collect taxes with government spending, yet most public finance experts consider tax expenditures to be "conceptually equivalent" to direct spending.[8] According to the Senate Budget Committee, tax expenditures "may, in effect, be viewed as the equivalent of a simultaneous collection of revenue and a direct budget outlay of an equal amount to the beneficiary taxpayer."[9] They "are considered to be analogous to direct expenditure programs, and the two can be viewed as alternative means of accomplishing similar policy objectives."[10] Policy makers certainly have no trouble understanding the concept of tax expenditures. In the words of Russell Long, then chairman of the Senate Finance Com-

[7] Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, *Tax Expenditures* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 3. Tax expenditures are one of two principal ways in which the tax code is used to make social policy, the other is tax rates.

[8] Woodside, "The Political Economy of Policy Instruments," 175. See also Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, *Public Finance in Theory and Practice,* 4th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1984); and Joseph A. Pechman, *Federal Tax Policy,* 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987). A few people do question the utility of the tax expenditure concept. One argument is that "the concept of listing uncollected taxes as an expenditure is rooted in the notion that all income belongs to the government and only the generosity of the government allows us to have the income we produce." See Richard Rahn, chief economist for the Chamber of Commerce, quoted in "Tax Subsidies: No End to Increases," *U.S. News and World Report,* 22 March 1982, 84. See also Irving Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1978). A second objection is that the definition of tax expenditures is arbitrary and subject to political manipulation. See Boris I. Bittker, "Accounting for Federal 'Tax Subsidies' in the National Budget," *National Tax Journal* 22 (June 1969): 244–61; Aaron Wildavsky, "Keeping Kosher: The Epistemology of Tax Expenditures," *Journal of Public Policy* 5 (August 1985): 413–31.

[9] U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, *Tax Expenditures: Relationships to Spending Programs and Background Material on Individual Provisions* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), 1.

[10] U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation [hereafter referred to as JCT] *Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1992–1996* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), 3.

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mittee, "that label don't bother me. . . . I've never been confused about it. I've always known that what we're doing was giving government money away."[11]

Students of U.S. social policy have been slow to appreciate the equivalence between direct spending and tax expenditures. The major histories of the American welfare state barely mention tax expenditures.[12] The reason for this omission is unclear, since Richard Titmuss, a British sociologist, called attention to the connections between tax policy and social policy as far back as the 1950s. Tax expenditures, in his view, constituted a system of "fiscal welfare." This system was conceptually distinct from the social welfare system of direct public spending and the occupational welfare system of fringe benefits.[13]

Titmuss's insight was largely ignored until the 1980s, when a few scholars began to acknowledge the existence of tax expenditures with social welfare objectives and occasionally hint at their importance. According to Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, tax expenditures constitute "the third and often neglected method" of providing welfare benefits, along with transfer payments and in-kind services.[14] That said, the authors then proceed to omit tax expenditures from their influential explanation of the development of modern welfare states. Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, in their sweeping survey of U.S. social and economic policies, draw a provocative analogy between contemporary tax expenditures and nineteenth-century patronage poli-

[11] Quoted in Alan Ehrenhalt, "Senate Finance: The Fiefdom of Russell Long," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1977* (Washington, DC: CQ Inc., 1977), 178.

[12] Mimi Abramovitz, *Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present* (Boston: South End Press, 1988); Edward Berkowitz and Kim McQuaid, *Creating the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Twentieth-century Reform*, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1988); Robert X. Browning, *Politics and Social Welfare Policy in the United States* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986); Michael Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Roy Lubove, *The Struggle for Social Security 1900–1935* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw, and Philip L. Harvey, *America's Misunderstood Welfare State* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); James T. Patterson, *America's Struggle Against Poverty, 1900–1985* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Theda Skocpol and John Ikenberry, "The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Social Research* 6 (1983): 87–148; Walter I. Trattner, *From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America*, 4th ed. (New York: Free Press, 1989).

[13] Richard Titmuss, *Essays on "The Welfare State"* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 34–55.

[14] Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, "The Historical Core and Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State" in Flora and Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 26.

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cies, but do not elaborate on the similarities.[15] A few scholars compare aggregate expenditures for direct and indirect social programs without examining concrete examples of tax expenditures or drawing out the full implications of their comparisons.[16] Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater and Neil and Barbara Gilbert have written the best theoretical treatments of tax expenditures.[17] The best empirical work belongs to Beth Stevens, whose study of corporate pensions helped to animate my own research.[18] None of these studies, however, attempts to generalize about policy making in the hidden welfare state or to compare the politics of tax expenditures and direct spending programs.

Tax expenditures have received closer scrutiny by students of taxation and budgetary politics.[19] Over the past two decades, a small group

[15] Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, "Taking Exception: Explaining the Distinctiveness of American Public Policies in the Last Century" in Francis G. Castles, ed., *The Comparative History of Public Policy* (London: Polity Press, 1989), 292–333.

[16] Mimi Abramovitz, "Everyone Is on Welfare: The Role of Redistribution in Social Policy Revisited," *Social Work* 28 (November-December 1983): 440–45; P. R. Kaim-Caudle, *Comparative Social Policy and Social Security: A Ten-Country Study* (London: Martin Robinson, 1973); Robert J. Lampman, *Social Welfare Spending: Accounting for Changes from 1950 to 1978* (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1984); Wallace C. Peterson, "The U.S. 'Welfare State' and the Conservative Counterrevolution," *Journal of Economic Issues* 19 (September 1985): 601–41; Paul Starr and Gosta Esping-Andersen, "Passive Intervention," *Working Papers for a New Society* 7 (July/August 1979): 15–25; and Judy Temple, "Tax Expenditures" in *Taxation* (Washington, DC: Project on the Federal Social Role, 1985), 1–44.

[17] Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, "From Welfare State to Welfare Society" in Gosta Esping-Andersen, Martin Rein, and Lee Rainwater, eds., *Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 143–59; Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, "The Public/Private Mix," in Rein and Rainwater, eds., *Public/Private Interplay in Social Protection*, 3–24; Neil Gilbert and Barbara Gilbert, *The Enabling State: Modern Welfare Capitalism in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[18] Beth Stevens, "Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has Influenced Welfare Benefits in the Private Sector," in Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States,* 123–48. Two good empirical studies by Daniel M. Fox and Daniel C. Schaffer also deserve mention. See their "Health Policy and ERISA: Interest Groups and Semipreemption," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 14 (Summer 1989): 239–60; and "Tax Policy as Social Policy: Cafeteria Plans, 1978–1985," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 12 (Winter 1987): 609–64.

[19] The seminal works are Surrey and McDaniel, *Tax Expenditures;* Stanley Surrey, *Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); and John F. Witte, *The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). See also Ronald F. King, "Tax Expenditures and Systematic Public Policy: An Essay on the Political Economy of the Federal Revenue Code," *Public Budgeting & Finance* 4 (Spring 1984): 14–31; Paul R. McDaniel, "Tax Expenditures as Tools of Government Action" in Lester M. Salamon, ed., *Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1989), 167–96; Allen Schick, "Controlling Nonconventional Expenditure: Tax Expenditures and Loans," *Public Budgeting & Finance* 6 (Spring 1986): 3–19; Sven Steinmo, "Rethinking American Exceptionalism" (Prepared for the Conference on The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, Boulder, CO, 20–22 February 1992; Stanley S. Surrey, "Tax

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of tax lawyers, economists, and political scientists has tried to make tax expenditures more visible, principally to academics and policy makers interested in budgetary reform. These studies enumerate the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of tax expenditures versus direct spending as tools of public policy. High on everyone's list of disadvantages are the ways in which tax expenditures distort market signals, causing taxpayers to overconsume. Furthermore, tax expenditures often confer windfall benefits to taxpayers, rewarding them for actions they would have taken anyway. These studies demonstrate that the benefits of tax expenditures accrue disproportionately to more affluent citizens and powerful corporations. Some chart the impressive growth of tax expenditures over the past quarter century. And some of these studies describe the unusual institutional setting in which tax expenditures are created. The consensus is that tax expenditures are bad public policy: they are economically inefficient; they distort the tax system; their growth is uncontrollable; and, because they are rarely deliberated over or reviewed, they lack the legitimacy of direct spending programs. The message of these studies is clear. If policy makers wish to control the budget deficit and make sound policy decisions, they have to exert tighter control over tax expenditures.[20]

For our purposes, the tax policy literature is limited in two respects. Most of these studies base their larger claims upon evidence from tax expenditures that favor wealthy individuals, specific companies, specific industries, or business generally.[21] To the extent that these exemptions are justified at all, the stated rationale is usually economic growth. The mass media perpetuate this equation of all tax expenditures with the rich and powerful, in part because the gyrations required to tailor the tax code to a single firm or a single individual make such good copy.[22] Tax bills are often referred to as Christmas tree bills

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Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures," *Harvard Law Review* 83 (February 1970): 705–38.

[20] The claim that tax expenditures cause taxpayers to overconsume assumes that market distributions of goods and services are somehow natural, appropriate, or fair. Sven Steinmo questions this and other critiques of tax expenditures in "So What's Wrong with Tax Expenditures? A Reevaluation Based on Swedish Experience," *Public Budgeting & Finance* 6 (Summer 1986): 27–44.

[21] The notable exception is Witte, *The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax.*

[22] Probably the most notorious and most cited example of such a tax expenditure is the so-called Mayer amendment of 1951. The language of the amendment "provided capital gains treatment for a lump sum distribution to Louis B. Mayer on his retirement from the movie industry. To avoid identifying him by name, the amendment was worded to apply to a movie executive who had been employed for more than twenty years, held his rights to future profits for twelve years, and had the right to receive a percentage of profits for life or for a period of at least five years after the

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because of Congress's habit of decorating them with tax expenditures targeted at their favorite special interests. Nonetheless, the attention devoted to these tax expenditures in the media and in Washington is disproportionate to their size, though certainly important. Many are one-time exemptions, and those which are permanent cost the government less than one-half the revenues lost through tax expenditures with social welfare objectives. The prevailing wisdom, therefore, rests on an empirical foundation that excludes the bulk of tax expenditures.

Equally important, these authors discuss tax expenditures in the context of tax policy and budgetary reform, not social policy. They are interested in the ways in which tax expenditures complicate and distort decisions about raising revenue and appropriating funds. They are not interested in investigating how tax expenditures change our understanding of the American welfare state. As a result, the hidden welfare state occupies a sort of no-man's land between the social policy and tax policy literatures.

Structure of the Hidden Welfare State

Earlier I argued that tax expenditures and other forms of indirect spending belonged in any comprehensive account of modern welfare states, no matter what definition of welfare state was used. The definition does make a difference, however, in determining the overall size of the hidden welfare state. If one defines the welfare state narrowly as comprising only those programs targeted at the poor, few tax expenditures in the United States qualify. On the other hand, such a definition excludes programs like Social Security and Medicare that policy makers, academics, and ordinary citizens routinely include when they discuss U.S. social policy or the American welfare state.

To most people, a welfare state guarantees a minimum standard of living and protects citizens against losses of income beyond their control, especially those caused by retirement, sickness, disability, or unemployment. This welfare state contains a public assistance component and a social insurance component. It serves both the poor and the middle classes.[23] Tax expenditures loom large under this standard defi-

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termination of his employment." Joseph Pechman, "Tax Reform: Theory and Practice," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 1 (Summer 1987): 14.

[23] This definition is similar to that used by Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey, *America's Misunderstood Welfare State* and by Fred C. Pampel and John B. Williamson, *Age, Class, Politics and the Welfare State* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

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TABLE 1

Major Programs of the Standard American Welfare State (Billions of dollars—1990E)

Direct Spending		*Tax Expenditures*	
Program	*Budget Outlay*	*Program*	*Budget Outlay Equivalent*
INCOME SECURITY	$353.1 B	INCOME SECURITY	$107.9 B
Social Security (OASDI)	248.5	Corporate pensions	60.1
Public employee retirement/disability (excluding military)	31.0	OASDI benefits	19.9
		Individual Retirement Accounts	7.8
Unemployment insurance	18.1	EITC	6.6
Food Stamps	15.3		
SSI	12.5		
AFDC	12.1		
HEALTH	154.3	HEALTH	51.7
Medicare	96.6	Corporate health insurance	36.5
Medicaid	40.2	Medicare benefits	7.7
HOUSING	16.3	HOUSING	0.7
SOCIAL SERVICES	9.6	SOCIAL SERVICES	12.0
		Charitable contributions	12.0
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING	6.3	EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING	5.9
		Child care expenses	5.2
TOTAL	$539.6 B	TOTAL	$178.2 B

Notes: Figures may not total because of rounding. Figure for EITC includes refund. Several minor programs are not listed but are included in total.

Source: Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1991*, Tables C-1, G-1.

nition of the welfare state, as Table 1 demonstrates. The left side of this table lists the major direct spending programs that are typically equated with the American welfare state. The right side depicts a corresponding list of major tax expenditures with social welfare objectives.[24] While these tax expenditures may exist for reasons in addition to their ability to increase the economic security of individuals and families, the fact remains that these tax expenditures provide goods and services directly comparable to those provided in the visible welfare state of direct spending.

Note that Table 1 reflects only national spending for social welfare; spending by state governments is excluded because of the difficulty in

[24] For a complete listing of tax expenditures with social welfare objectives, see Christopher Howard, "The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), app. 1.

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finding data concerning state-level tax expenditures.[25] Three borderline categories—education, veterans' benefits, and military benefits—are excluded. So, too, are direct spending for mortgage credit and deposit insurance and most tax expenditures for housing; usually housing assistance is considered part of the standard welfare state only if it benefits the poor. Many of the items excluded from Table 1 are included below in a more expansive definition of the welfare state.

This simple side-by-side comparison is revealing. Tax expenditures with social welfare objectives cost the national government the equivalent of $175 billion in fiscal year 1990. This sum was roughly one-third of what the government spent on traditional social programs. Seen from another angle, the U.S. government paid out an estimated three dollars in tax expenditures with social welfare objectives for every ten dollars it collected in individual and corporate income taxes in 1990.[26]

The relative importance of tax expenditures varies by function. The United States spends as much or more on social services and on employment and training through the tax code as it does through direct spending. The key provisions are tax expenditures for charitable contributions and child care. The government spends approximately one dollar through the tax code on health and on income security for every three dollars of direct spending. Very little is spent on tax expenditures for low-income housing.

In absolute dollars, the most important categories of tax expenditures are income security, especially retirement security, and health care. The tax expenditure for corporate retirement pensions ($60 billion) is the third largest social program in the American welfare state after Social Security and Medicare. Tax expenditures for Social Security benefits and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) add another $28 billion to retirement security. All of these programs benefit the same citizens—workers with long and stable histories of wage-earning—who fare best in the visible welfare state.[27] The tax expenditure for corporate health insurance ($36 billion) is almost as large as Medicaid.

The extent to which the government subsidizes supposedly private welfare programs—to the tune of $100 billion per year—is one of

[25] The available data suggest that indirect forms of social spending are much less important at the state than at the national level.

[26] U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways and Means, *Overview of the Federal Tax System* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 47.

[27] Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, "Understanding American Social Politics" in Weir, Orloff, Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States,* 4.

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the more striking implications of this table. The tax expenditures for corporate pensions, health insurance, and other fringe benefits demonstrate that the line separating public and private is not a rigid barrier; Titmuss's fiscal welfare and occupational welfare systems are not as distinct as he portrayed them. Some medium-size and smaller tax expenditures subsidize public programs: Social Security, Medicare, workers' compensation, and public assistance benefits all enjoy favorable tax treatment. These latter subsidies are comparatively modest. Altogether, tax subsidies for corporate welfare programs are three times those for government programs.

Perhaps the other major insight to draw from Table 1 is the role of congressional revenue committees, the Treasury Department, and its Internal Revenue Service, for these authorities oversee and administer the hidden welfare state. Tax expenditures accentuate the importance of the revenue committees (House Ways and Means, Senate Finance), which already have jurisdiction over Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance. What most distinguishes the visible and hidden welfare states are the agencies responsible for administering their respective programs. Most direct spending programs are administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. Others are administered by the Departments of Labor, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture. The Treasury Department, on the other hand, is responsible for all tax expenditures, whether they are classified as income support, health, housing, employment and training, or social services.[28] One could argue that the broad range of tax expenditures makes the Treasury, rather than Health and Human Services, the most comprehensive social welfare agency in the United States. Clearly, the addition of some three dozen tax expenditures and yet another social welfare bureaucracy reinforces the prevailing image of the American welfare state as fragmented and disjointed.[29]

Tax expenditures become even more important if we adopt a broader definition of the welfare state. Some scholars, especially those who use Scandinavian welfare states as their point of reference, believe that welfare states do more than provide assistance to the poor and social insurance to the middle classes. In their view, a third function

[28] The Treasury Department sometimes shares administrative duties with other agencies such as Labor.

[29] Katz, *In The Shadow of the Poorhouse;* David B. Robertson and Dennis R. Judd, *The Development of American Public Policy* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989), chap. 7; Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States.*

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TABLE 2

Major Programs of the "Expanded" American Welfare State (Billions of dollars—1990E)

Direct Spending		*Tax Expenditures*	
Program	*Budget Outlay*	*Program*	*Budget Outlay Equivalent*
INCOME SECURITY	$374.6 B	INCOME SECURITY	$161.6 B
Social Security (OASDI)	248.5	Corporate pensions	60.1
Public employee retirement/disability (excluding military)	52.5	State and local taxes	20.3
		OASDI benefits	19.9
Unemployment insurance	18.1	Capital gains at death	18.1
Food Stamps	15.3	Individual Retirement Accounts	7.8
SSI	12.5	EITC	6.6
AFDC	12.1		
HEALTH	154.3	HEALTH	51.7
Medicare	96.6	Corporate health insurance	36.5
Medicaid	40.2	Medicare benefits	7.7
HOUSING	32.9	HOUSING	74.2
		Mortgage interest	39.8
		Capital gains on home sales	12.6
		Property taxes	11.2
SOCIAL SERVICES	9.6	SOCIAL SERVICES	12.0
		Charitable contributions	12.0
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING	6.3	EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING	5.9
EDUCATION	12.0	EDUCATION	4.0
TOTAL	$589.7 B	TOTAL	$309.4 B

Note: Figures may not total because of rounding. Figure for EITC includes refund. Several minor programs are not listed but are included in total.

Source: Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1991*, Tables C-1, G-1.

of welfare states is "ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services."[30] This range of services varies over time and crossnationally, but it usually includes education and all housing programs. Laws governing minimum wages, consumer protection, and collective bargaining are sometimes included in this definition, but they are omitted here as borderline cases that are hard to express in terms of dollars spent. Some of these scholars stipulate further that social programs must promote income equality, must re-

[30] Asa Briggs, "The Welfare State in Historical Perspective," *European Journal of Sociology* 2 (1961): 228.

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distribute income downward; I do not preserve this restriction.[31] Table 2 compares direct spending and tax expenditures using a broader conception of the welfare state.

Using this definition, direct spending for social welfare increases from approximately $540 billion to $590 billion. The change in tax expenditures is more dramatic. They increase from roughly $175 billion to over $300 billion. They now exceed one-half of total direct spending for social welfare and one-half of all income tax receipts. Most of this increase is due to the inclusion of middle-class housing programs such as the home mortgage interest tax deduction. Tax expenditures for housing are far more significant than those for education, the other major category included in Table 2 but not in Table 1. This table suggests that it is misleading to think of U.S. housing programs as small or targeted at the poor. Most housing programs are administered through the tax code rather than appropriations; the U.S. government spends twice as much on housing tax expenditures as on traditional housing programs.

Whether one favors a standard or expansive definition of the welfare state, one crucial fact remains: the middle- and upper-income classes are the main beneficiaries of the hidden welfare state. Table 3 shows the distribution of benefits by income class for selected tax expenditures. The majority of benefits accrue to taxpayers earning more than $20,000, the chief exception being the Earned Income Tax Credit. Over 80 percent of the tax benefits for home mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and real estate taxes go to those earning more than $50,000.[32] Direct spending for social welfare is similarly skewed, but less so. Although comparable data indicating the distribution of benefits by income class are unavailable for most direct spending programs, rougher measures are available. For instance, the mix of direct spending in the standard welfare state is roughly one-quarter public assistance and three-quarters social insurance. For every dollar spent on targeted programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the United States spends three dollars on inclusive programs

[31] Esping-Anderson, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism;* Norman Furniss and Timothy Tilton, *The Case for the Welfare State* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

[32] A study by the Congressional Budget Office in 1983 found that "88 percent of tax-free employer contributions [for medical insurance premiums and medical care] went to households with annual incomes over $20,000. The median household income that year was $20,885. The tax benefit averaged $622 per household in the $50,000–$100,000 income range, but $83 per household in the $10,000–$15,000 range." Alain Enthoven, "Health Tax Policy Mismatch," *Health Affairs* 4 (Winter 1985): 11.

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TABLE 3

Distribution of Selected Tax Expenditures (1991)

Tax Expenditure	No. of Taxpayers	Total Amount	Percentage of total dollar amount claimed by income class				
			<$10K	10–20K	20–50K	50–100K	100K+
Home mortgage interest	24.1 M	$36.8 B	0.0%	0.1%	17.9%	50.7%	30.6%
Untaxed Social Security (OASDI) and Railroad Retirement benefits	19.9	22.5	1.6	17.1	67.3	14.1	4.4
Charitable contributions	27.9	15.0	0.0	0.6	13.0	31.2	55.2
Real estate taxes	25.2	10.3	0.0	0.8	16.6	47.9	34.7
EITC	11.4	8.3	31.9	57.0	10.7	0.3	0.0
Child care	7.2	3.1	0.0	12.3	47.9	35.0	4.8
Extraordinary medical expenses	4.6	2.7	0.1	5.0	42.0	33.6	19.3

Notes: Percentages may not total 100 percent because of rounding. Dollar figures reflect revenue losses, not budget outlay equivalents.

Source: JCT, *Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1992–1996.*

like Social Security. In contrast, only about 5 percent of tax expenditures are targeted at people at or near the poverty line. Based on an expansive definition of the welfare state, the fraction of means-tested benefits drops to 20 percent of direct spending and to 3 percent of tax expenditures. This skew in favor of the middle classes, combined with the large fraction of tax expenditures that subsidize corporate fringe benefits, is one reason that some analysts believe that the hidden welfare state undermines support for the visible welfare state, especially for programs targeted at the poor.[33]

Table 3 also suggests the limits of one of the most common assertions about the American welfare state, namely that it is two-tiered. Many scholars who dispute the origins and function of social welfare programs nevertheless agree that the overall structure is bifurcated.[34] The upper tier consists of inclusive social insurance programs like Social

[33] Stevens, "Blurring the Boundaries"; Michael Peter Smith, *City, State, and Market: The Political Economy of Urban Society* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 32.

[34] Michael K. Brown, "The Segmented Welfare System: Distributive Conflict and Retrenchment in the United States, 1968–1984" in Brown, ed., *Remaking the Welfare State: Retrenchment and Social Policy in America and Europe* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 182–210; Linda Gordon, "What Does Welfare Regulate?" *Social Research* 55 (Winter 1988): 609–30; Russell L. Hanson, "The Expansion and Contraction of the American Welfare State" in Robert Goodin and Julian Le Grand, eds., *Not Only the Poor: The Middle Class and the Welfare State* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1987), 169–202; Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse;* Jill Quadagno, *The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Robertson and Judd, *The Development of American Public Policy,* chap. 7; Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States.*

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Security. These programs are widely viewed as entitlements and enjoy broad political support. Benefits are financed by contributions from wage earners and are proportional to contributions. While redistribution occurs, it is hard to detect. Beneficiaries are treated fairly well: eligibility criteria are uniform nationwide, receipt of benefits is considered socially legitimate, and bureaucratic discretion is kept to a minimum. Benefit levels are high enough to lift most recipients out of poverty.

The lower tier consists of means-tested programs like AFDC and Food Stamps. By definition, these programs serve the poorest segment of the population. Benefits are financed out of general revenues rather than through contributions. They are not earned like Social Security benefits. The combination of targeting and visible redistribution renders these programs politically vulnerable. Recipients are treated relatively poorly. Eligibility criteria and benefit levels vary considerably from state to state, and administrative hurdles are often high. Receipt of welfare is stigmatizing and at times dehumanizing. Benefits are seldom indexed for inflation and leave many recipients below the poverty line.

Tax expenditures do not conform to either tier. Like means-tested programs, tax expenditures are financed out of general revenues rather than contributory payroll taxes. Yet most tax expenditures are structured as open-ended entitlements; their receipt does not depend on the judgment of caseworkers and does not entail social stigma. While many of the largest tax expenditures go to corporate fringe benefits, benefits are tied more to income than employment. Recipients do not have to earn their tax benefits. They can, for example, use income from trust funds or dividends to pay off their home mortgage and still claim the home mortgage interest deduction. Moreover, no tax expenditure is as inclusive as Social Security or Medicare. The broadest measures such as corporate pensions and home mortgage interest benefit less than one-half of taxpayers. Not all tax expenditures that are means-tested are targeted at the poor. Some provisions (charitable contributions, state and local income taxes) are effectively targeted at the rich. Perhaps, then, tax expenditures comprise a third tier of social programs. Perhaps the model of tiers needs to be reexamined.[35]

In looking at these tables, one senses immediately the potential significance of tax expenditures for the American welfare state. Neverthe-

[35] Workers' compensation and unemployment insurance also fit awkwardly in the two-tiered model.

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less, before drawing any firm conclusions, one should keep in mind several limitations of tax expenditure data. For instance, the U.S. government does not publish one set of numbers. The Treasury Department and Congress's Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) issue separate estimates of the cost of tax expenditures. The Treasury's numbers are cited in the annual budget submitted by the president; the JCT's numbers are cited by Congress. The discrepancies between their estimates are small in the aggregate, and most are concentrated in tax expenditures with economic growth objectives (for example, corporate depreciation schedules), so this problem is a minor one for us.

More consequential is how one chooses to estimate the cost of tax expenditures. Their cost can be expressed as revenue losses or as budget outlay equivalents. Depending on the tax expenditure, budget outlay equivalents are either equal to or greater than revenue losses.[36] For the purpose of comparison with direct spending programs, budget outlay equivalence is the superior method. For any time-series analysis, revenue losses are preferable because they have been estimated since 1967, while outlay equivalents have been estimated only since 1983.

Care must be taken when adding tax expenditures. While some analysts claim that "the differences between an additive summary of tax expenditures and a summary that controls for interactive effects are not large," others are more cautious.[37] Cost estimates of individual tax expenditures assume no interaction effects and no changes in consumer behavior.[38] The net effect of eliminating several tax expenditures simultaneously could be larger or smaller than the sum of individual provisions. Nonetheless, cuts in direct spending programs can have similar second-order effects elsewhere in the budget. For instance, cuts in unemployment insurance may prompt more claims for workers' compensation.[39] A conservative approach would be to consider the sum of tax expenditures as a good ballpark estimate of their overall magni-

[36] "Often the outlay equivalent is greater than the revenue loss, because in many cases outlays would have to be included in the taxable income of the beneficiaries of the program." U.S. Congress, JCT, *Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1991–1995* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 8.

[37] Quotation from Gilbert and Gilbert, *The Enabling State,* 30, fn. 13. Witte is more cautious. See his *Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax,* 283–84.

[38] "If two or more items were to be eliminated simultaneously, the result of the combination of changes might produce a lesser or greater revenue effect than the sum of the amounts shown for each item separately." U.S. Congress, JCT, *Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1991–1995,* 7.

[39] King, "Tax Expenditures and Systematic Public Policy," 18; Surrey and McDaniel, *Tax Expenditures,* 52.

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tude. Lastly, one must remember that the government does not publish statistics concerning the actual cost of tax expenditures. All figures are estimates based on incomplete data supplied by the Internal Revenue Service.

Despite these caveats, the significance of Tables 1, 2, and 3 is clear: tax expenditures pervade the American welfare state; their inclusion increases the size of the welfare state by something on the order of 33 to 50 percent; and their exclusion from analysis must lead to major misconceptions.[40] The remainder of this article explores certain misconceptions concerning the origins of U.S. social programs.

Origins of the Hidden Welfare State

In the textbook account of the American welfare state, the United States enacted social programs later than most European nations and failed completely to enact some programs like national health insurance—hence the frequent reference to the United States as a welfare state laggard.[41] Scholars have attributed this pattern of delay to a variety of factors that supposedly made (and still make) the American polity exceptional: cultural values of limited government and individualism; James Madison's "compound republic," which fragments political authority among different levels of government and among national institutions; the absence of truly programmatic political parties; the absence of a durable socialist or labor party; the peculiar sequence of bureaucratization and democratization; the power of business; the weakness of organized labor; the historic power of the South in national politics, particularly Congress. Although scholars disagree over which of these barriers have been decisive, they all agree that the barriers to new social programs have been high.[42]

[40] It does not follow, however, that if all tax expenditures with social welfare objectives were eliminated, then policy makers would appropriate the equivalent sum to direct social spending.

[41] The laggard label also refers to the failure of the United States to spend as large a fraction of its gross domestic product on social welfare as other advanced industrial nations. An early statement of the laggard thesis can be found in Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: Russell Sage, 1958).

[42] For good summaries of these alternative explanations, see Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, "States and Social Policies," *Annual Review of Sociology* 12 (1986): 131–57; Hugh Heclo, "The Political Foundations of Antipoverty Policy" in Sheldon Danziger and Daniel Weinberg, eds., *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 312–40; and Jill Quadagno, "Theories of the Welfare State," *Annual Review of Sociology* 13 (1987): 109–28.

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Historically, clearing these hurdles has required an extraordinary combination of events. This feat has been accomplished only twice in the twentieth century, during the mid-1930s and mid-1960s—the two big bangs of American welfare state formation.[43] The first period witnessed passage of the Social Security Act; the second witnessed passage of Medicare, Medicaid, and a variety of social service, education, and job training programs targeted at the poor. Explanations for each burst of legislation depend, of course, on which hurdles one believes are decisive. For some scholars, the key event was the election of liberal Democrats to the White House (Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson) and Congress. For others, economic crisis, public protest, the actions of organized labor, or the actions of far-sighted capitalists provided the impetus for policy innovation. Resolving these debates is less important than observing that each of these events was in its own way extraordinary.

It follows that if the barriers to enactment are large, attempts to surmount these barriers will be strenuously opposed. The ensuing struggle will be overt. The key pieces of social welfare legislation have generated significant debate, controversy, and struggle at the time of their enactment. Thus, we would expect that the scope of conflict or the range of government officials and interest groups active in the process of enactment, as well as the intensity of debate, should be quite broad. Passage of the Social Security Act and Medicare bill are two classic examples of these general patterns.

The origins of new tax expenditures have followed a much different pattern. The starkest contrast is the timing of new tax expenditures. Unlike traditional social programs, tax expenditures have been created throughout the twentieth century (see Table 4). At least two have been created in every decade since the 1910s. Some of the largest tax expenditures currently, such as the home mortgage interest deduction, were embedded in the first permanent individual income tax, passed in 1913. Several important measures, including corporate pensions (1926), passed during the late 1910s and 1920s, a period better known for its resistance to social policy initiatives at the national level. The next wave of tax expenditures exempted benefits from public programs created during the New Deal. Several measures passed in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s did indirectly for health care and housing what

[43] This oft-used metaphor originated with Christopher Leman, "Patterns of Policy Development: Social Security in the United States and Canada," *Public Policy* 25 (1977): 261–91.

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TABLE 4

Chronology of the Hidden Welfare State

Date	*Tax Expenditure*
1913	Original tax code included deductions for home mortgage interest, property taxes, state and local taxes, interest on life insurance savings, casualty losses, and nonmortgage consumer interest (since eliminated)
1917	Charitable deductions
1918	Workers' compensation benefits
1920	Group term life insurance
1921	Capital gains; capital gains at death
1926	Corporate pensions
1935	Railroad retirement system benefits
1938	Unemployment benefits (since eliminated)
1941	Social Security (then OASI) benefits
1942	Extraordinary medical benefits
1946	Accelerated depreciation on rental housing
1951	Capital gains on home sales
1954	Corporate health benefits; child and dependent care expenses; scholarship and fellowship income
1962	Keogh retirement plans for the self-employed
1964	Capital gains on homes sales for persons age 55 and over
1971	WIN tax credit (later combined with TJTC)
1974	Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
1975	Earned Income Tax Credit
1977	New Jobs Tax Credit (replaced by TJTC)
1978	Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
1981	Employer-provided child care
1986	Low-income housing
1990	Child health insurance; Young Child Tax Credit

Source: U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget, *Tax Expenditures: Relationships to Spending Programs and Background Material on Individual Provisions* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986); Witte, *Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax*, 276–82.

the government could not or would not do directly. Since 1960, the major initiatives have offered individuals alternative sources of retirement income and targeted a variety of needs of lower-income taxpayers. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) fall in this latter category. Making sense of this overall pattern is beyond the scope of this article and merits further investigation. For now it is sufficient to note that whereas the visible welfare state was built in two short, intense bursts, the hidden welfare state was built steadily over nine decades.

This pattern means that sometimes new tax expenditures coincided with momentous social and political developments; more often they did not. Tax expenditures have been enacted under a variety of political regimes. One can argue that the unusual strength of liberal (or socially

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progressive) politicians is associated with creation of new tax expenditures in 1913, the late 1930s, and early 1940s. Nevertheless, other combinations of party control also seem conducive to new tax expenditures. Although the New Jobs and Targeted Jobs Tax Credits passed under unified Democratic control of government, then president Jimmy Carter was the most conservative Democrat president of the twentieth century, and his vision of the American welfare state differed sharply from that of Roosevelt and Johnson.[44] Tax expenditures for corporate pensions and corporate health benefits, two of the three largest programs currently, were enacted under unified Republican control for the White House and Congress. The Work Incentive (WIN) tax credit and Earned Income Tax Credit were enacted when Republicans controlled the White House and Democrats controlled Congress.

By the same token, the steady pattern of enactment indicates that social movements and mass protest, which occur infrequently, have not been essential to the creation of most tax expenditures. Even during times of social ferment, new tax expenditures have seldom been demanded. None of the social movements of the 1970s (antiwar, women's environmental), for instance, advocated anything like the EITC or TJTC; the plight of the working poor was not on their agendas.

Interest-group pressure has been evident in only a few cases, most notably the role of the Red Cross and other charities in passage of the tax deduction for charitable contributions (1917).[45] Typically, groups representing beneficiaries and service providers appeared only after these programs had been enacted. The same appears true of organized labor, which has become a strong advocate of existing tax expenditures for corporate fringe benefits. The one case I have found in which labor tried to influence the creation of a new tax expenditure (the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit), it failed.

The role of business interests deserves close scrutiny, for both the corporate liberal wing of the social policy literature and the tax policy literature predict that business should be instrumental.[46] Here it is

[44] Carter, after all, favored increasing the work requirements on welfare recipients and augmenting the role of business in job training programs. And his Commission on Pension Policy recommended greater reliance on corporate pensions for retirement security in order to reduce pressures for expansion of Social Security.

[45] Jerold L. Waltman, *Political Origins of the U.S. Income Tax* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1985), 51.

[46] A variety of corporate liberal explanations, some more nuanced than others, are represented by Berkowitz and McQuaid, *Creating the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Twentieth-century Reform,* 2nd ed.; G. William Domhoff, "Corporate-Liberal Theory and the Social Security Act: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge," *Politics & Society* 15 (1986–1987): 297–330; Colin Gordon,

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worthwhile to examine a few cases in depth. Each case selected corresponds to a principal mode of social protection in the United States.[47] The first case, the tax expenditure for corporate pensions, is an inclusive social insurance program, comparable to Social Security. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit is a human capital program designed to improve the job skills and job opportunities of disadvantaged workers. The third and final case is the Earned Income Tax Credit, a means-tested income transfer. If business influence is important, these cases should illustrate that influence, since all three of these tax expenditures function to lower employers' labor costs.

Business influence, to the extent it matters, appears to be less instrumental and more structural than the social policy and tax policy literatures would lead one to believe. The one instance in which employers participated directly, they failed to have much of an impact. Business interests were divided over the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC), the immediate predecessor of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. Larger, capital-intensive firms favored a bigger increase in the investment tax credit, while smaller, labor-intensive firms favored the NJTC. One year later, the same business interests that pushed for the NJTC failed to prevent Congress from changing it into the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. The National Federation of Independent Business, a leading representative of small business, argued unsuccessfully that targeting would place too great an administrative burden on small firms and that such firms would be uninterested in hiring the categories of disadvantaged

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"New Deal, Old Deck: Business and the Origins of Social Security, 1920–1935," *Politics & Society* 19 (June 1991): 165–207; Quadagno, *The Transformation of Old-Age Security;* and James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). Students of tax policy usually point out that business interests are not alone in seeking tax expenditures; a variety of special interests do so. Business interests are simply more successful at it. Business influence results from greater access to the revenue committees, which is in turn a function of money and expertise in tax matters. Concerning the origins of tax expenditures, see the citations in footnote 19 as well as Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, *Showdown at Gucci Gulch* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); David G. Davies, *United States Taxes and Tax Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 285; JoAnn Klimschot, *The Untouchables: A Common Cause Study of the Federal Tax Expenditure Budget* (Washington, DC: Common Cause, 1981); Ralph Nader Congress Project, *The Revenue Committees* (New York: Grossman, 1975), 109; Stanley S. Surrey, "The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist—How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted," *Harvard Law Review* 70 (May 1957): 1145–82. Witte questions the role of special interests in creating tax expenditures in *Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax.*

[47] This typology is similar to that used by Gary Burtless, "Public Spending for the Poor: Trends, Prospects, and Economic Limits" in Sheldon Danziger and Daniel Weinberg, eds., *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 18–49. Additional detail concerning the origins of these programs can be found in Howard, "The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy."

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workers specified in the legislation. There is little evidence that business leaders lobbied for the Earned Income Tax Credit or the tax expenditure for corporate pensions.

In the case of corporate pensions, such direct involvement may have been unnecessary. The origins of this tax expenditure, a minor political footnote at the time, should be understood in the context of a profound transformation in tax politics which took place between the 1870s and 1920s. What began as a zero-sum contest over income distribution, fraught with class conflict, became over time a positive-sum game in which concessions to business were seen as an essential stimulus to investment and economic growth.[48] Changes in party control of government were central to this transformation. Prior to World War I, a coalition of Democrats and progressive Republicans succeeded in enacting the first permanent income taxes on corporations (1909) and individuals (1913). These legislators and the interests they represented favored using income taxes to redistribute wealth from the urban, industrial Northeast to the more rural, agrarian South and Midwest. After the war, a pro-business coalition led by conservative Republicans such as Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon succeeded in reorienting tax policy toward accumulation and investment. Seen in this context, the tax expenditure for occupational pensions was one of several measures designed to lower the tax burdens on capital, thereby solidifying business support for the Republican party. On major issues like lowering corporate tax rates, conservative Republicans worked in concert with business organizations like the National Industrial Conference Board and the National Tax Association. For a minor matter like the tax treatment of corporate pensions, which only a small fraction of employers offered, Republicans did not need to be instructed what to do. Most likely, they acted in anticipation of business demands.[49]

Interestingly, the actors who keep surfacing as the builders of the hidden welfare state are moderate and conservative members of Congress. This finding runs contrary to the social policy literature, which typically depicts these legislators as antagonistic to new social programs, and to the tax policy literature, which usually portrays them

[48] Ronald Frederick King, "From Redistributive to Hegemonic Logic: The Transformation of American Tax Politics, 1894–1963" *Politics & Society* 12 (1983): 1–52.

[49] Thus, this explanation resembles more the structural arguments of Fred Block and Charles Lindblom than the corporate liberal arguments of James Weinstein and G. William Domhoff. For more detail concerning the origins of this program, see Howard, "The Hidden Welfare State," chap. 2.

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as passive agents of powerful interest groups.[50] Although a liberal Democrat, Charles Rangel, helped shepherd the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit through the House, southern Democrats and moderate Republicans influenced the structure of both it and its forerunner, the New Jobs Tax Credit. Senator Russell Long (D-LA), architect of the Earned Income Tax Credit, was a vocal critic of AFDC and other welfare programs. The Nixon administration's Family Assistance Plan (FAP) went too far, in his view, in guaranteeing an annual income to the unemployed. His workfare package, including a 10 percent work bonus that eventually became the EITC, was designed to boost the work incentives of the poor and eliminate many of them from the welfare rolls. Representative Al Ullman (D-OR), chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and a moderate Democrat, was the chief sponsor of the EITC in the House. Ullman may not have shared Long's antipathy toward welfare, but he objected to FAP for similar reasons. Ullman also opposed proposals put forward by liberal Democrats to guarantee employment in the public sector to the poor. Senator George McLean (R-CT), who sponsored the key amendment creating the tax expenditure for corporate pensions, was of all things a conservative Republican. More recently, Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), a Finance Committee chairman in the tradition of Russell Long, pushed through a tax credit for child health insurance. Although such individuals have typically been viewed as barriers to expansion of the American welfare state, they are better understood as opponents of direct forms of social spending.

The final distinctive aspect of the origins of these tax expenditures is the scope of conflict. Not surprisingly, given the routine introduction of new tax expenditures, the scope of conflict has been relatively narrow. Although it appears that the process of creating new tax expenditures has become more visible and contentious over time—particularly after a series of congressional reforms in the late 1960s and early 1970s opened up the process of making tax policy—the scope of conflict has never reached the level of the Social Security Act or Medicare bill. The tax expenditure for corporate pensions had probably the quietest start of any major social program in the contemporary welfare

[50] Concerning the role of Congress in blocking or diluting social welfare legislation, see footnote 5. Some students of tax policy portray members of the revenue committees as little more than department store clerks: "Seekers of special tax breaks make a quick congressional shopping trip to the tax-writing committees where tax expenditures are designed" (Klimschot, *The Untouchables,* ii). Most of the tax policy literature cited above in footnote 46 also applies here.

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state. Members of Congress approved it without debate late one night as they worked out the details of the Revenue Act of 1926. The legislative sponsor, Senator McLean, offered no explanation or justification for the favorable treatment of corporate pensions. A similar provision passed as part of the Revenue Act of 1921 also failed to trigger anything approaching a debate or struggle. The same silence characterized Treasury Decision 2090 (1914), which was the earliest official statement regarding the tax treatment of corporate pensions.

The Earned Income Tax Credit did emerge out of highly charged debates over the Family Assistance Plan. Yet the EITC generated little attention between 1972, when Senator Long first proposed the 10 percent work bonus, and 1975, when it passed. Instead, advocates of welfare reform debated the wisdom and adequacy of a guaranteed annual income. After FAP died in Congress, Richard Nixon defined welfare reform to mean administrative reform of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and antipoverty groups fought to increase and standardize AFDC benefit levels. Long singlehandedly kept the EITC alive until he found a way to bury it deep in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.

There was a noticeable difference between passage of the EITC and passage of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit a few years later. The New Jobs Tax Credit, forerunner of the TJTC, was one of the more contentious provisions the Tax Simplification and Reduction Act of 1977. Representatives of business, labor, government, and academia openly debated the merits of various employment tax credits, including versions that resembled the later TJTC. Because many key actors had registered their preferences in 1977, it was unnecessary to rehash these debates in 1978, and the TJTC passed easily. Few people, however, would compare debate over the New Jobs Tax Credit and tax simplification in 1977 with Medicare or Social Security; few social scientists, much less attentive citizens, could probably name a single component of the 1977 bill.

All three tax expenditures were appended to larger revenue or tax reform bills. All three were dwarfed by other parts of these bills, both in terms of dollars and the time and energy required to pass them. No separate floor votes were taken on any of these tax expenditures. Hardly anyone at the time trumpeted their passage or predicted that dire consequences would result. Hardly anyone noticed at all.[51]

[51] Stanley S. Surrey alleges that the quality of debate and deliberation suffers accordingly. "It can generally be said that less critical analysis is paid to these tax expenditures than to almost any

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We have additional evidence that a narrow scope of conflict and absence of struggle are typical of new tax expenditures. While some tax expenditures (such as charitable contributions) appear to have been the product of conscious lobbying by prospective beneficiaries, they were never seriously debated or contested. They, too, were insignificant parts of larger revenue bills. Most of the tax expenditures embedded in the original 1913 tax code—such as those for home mortgage interest, property taxes, and state and local taxes—appear to have been uncontroversial legacies of the Civil War tax codes. Legislators spent far more time and energy debating whether or not to create an income tax and if so what rates to charge on different incomes.[52]

The reasons why new tax expenditures face lower hurdles than new direct spending programs become clear when we shift the emphasis away from the barriers confronting new social programs and focus more on the possibilities. In fact, these possibilities are often barriers seen from a different angle. Here the tax policy literature provides important insights. Although these scholars have overstated the role of business interests in creating tax expenditures, they have correctly noted that the structure of Congress facilitates passage of tax expenditures vis à vis appropriations.[53] As Richard Fenno, John Manley, and other scholars have well documented, the revenue committees have been the most prestigious and powerful committees in Congress for much of the twentieth century.[54] Their chairmen, men such as Wilbur Mills and Russell Long, have been some of the most powerful single members of Congress. Part of their power resulted from the programs under their jurisdiction, which include all tax matters and since 1935 Social Security. In the House, Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee gained added clout by virtue of their responsibility for all Democratic committee assignments between the 1910s and

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direct expenditure program one can mention. The tax expenditures tumble into law without supporting studies, being propelled instead by cliches, debating points, and scraps of data and tables that are passed off as serious evidence" (*Pathways to Tax Reform,* 6). Similar judgments can be found in Ralph Nader Congress Project, *The Revenue Committees,* 109.

[52] Waltman, *Political Origins of the U.S. Income Tax.*

[53] In addition to the citations in footnote 19, see Thomas J. Reese, *The Politics of Taxation* (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1980); Catherine E. Rudder, "Tax Policy: Structure and Choice" in Allen Schick, ed., *Making Economic Policy in Congress* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 196–220.

[54] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); John F. Manley, *The Politics of Finance* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Randall Strahan, *New Ways and Means: Reform and Change in a Congressional Committee* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

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1970s. Even after the revenue committees lost some of their formal powers in the late 1960s and early 1970s (for example, closed rule consideration of revenue bills), and even after budget deficits in the 1980s limited their options, they remained quite influential. The revenue committees certainly wielded more clout than the education and labor committees, the other major sources of social welfare legislation in Congress, whose members typically favored direct spending. As a general rule, when the revenue chairs advocate passage of a new tax expenditure—as Russell Long did with the Earned Income Tax Credit and Lloyd Bentsen did with the tax credit for child health insurance—chances of enactment are good.

Whereas direct spending programs require new legislation, which Congress is not obligated to act upon, tax expenditures can be tucked away in must-pass revenue bills, which originate with the revenue committees. These advantages help to explain why Long's work bonus failed as part of various social welfare bills between 1972 and 1974 and succeeded as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. They help to explain why the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit passed as an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1978 after failing as part of President Carter's urban aid package.

Furthermore, although political authority has been highly fragmented for direct spending programs, it has been somewhat more centralized for tax expenditures. Unlike direct spending programs, which must be authorized by one congressional committee and funded by another (in each house), tax expenditures are authorized and funded by the same committee in each house. The number of possible veto points in Congress is thereby cut in half. More specifically, this structure prevents the appropriations committees from imposing the same fiscal discipline on the revenue committees that they do on the authorizing committees.

The origins of tax expenditures depend heavily, then, on the structure of tax policy making in Congress. This observation suggests that we need to reevaluate the impact of party competition on social programs. Although party competition is commonly cited as a determinant of social spending by state governments, it is not believed to play an important role at the national level.[55] In contrast, party competition

[55] The chief exception appears to be veterans' pensions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Mothers and Soldiers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). Examples of the state policy literature include Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969): 858–66; Edward T. Jennings, "Competition, Constituencies,

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has been central to tax policy; and because tax expenditures are considered tax measures and not appropriations, party competition has affected tax expenditures as well.[56] During periods of heightened competition, political parties have competed for the support of key blocs of voters by selectively lowering their tax burdens. Party competition, for example, was integral to creation of the tax expenditure for corporate pensions in 1926. This program was part of a larger effort by Republicans to reorient tax policy from income redistribution to corporate accumulation and investment. Party competition was associated as well with passage of the Young Child Tax Credit in 1990, as Democrats and Republicans competed to be the pro-family party.[57]

Some students of tax policy would argue that the structure of Congress provides both the opportunity and the motive for creating new tax expenditures.[58] In their view, such expenditures provide members of the revenue committees, who have the politically unenviable task of levying taxes, a valuable opportunity to claim credit for spending money on a specific constituency. In the context of weak political parties and frequent elections (at least in the House), individual legislators must regularly provide constituents with divisible benefits if they hope to be reelected. This task is complicated for members of the revenue committees, who cannot distribute pork via the traditional channels of appropriations. Instead, they try to lower the tax burdens on specific individuals and groups.

The validity of this explanation is debatable. It does not help us understand the creation of the tax expenditure for corporate pensions, since McLean was not a member of the Senate Finance committee. Conceivably, his proposal could have appealed to members of the revenue committees for the reasons cited above, but the lack of debate

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and Welfare Policies in American States," *American Political Science Review* 73 (June 1979): 414–29; V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Knopf, 1956); Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959); and Robert D. Plotnick and Richard F. Winters, "Party, Political Liberalism, and Redistribution," *American Politics Quarterly* 18 (October 1990): 430–58.

[56] Concerning the importance of parties and party competition to tax policy, see Susan B. Hansen, "Partisan Realignment and Tax Policy 1789–1976" in Paul Peretz, ed., *The Politics of American Economic Policy Making* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 233–54; Charles H. Stewart III, "The Politics of Tax Reform in the 1980s" in Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, eds., *Politics and Economics in the Eighties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 143–70; Witte, *Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax.*

[57] Party competition can also fuel expansion of existing tax expenditures, as happened with the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 1980s.

[58] See, for example, Steinmo, "Rethinking American Exceptionalism."

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at the time and credit-claiming behavior afterward suggest that these considerations were not decisive.

A case can be made that Russell Long used the Earned Income Tax Credit to provide material benefits to low-income workers in his state. In addition, the combination of his opposition to AFDC and support for the EITC might have conferred symbolic benefits upon voters who feared that the government was doing too much for blacks and undermining the work ethic. It seems equally plausible that Long believed that the EITC was good public policy—at least relative to AFDC and guaranteed income proposals—and expected no direct electoral benefit. The dollar value of the tax credit was not large, those eligible for the credit had low rates of voter participation, and Long was a virtual lock for reelection.

It seems unlikely that architects of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit were trying to win the support of small business, which after all opposed the TJTC. And the idea that they were vying for the votes of disadvantaged urban youth and the handicapped seems far-fetched. More likely, they thought that the TJTC would make a dent in structural unemployment and was therefore worthwhile.

In short, the reelection motive probably applies less to the creation of tax expenditures with social welfare objectives than it does to the creation of tax expenditures targeted at corporations and wealthy individuals, and to politicians' support for existing tax expenditures.[59] One can make the more general claim that tax expenditures enable members of the revenue committees to accomplish their individual goals, whatever those goals may be, without having to go through the authorizing and appropriations committees.

In addition to the structure of Congress, the structure of tax expenditures as a policy tool makes their introduction less controversial than comparable direct spending programs. The most important policy attribute of tax expenditures is ambiguity of purpose. The purpose of direct spending programs for social welfare is usually straightforward: to provide assistance to those in need. Tax expenditures are harder to pigeon-hole as welfare or even social insurance. Sometimes they are portrayed as social welfare programs; sometimes they are portrayed as tax relief. The potential to reduce the tax burdens on low-income

[59] Moreover, the reelection motive applies only to tax expenditures created by the finance committees. Some tax expenditures were created by administrative ruling, and others were first proposed by presidents or members of other congressional committees.

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workers appears to have persuaded House Democrats, many of whom were skeptical of Long's previous workfare bill, to accept the EITC. Tax expenditures can also be portrayed as subsidies to private sector producers, which provide most of the goods and services underwritten by the tax code.

Finally, policy makers may embrace new tax expenditures strategically as a way to constrain the growth of direct spending. Senator Long, for example, evidently hoped that his work bonus would drain support away from the Family Assistance Plan and proposed increases in AFDC benefits. Likewise, Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia, another conservative Democrat, appears to have initiated the WIN tax credit for employers who hired welfare recipients as an alternative to increased spending for the Job Corps and other Great Society job training programs.[60] Using tax expenditures to check the growth of the visible welfare state appears to have become more prevalent since the 1960s. This strategy also helps to account for the persistence and expansion of existing tax expenditures. Senator Robert Packwood (R-OR), a powerful member of the Senate Finance committee, has repeatedly defended the tax expenditure for corporate health benefits as a means of preventing the introduction of national health insurance.

These various objectives are not mutually exclusive. Policy makers can and probably do support tax expenditures for more than one reason. Such ambiguity helps proponents of new tax expenditures forge broader coalitions of support than proponents of new appropriations are typically able to do. Whatever their motivation, elected officials find it easier to support new tax expenditures than new direct spending programs. Ambiguity probably plays a larger role the more public and controversial the proposal. In the case of corporate pensions, for example, McLean had no need to frame the issue in different ways. If we are correct in believing that new tax expenditures have become more visible since the early 1970s, then we would likewise expect ambiguity to play an increasingly larger role in recent decades.

In sum, the structure of Congress has facilitated the introduction of new tax expenditures under a variety of circumstances. One cannot point to any set of political, economic, or social developments that is consistently associated with enactment. One cannot state as a general rule that business or any other interest group is the motive force behind

[60] Concerning the WIN tax credit, see *Congressional Record,* 11 November 1969, 35053–55; U.S. Senate, Finance Committee, *Revenue Act of 1971,* 9 November 1971.

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their enactment. One cannot identify any single reason why members of the revenue committees support their enactment. The most one can do for now is create a typology of new programs. My research suggests that many of the earliest tax expenditures, including corporate pensions, were "inadvertent outcomes of distributional conflicts over taxation."[61] A second type can be understood in relation to direct spending programs. These tax expenditures were created to address needs that proponents believed could not or should not be addressed by direct spending programs. This category would include those tax expenditures created immediately after World War II and means-tested programs like the EITC and Young Child Tax Credit created since the early 1970s.

Over time, however, Congress has become somewhat less friendly to new tax expenditures. Since the mid-1970s, Congress has appended a separate tax expenditure budget to the annual budget, thus making the incidence of tax expenditures more visible and reducing the opportunities for covert action. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 created additional constraints by requiring any new spending to be offset with new revenues. Although tax expenditures were excluded from such offset requirements under the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation, they were included in the more recent act. Proponents of new tax expenditures must now specify how they plan to pay for their program. The conditions that facilitated creation of the hidden welfare state have changed, leading one to expect fewer and smaller new programs.

Conclusion

This article has tried to demonstrate that a broader conception of governmental capacity can have profound implications for our understanding of modern welfare states. That understanding is not so much wrong as incomplete, for it excludes indirect social spending. In the United States, inclusion of tax expenditures significantly increases the level of social spending. This finding suggests that while the United States spends proportionately less on traditional social programs than do other advanced industrial democracies, it may be less of a welfare state laggard when all forms of social spending are taken into account. Tax expenditures elevate housing programs, corporate fringe benefits,

[61] This phrase was suggested to me by Ellen Immergut (personal correspondence, July 1992).

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middle-class beneficiaries, the Treasury Department, and the Internal Revenue Service to much greater prominence. The origins of tax expenditures indicate that certain kinds of social programs do not require momentous changes in the political landscape in order to be enacted. What look like barriers to welfare state formation—most importantly the structure and membership of Congress—appear from a different angle to facilitate expansion of the welfare state.[62]

Might tax expenditures present a comparable challenge to our understanding of other welfare states? Or, might the United States be as unusual in its reliance on tax expenditures as it is exceptional in its reluctance to appropriate funds directly for social welfare? One of the leading students of comparative tax politics, Sven Steinmo, suggests that the United States is atypical in its reliance on tax expenditures. Based on evidence from the United States, Sweden, and Britain, he concludes that "one of the major distinguishing characteristics of the American tax system is the huge number and amount of tax expenditures that complicate the tax code. No other tax system is as particularistic, or as complex, as the American."[63] Steinmo bases his conclusions, however, on highly aggregate data: total tax expenditures as a percentage of total government outlays and as a percentage of total tax revenues. These data include tax expenditures for social welfare, economic growth, and other objectives. It is possible that a crossnational comparison including only tax expenditures with social welfare objectives would make the United States appear less exceptional.

The more fundamental problem with Steinmo's or any crossnational study is the inherent difficulty of comparing tax expenditures. The one and only time that the OECD tried to compare tax expenditures among member countries, it essentially gave up. Instead of developing a standard measure of tax expenditures and grouping programs according to function, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

[62] It is worth noting that the development of tax expenditures follows a different pattern from their origins. As is the case with direct spending programs, beneficiaries and third-party providers become important advocates of maintaining and expanding tax expenditure programs. However, the main agency responsible for administering tax expenditures, the Treasury Department, is a frequent opponent rather than advocate of their expansion. Moreover, government officials have less direct control over the growth of tax expenditures than of direct social spending. Marginal tax rates, inflation, collective bargaining agreements, and a variety of other factors influence taxpayers' decisions to take advantage of these tax breaks and the dollar value of their tax deductions and tax credits. Howard, "The Hidden Welfare State."

[63] Sven Steinmo, "Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain," *World Politics* 41 (July 1989): 505, 510.

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Development (OECD) grouped programs by country and made no explicit comparisons. It found that the chief obstacles to making meaningful comparisons were the differences among countries' definitions of their normal tax structure and of deviations from that structure. Some countries, for instance, exempt certain foods from sales or valued added taxes and count these exemptions as tax expenditures. Other countries consider only exemptions from income taxes as tax expenditures.[64] Thus, it is difficult to compare in absolute dollar terms the magnitude of indirect social spending across countries. Future studies may therefore need to focus on some subset of OECD countries with comparable tax systems.

Alternatively, one might circumvent these definitional issues by comparing the mix of direct and indirect social spending within various welfare states. However countries choose to define tax expenditures, how much do they spend through the tax code versus appropriations? The aforementioned OECD study indicated enough variation within and across countries to make comparative study worthwhile. Canada, for example, spent almost twice as much on old age and disability programs via tax expenditures as it did via direct transfers in 1979. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, by contrast, funded the majority of their old age and disability programs through direct transfers. There are interesting differences within countries as well. Compared with direct spending, tax expenditures were far more important in the area of old age and disability in Canada than in family allowances or unemployment. The chief impediment to comparisons of this sort is old and sometimes partial data. The OECD has not published tax expenditure figures for years after 1980, so researchers must wade through the tax and budget documents of individual countries.

We also know that countries demonstrate enough variation among their institutions to make a different sort of comparison fruitful. We have already seen how the structure of Congress effectively segregates tax expenditures from direct spending in the United States. In contrast, when Canada reformed its budget process in 1979, it grouped direct spending and tax expenditures together in ten policy areas, or envelopes. Budget ceilings are set for each envelope, and any proposed increase in tax expenditures must be accompanied by an equal decrease

[64] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Tax Expenditures* (Paris: OECD, 1984).

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in direct spending within that same envelope. This system is designed to force policy makers to make explicit trade-offs between equivalent forms of spending.[65] In Britain, however, the lack of coordination is even more pronounced than in the United States. There, "decisions about totals for public expenditure programmes for the next financial year are announced in the Autumn Statement in November of the previous year. Tax changes, including changes effecting tax expenditures, are announced in the Budget in March or April as a result of a quite separate process of decision-making."[66] One might investigate how three welfare states that are usually grouped together in the literature have developed such different procedures for choosing between direct and indirect social spending. And then one might try to determine what effect these differing institutions have on patterns of spending. Only by asking such questions will students of social policy discover how much is missing from our current conceptions of welfare states. Without an appreciation of government's multiple tools of social welfare, scholars will continue to generalize about welfare states when they really mean direct spending.*

[65] Congressional Budget Office, *Tax Expenditures: Budget Control Options and Five-Year Budget Projections for Fiscal years 1983–1987* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1982).

[66] Hogwood, "The Hidden Face of Public Expenditures: Trends in Tax Expenditures in Britain," 114.

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Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War

SHIBLEY TELHAMI

While it is generally assumed that public opinion matters little in authoritarian polities, I argue in this article that on issues of foreign policy, Arab public opinion has a discernible impact on the foreign policies of Arab states; moreover, in the conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Arab public opinion was a key element in the strategies of the central parties. I also argue that the absence of the predicted upheavals in the Middle East following the smashing of Iraq was partly due to the success of members of the alliance in controlling some of the variables that help shape Arab public opinion, partly to the failure of Saddam Hussein to deliver what he promised, and partly to the fact that the allies took seriously the predictions of the public upheaval.

Methodology

My assessment of Arab public opinion is based on, first, extensive interviews in May–June 1990, December 1990, and July 1991. My travels in the region included visits to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Israel, and the West Bank. During those visits, I interviewed

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policy makers, academics, journalists, middle- and working-class families, and Egyptian workers returning from Iraq. Second, my assessment is based on extensive coverage of the Arab press; during the Gulf crises, while on the staff of the United States' delegation to the United Nations, I read daily reports in most Arab publications, including the opposition press.

My interviews were not limited to elite views, although much of my assessment is based on those views and on Arab leaders' analysis of mass public opinion. However, it should be noted that while there are differences between elite and mass public opinion, the discrepancy works in favor of my argument in this article: to the extent that my assessment centers on strong Arab resentment of U.S. policy and on Arab views about the Palestinian question, it is generally accepted that mass public opinion is more radical on those issues than elite and official positions. Contrasting the costs of Israeli concessions to Arab concessions, Syria's foreign minister, Farouq Sharaa, noted that the views expressed by Arab governments are already much more moderate than public opinion on the Arab-Israeli question, whereas views of the Israeli government are more radical than public opinion.[1] Yet the argument presented here documents even radical views among elites and government officials in Arab states with strong ties to the United States. Similarly, while it is clear that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) coverage of the Arab press to which I refer is selective, the bias in this case also works in favor of my argument.

The Relevance of Public Opinion

Is Arab public opinion relevant to the conduct of Arab foreign policy? Even in democracies, where the public is assumed to have more influence on state policy, some students of public opinion rule out a causal connection.[2] A few argue, for example, that public opinion is primarily shaped by policy makers.[3] Others hold that public opinion and policy

[1] Farouq Sharaa, *New York Times*, 4 November 1991.

[2] For a summary on the literature on the links between public opinion and foreign policy, see B. Russet and J. W. Graham, "Public Opinion and Natural Security Policy: Relationships and Impacts" in M. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1989).

[3] See J. E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinions* (New York: Wiley, 1973); R. A. Brody and C. R. Shapiro, "Policy Failure and Public Support: Reykjavik, Iran and Public Assessments of President Reagan" (Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987); C. W. Ostrom and D. Simon, "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity," *American Political Science Review 79* (June 1985): 334–358.

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are causally unrelated, that neither influences the other.[4] If this could be the case in democracies, where instruments of information are not in the hands of rulers, what could be said of authoritarian polities?

Indeed, during the Camp David negotiations, when Egypt's President Anwar Sadat argued that Egyptian public opinion would prevent him from making concessions, Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin countered that "the people of Egypt could be easily manipulated by Sadat, and their beliefs and attitudes could be shaped by their leader." Begin went on to cite Sadat's ability to convince his people that the Soviets were their best friends only to later cast them as their worst enemy. So heated was the exchange that the two men had to be separated for much of the Camp David negotiations.[5] Arab alignments following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the ability of several Arab governments to join the American-led coalition against Iraq, despite the reported unpopularity of this move, appear to reinforce doubts about the relevance of public opinion to the policies of Middle East states.

Yet Arab leaders act as though Arab public opinion matters. This judgment is historically valid, as witnessed by the popular revolution against an entrenched shah in Iran; the popular uprisings across the Middle East in the 1950s that helped topple several Arab governments; massive food riots in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, all of which were followed by consequential policy shifts; and the apparent increase in the political power of social and religious movements. The concern of Arab leaders is not irrational.

The importance of Arab public opinion to the foreign policies of Arab states derives from the very absence of electoral legitimacy and the prevalence instead of transnational symbols of legitimacy. To be sure, governments in the Middle East, like others around the globe, are driven first and foremost by the interests of their nation-states. But since most political movements within each state profess broader Arab and Islamic objectives, any Arab government must present credentials on those issues: no matter what the governments of Egypt or Syria do in their own interests, these actions must also be in the interests of all Arabs or Muslims.

This common Arab need creates an uncomfortable interdependence, which alters the priorities of Arab governments. What happens in

[4] M. Leigh, *Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937–1947* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1976).

[5] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam, 1982).

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Arab and Islamic political movements outside a given Arab state affects political movements within that state. For this reason, many Arab governments continually engage in a competition for regional political leadership. The closer these states are in their ideology, and thus in their legitimacy, the fiercer the competition for leadership. Two examples tell much about the configuration of Arab alliances in the Gulf War.

One pertains to Syria and Iraq, the only two Baathist states in the world—an ideology centered on a single priority: Arab unity. Baathists also advocate freedom and socialism, which together with unity complete the Baathist trilogy. Yet Syria became the Arab world's only ally of non-Arab Iran during the eight years of the Iraq-Iran War. In the Gulf crisis of 1990–1991, Syria, one of the Arab states most critical of the United States, joined the United States to make sure that Saddam Hussein's influence in the Arab world did not rise at its expense.

The case of Egypt and Iraq in 1961 is even more telling: the government of Abd al-Karim Qasim of Iraq had come to power in 1958, to the pleasure of Egypt, by overthrowing the pro-British anti-Egyptian monarchy. Qasim was as anti-British as Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, advocating similar Pan-Arab ideals. But he was unwilling to subordinate himself to Nasser and quickly became Egypt's most targeted opponent. Nasser adamantly opposed Qasim's plan to control Kuwait following British withdrawal, a plan consistent with Nasser's Pan-Arab ideals. So sharp was Egypt's opposition to the Iraqi plan that it was willing to reconcile its differences with its ideological opponent, Saudi Arabia, and risk the dissolution of its union with Syria. More embarrassing, Egypt found itself unable to oppose the deployment of British troops in Kuwait to defend against potential Iraqi attacks.[6]

Given the transnational nature of symbols of legitimacy, the Arab public looks for external cues in assessing their own governments. And to the extent that governments can rarely hide their failures from their own people, Arab leaders championing transnational issues are often more popular outside their countries than within. The cases of Egypt's Nasser and Iraq's Saddam Hussein provide two examples. Indeed, in Nasser's case, the external Arab and Islamic legitimacy that he acquired following Suez preceded the increase in his popularity at home. Moreover, it is generally believed that he was less popular in Egypt than elsewhere.

[6] For an interesting discussion of the Iraqi-Egyptian competition, see Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

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While Arab governments are interdependent on their quest for legitimacy, there are few specific issues on which the competing ideological movements agree. Two issues stand out, both pertaining to the conduct of foreign policy. One is a general anticolonial sentiment and the other is the specific question of Palestine. To be sure, Arab states have abused this question for their own ends, with the Palestinians always paying the price. It is also true that the Palestinian issue is not high on the daily agenda of most Arabs. Still, for historical reasons, the Palestinian issue remains at the core of every major Arab, Islamic, and anti-western political movement, providing the lens through which Arabs view the world. Its history is closely linked to the inception of Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism, and all those defining moments of Arab relations with the rest of the world. Palestine remains the subconscious cue that the Arab public employs in evaluating the behavior of the outside world toward the Middle East: a friend is he who supports the Palestinians; and an enemy is he who opposes them. Whenever the legitimacy of an Arab government comes into question, it will rush to wrap itself in the Palestinian flag.[7] It is not surprising that Arab governments that opposed Iraq in the Gulf crisis and that were frustrated by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) positions argued that their strategy was the better one for serving Palestinian interests. For example, on 1 November 1990, a Syrian editorial argued that Israel is synonymous with U.S. interests in the Middle East and, given absolute U.S. support for Israel, the Arabs would do well not to take the risks inherent in backing Iraq.

Arab governments have always understood that the regional influence that affects their legitimacy depends on the degree to which they offer advantages on the question of Palestine: in the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt's authority in the Arab world was predicated on its military leverage vis-à-vis Israel; when this leverage disappeared following the Camp David accords, Egyptian influence also disappeared. In the late 1980s, in the absence of any Arab military leverage, Egypt used its influence with the United States and Israel to seek a satisfactory settlement of the Palestinian issue (with a successful dialogue between the PLO and the United States). By the spring of 1990, with the apparent failure of the first Baker-Shamir initiative despite perceived Arab concessions, Egypt's influence declined again in favor of Iraqi influence,

[7] *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (hereafter *FBIS*) *Daily Report*, 25 July 1990 (FBIS-NES-90-122).

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as Iraq moved to project military leverage vis-à-vis Israel. It is this latter issue that must be explored in order to address the relationship between Arab public opinion and the recent Gulf War.

Arab Public Opinion before Iraq Invaded Kuwait

Whatever the sources of Saddam Hussein's ambitions toward Kuwait, his calculation of risk and his chances for success were linked to the prevailing mood in the region that afflicted the populace and the elites alike—a mood related to the end of the cold war and its perceived implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most Arab leaders and elites did not see at the end of the cold war a victory of democracy over dictatorship, or the victory of consensus politics over power politics. Instead, to Arabs the end of the cold war, which signaled the decline of the Soviet Union as a major superpower, ushered in an era of American hegemony that also entailed Israeli's regional hegemony.[8]

A common Arab view was summarized by Saddam Hussein in a speech to the Arab Cooperation Council in February 1990: "Given the relative erosion of the role of the Soviet Union as the key champion of the Arabs in the context of the Arab-Zionist conflict and globally, and given that the influence of the Zionist lobby on U.S. policies is as powerful as ever, the Arabs must take into account that there is a real possibility that Israel might embark on new stupidities within the five-year span I have mentioned. This might take place as a result of direct or tacit U.S. encouragement."[9] Saddam Hussein clearly understood his Arab colleagues' fear and apprehension about the new global political order.[10] Going beyond the typical interpretation of the end of the cold war as inaugurating an era of U.S. hegemony, and therefore Israeli hegemony, the Iraqi leader offered Arabs an alternative: if

[8] The speeches by Arab leaders meeting at the Baghdad summit at the end of May 1990 are a good indicator of official views on this question. These views were also consistent among Arab elites and leaders in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and the West Bank in May and June 1990. This assessment is based on dozens of interviews I conducted in the region during that period in preparing a report for Representative Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

[9] Saddam Hussein's speech to the Arab Cooperation Council, *FBIS Daily Report*, 27 February 1990 (FBIS-NES-90).

[10] For an assessment of the Arab interpretation of the end of the cold war, see Shibley Telhami, "Middle East Politics in the Post-Cold War Era" in George W. Breslauer, Harry Kreisler, and Benjamin Ward, eds., *Beyond the Cold War: Conflict and Cooperation in the Third World* (Berkeley: IIS, University of California at Berkeley, 1992).

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Arabs act jointly and consolidate their oil and financial resources, they will have to be taken seriously by the United States.

In pursuing his designs for Kuwait, the Iraqi leader had Arab public opinion behind him by early summer. At the end of the Arab summit conference held in May in Baghdad, anti-Americanism at the popular level was approaching the intensity of anti-British sentiment of the 1950s; Iraq had become the most influential Arab state; and Saddam Hussein's personal popularity had increased dramatically, despite his all too obvious shortcomings.[11] Driving Arab sentiment were the perception that the Arab-Israeli peace process was dead, the tilt to the right in Israeli politics, a U.S. veto of a UN Security Council resolution on protecting Palestinians, a congressional resolution declaring Jerusalem to be the united capital of Israel, and the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. The prevailing sentiment was concisely summarized by a former Egyptian ambassador to the United States: "Arabs are sick of their governments pathetically begging the U.S. to plead with Israel to please let them have peace."[12] The official spokesman of the Islamic deputies in the Jordanian House of Representatives echoed the sentiment: "The U.S. hostility and arrogance must motivate our Arab and Islamic nation to put an end to the course of begging and capitulation that it is immersed in."[13] By the end of June 1990 following the suspension of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, even Kuwaiti newspapers were calling on the Arabs "to adopt serious and objective stands against the US which persists in a position hostile to the Arab causes."[14] Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak also warned that "the biased U.S. positions will certainly return the region to dependence on the military option."[15]

By flaunting his military capabilities, targeting Israel, and highlighting the Palestinian question, Saddam Hussein filled the gap of regional despair. The popular success of Iraq's leader in exploiting Arab desperation is best illustrated by the reaction of some Muslim

[11] "An Anti-Zionist Ink-blot," *The Economist*, 2 June 1990, quoted an Iraqi passer-by: "Nasser made promises, but could not deliver. But when Saddam speaks, he acts." A lot of Arabs, including millions beyond Iraq, seem inclined to agree. On 19 May 1990, *The Economist* concluded that "By meeting in Baghdad, Iraq's capital, the Arabs hope to show the world that they stand fully behind their newest hero, with his mysterious new monster gun and his promise to destroy 'half of Israel' if Israel dares to attack him." This picture corresponded well to my own conclusions during my visit to the region in May–June 1990.

[12] Ashraf Ghurbal interview with author, Cairo, Egypt, June 1990.

[13] Statement by official spokesman of the Islamic deputies in the Jordanian House of Representatives, *FBIS Daily Report*, 10 May 1990 (FBIS-NES-90).

[14] Reports in Kuwaiti newspapers, *FBIS Daily Reports*, 25 June, 1990 (FBIS-NES-90-122).

[15] Statement by Hosni Mubarak, *FBIS Daily Report*, 5 June 1990 (FBIS-NES-90-108).

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fundamentalists, who earlier had targeted him as an atheist enemy of Islam for his eight years of squandering the resources of two Islamic nations – Iran and Iraq – instead of using them to liberate Jerusalem. By summer, some Muslim leaders had convinced themselves that Saddam now saw the light and that his calls for Islamic Jihad were real.

Indeed, if Iraq made any miscalculation about invading Kuwait, it concerned Arab, not American reaction. The Iraqi leader had been saying for months that he expected the United States to have fewer constraints in advancing its interests now that the Soviets were out of the picture. But he believed that the United States could not succeed without Arab cooperation, and given the mood of despair and anti-Americanism in the region, he calculated, not unreasonably, that Arab governments would be reluctant to accept the deployment of American troops to attack an Arab state. Even in Washington, D.C., as the possibility of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was considered at the end of July 1990, Arab public opinion was considered the primary obstacle to countering a potential Iraqi invasion militarily.[16] What Saddam seemed to forget, however, is that the very competition that initially concerned Arab governments with the Palestinian question would prevent Syria and Egypt from allowing Saddam to seize the reins of Arab leadership.

Capitalizing on Arab frustrations, and exploiting the issue of massive Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel as a symbol of the dangers that would follow the end of the cold war, Saddam Hussein hosted a successful Arab summit in Baghdad in May 1990. This summit, which the Iraqi leader chaired and dominated, was telecast live in most Arab states, making Saddam even more popular.[17] Palestinian leader, Yassir Arafat concluded, "The most important thing to be said is that the latest Arab summit conference under the chairmanship of brother President Saddam Hussein has given a new Pan-Arab resurgence to our Arab nation through Iraqi ability."[18] Arab speeches at the Baghdad summit and extensive interviews with elites and government officials in several Arab nations indicate relative unanimity on the negative consequences of the end of the cold war and on the extent of frustration

[16] This was the assessment of several congressional aides and Middle East experts meeting in Washington, DC a few days before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

[17] In my report to the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, I concluded that Saddam Hussein had emerged as the most popular Arab leader.

[18] Statement by Yassir Arafat at May 1990 Arab summit, *FBIS Daily Report*, 11 July 1990 (FBIS-NES-90).

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with American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. But there were two significant areas of difference.

The first issue on which Arab leaders did not have unanimous agreement concerned what tactics they could use to counter what was perceived to be a difficult global environment. In particular, most believed in 1990 that the world was entering an era of U.S. dominance that would last several years. They also believed that American policy in the Middle East was primarily determined by "the Zionist lobby in Washington" and that American preeminence thus entailed Israel's regional dominance. How the Arabs could overcome these strategic drawbacks was a disputed issue. The Egyptians and the Syrians, even without mutual cooperation, believed that these disadvantages could not be reversed and that the Arabs should try to make the best of a bad situation. In essence, the argument centered on the assumption that this was no time to get on the wrong side of the United States. While the Arabs could not reverse American policy in the Middle East, they could cooperate with the United States to prevent possible disaster and to buy time until a new global political order emerged.[19]

In contrast to Egypt and Syria, the Iraqis argued that the Arabs possessed sufficient economic and military resources to enable them, if they acted collectively, to either compel American cooperation or to help in the formation of a counterweight to the United States.

The third view, held by the Jordanians and the Palestinians, was one of impending disaster that could not be prevented. To begin with, the Palestinian and Jordanians perceived the United States to be in "collusion with Israel." Yassir Arafat believed that the political initiatives of the Bush administration were motivated by the desire to get more and more from the Palestinians, to buy time, and to kill the Intifada, without any serious intent to work toward Israeli compromise.[20] The Jordanians shared this assessment. In addition, both Palestinians and Jordanians believed that Israel was about to embark on a war to implement the Sharon plan to turn Jordan into Palestine. Arafat was anticipating that unless Arabs took serious countermeasures, Israel would launch an attack against Jordan within months, leading to the expulsion of Palestinians from the occupied territories. He was unconvinced by the argument that the Israeli public would not support such an incursion, especially given the lessons that Israelis

[19] Author's interview with Syrian and Egyptian officials, June 1990.
[20] Yassir Arafat, interview with author, Baghdad, Iraq, June 1990.

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had learned from their adventure in Lebanon. To his Arab colleagues, Arafat chanted: "Brother Arabs: The Israelis are beating the drum of war. They are beating the drum of war."[21] In short, for Arafat, disaster was imminent.

A similar sentiment was expressed by Jordanian elites and leaders about the imminent danger to the Arab nation.[22] So desperate was King Hussein at the Baghdad summit, so tragic was the manner of his televised speech, that some of his most loyal citizens felt humiliated by the king's tone. The king, a man with legendary talent for the game of survival, ended his speech with the following warning to Arab leaders: "I have talked about my country with such candor and bitterness in the hope that the day will never come in which I and my people in Jordan—men, women, children, and young men—have nothing to repeat on every lip but that painful cry by the Arab poet: 'They have lost me, and what a brave man they have lost, for he would have defended their frontiers on the evil day.' Peace be upon you."[23]

The unusually harmonious views of Yassir Arafat and King Hussein further consolidated a relationship already strengthened by the Jordanian riots of April 1989 protesting against tough economic measures. Jordanian analysts argued that, besides the economic factor, Jordanians were inspired by the Palestinian uprising and the perceived heroics of the people in south Lebanon.[24] The demonstrations were especially threatening to the king since they took place almost exclusively in Jordanian, not Palestinian, communities. There was a sense that, had the PLO not advised its supporters in Jordan against joining the demonstrations, King Hussein would have been in serious trouble.[25] Expecting more difficult economic times ahead, complicated by fears caused by Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel, the king sought to defuse the situation and spread the blame by holding elections. The PLO, on the other hand, had every incentive to help the Jordanian monarch survive, lest instability in Jordan give Israel an opportunity to implement the option of turning Jordan into a Palestinian state. While these evaluations of Arab positions were made before Iraq invaded Kuwait, it is striking that the eventual lineup of alliances over the Kuwait-Iraq conflict matched these earlier groupings.

[21] Statement by Yassir Arafat, *FBIS Daily Report*, 29 May 1990 (FBIS-NES-90).

[22] Interviews with author, Amman, Jordan, June 1990.

[23] Statement by King Hussein, *FBIS Daily Report*, 30 May 1990 (FBIS-NES-90).

[24] Kamal Abu Jaber, interview with author, Amman, Jordan, June 1990.

[25] This view was expressed by Yassir Arafat during our interview on 5 June 1990, as well as by several Jordanian analysts.

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The second important issue on which Arab rivalry showed itself even before Iraq invaded Kuwait was the question of leadership. On this question, both Syria and Egypt were uneasy about Iraqi's new preeminence in Arab politics. Syria, Iraq's primary rival, was the only Arab state absent from the Baghdad summit, even though the Syrians, like the Jordanians and Palestinians, were calling on the Arabs to prepare themselves to face a war that Israel intended to launch.[26] During the Baghdad summit, Syrian officials privately expressed fear of "excessive" Iraqi influence in Arab affairs.[27] Similarly, Egyptian officials were concerned about the new Iraqi role. Egyptian presidential adviser Usama Al-Baz expressed concern, symbolically, that Yassir Arafat was spending too much of his time in Baghdad (thus acquiescing in the notion that Saddam Hussein was the new Pan-Arab champ). Al-Baz argued that Arafat should be persuaded to spend more time in Cairo, instead.[28]

In contrast to Egypt and Syria, the Jordanians, the Palestinians, the Yemenis, and some North Africans appeared enthusiastic about the Iraqis' new role. The wealthy Gulf Arabs seemed uncertain. These divisions among Arabs on the question of Iraqi leadership were eventually reflected in the various Arab coalitions that emerged following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Arab Public Opinion after the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

While scholars continue to disagree about the relevance of public opinion to public behavior and state policy, several studies indicate that the causal links are affected by one important criterion: how the public ranks a given issue among its priorities. In the United States, for example, it has been shown that how an issue is ranked among public priorities affects how people contribute to campaign funds and how they vote. Those who rank an issue highest in their priorities are more likely to act on the basis of that sentiment and are more likely to affect policy on that issue.[29] Issue importance can explain some of the discrepancy between opinion and behavior. While most Middle East experts were correct in their estimations of the public sentiments

[26] *Al-Ba'th*, Syrian Daily Newspaper (Arabic) 1990.

[27] Interview with author, Damascus, Syria, 30 May 1990.

[28] Usama Al-Baz, interview with author, Cairo, Egypt, 1990.

[29] Jon Krosnick and Shibley Telhami, "Public Attitudes and American Policy Toward Israel" (unpublished, 1992).

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in the Middle East during the Gulf crisis, many were wrong about public behavior. Assessing issue importance for each Arab country can be a helpful measure.

While voting behavior is hardly a useful indicator in Middle East polities, there are ways of measuring the impact of opinion on public behavior. For example, in the case of the Gulf War, one can look at public demonstrations as one indicator of the extent to which the public cared about the issue. While demonstrations in many Arab states are illegal and therefore risky, the pattern of demonstrations can be telling.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait brought out several issues of contention for Arab public opinion. The first issue was the promise of deliverance from an unacceptable status quo, which was blamed on corrupt governments and foreign imperialism. The second question pertained to the principle of state sovereignty, clearly violated by Iraq. A third issue was the promise of economic redistribution in the Arab world. Fourth was the idea of a powerful Arab state finally able to stand up to Israel and western powers and to liberate Palestine. The fifth issue pertained to foreign intervention on Arab soil. While all these issues were present in the calculations of most Arabs, the relative weight of each issue varied across the Arab world.

To assess Arab popular behavior and the impact of that behavior on the policies of Arab states, it is especially helpful to rank these issues in light of the priorities of each Arab community. The fact that Arabs disagreed on the ranking of these issues—or disagreed on one issue, such as the danger inherent in one Arab state invading another—did not indicate fundamental disagreements on others. For example, most Arabs (with the possible exception of the Kuwaitis) were uneasy about the presence of foreign troops on Arab soil, and most hoped that the crisis could be exploited to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Clearly, the Jordanians and Palestinians, the two parties most vulnerable to possible Israeli threats, cared most about Iraq's potential in standing up to Israel and the United States, especially given their expectations of impending disaster prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The North Africans, the Yemenis, and the Sudanese—poor nations who envied the Gulf Arabs—were frustrated by what appeared to be imperial designs for Palestine and were lured by the possibility of economic redistribution and the resurgence of Arab pride. For wealthy Gulf Arabs, immediately threatened by Iraqi aggression, confronting Iraq was their primary objective.

As for the Syrians and Egyptians, the popular soul was more divided, although opinion tipped toward confronting Iraq only by strong gov-

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ernment decisions. First, both Syria and Egypt feared Iraq's regional dominance; second, neither thought that Iraq could stand up to the United States, and both thought that they would be on the losing side if they did not confront Iraq. Third, extensive U.S. lobbying played an important role in shaping opinion.

Patterns of Demonstrations in the Arab World

The patterns of reported demonstrations in the Arab world support the view that public behavior reflected the public ranking of issues.[30] In the months preceding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, most reported protests took place in Jordan and Algeria: nine were reported in Jordan in April and May, and seven demonstrations were reported in Algeria during the same period.

The demonstrations held in Jordan were primarily related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The protests were over Soviet Jewish immigration, the killing of several Palestinians by a lone Israeli in Reshon Lizion, and American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the two months following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait more demonstrations were reported in Jordan than anywhere else in the Arab world, with the linkage between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf crisis emphasized.

In Algeria, the demonstrations prior to the Gulf War focused primarily on domestic political and economic problems, with some favoring political reform, others protesting price rises. The Gulf crisis gave opposition groups in Algeria additional tools for mobilizing the masses and challenging the status quo.

No demonstrations were reported in the Gulf states, and only one was reported in Egypt during the crisis. In Sudan and Yemen, where only one demonstration was reported in the four months before the crisis, fourteen demonstrations were reported in August, with the primary issue apparently being opposition to foreign intervention.

Still, despite differences in priorities, many Arabs, including Egyptians and Syrians (but probably not including the Arabs of the Gulf) felt that the defeat of Iraq would not be good for the Arabs, believed

[30] This account is based on a survey of the daily reports from the Arab world as published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. It should be noted that these reports are by no means comprehensive, because they reflect mostly official and local press accounts, which could not be entirely reliable given the strict information control campaigns during the Gulf crisis. Nonetheless, this survey is useful as a limited indicator in conjunction with the analytical and first-hand accounts.

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that the alliance against Iraq was an American hegemonic design, and once Iraqi forces came under attack, hoped for an Iraqi victory. Yet, beyond the few popular demonstrations in several Arab states, there seemed little threat to Arab governments that joined the U.S.-led alliance against Iraq. Even more puzzling is the relatively muted popular reaction following the apparent destruction of Iraq's military force and much of its industrial base, not to mention tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens. How is this possible if Arab public opinion fits the picture described earlier?

Between Public Opinion, Public Behavior, and State Policy

There are three intervening variables linking events, opinions about them, and consequent policy. The first is the sources of public information about a given issue; the second is the ranking of that issue in public priorities; and third is the assessment of the future outcome.

As for the first issue, Iraqi leaders must have made an erroneous connection between their reading of public sentiment on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S. role in it, on the one hand, and their ability to feed that public his own version of events, on the other hand. Members of the alliance against Iraq understood from the beginning that the Iraqi leader's biggest leverage in the crisis rested on his ability to mobilize public opinion. His opponents among Arab governments were not about to make it easy for him.

Once Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia made a decision to join a U.S.-led alliance against Iraq, they could no longer pretend they had any misgivings about United States' efforts, and they had every incentive to make a public case against the Iraqi invasion. Divided soul or not, they had to act as though the choice was utterly clear. A coordinated information campaign portrayed a uniform picture of events.[31]

[31] In Egypt, many "Islamic" books, apparently funded by Gulf states, were published. Many of them found Iraq guilty on religious grounds and defended Egypt and Saudi Arabia: Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (Egypt's Mufti), *Al-Hukm al-Shar'i fi Ahdath al-Khalij* (Cairo: Dar al Ifta' al-Masriyya, 1990); Manna' Al-Qattan, *Harb al-Khalij fi Mizan al-Fiqh al Islami* (Cairo: al-Zahra' lil-'loom, 1991); Ahmad Omar Hashim, (Deputy President of al-Azahar University) *Mihnat al-Khalij Wamawqif Misr Wassa'oodiyya Walbilad al-Islamiyya* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 1991); Abd al-Halim 'uweis, *Ightiyal al-Kuweit* (Cairo: Dar al-Sahwa, 1991); and a collection of poems by Muhammad al-Tuhami, *Dima' al-"urooba 'la Judran al-Kuweit* (Cairo: Matabi' al-ufset, 1991). Still, there were indications that public sentiment among the Islamic leaders was not unanimous. In the introduction to one of the books finding Iraq guilty on religious ground, the introduction (by Ahmad Ra'if) presents the author as "one of the few who did not hesitate to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, speaking frankly and forcefully even though this hurt many of his friends and acquain-

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In contrast to the 1950s, the substantially enhanced capacities of these states made the task easier. More important, the appearance of a collective position among the three primary Arab actors presented an important cue for Arabs looking for external signals by which to evaluate Arab and Islamic interests. It is not surprising that Syria and Egypt, like Iraq, explained their policies in terms of Arab and Islamic interests and the cause of the Palestinians.

The information campaign deprived Iraqi leaders of extensive access to the masses they sought to mobilize. One glaring exception was the case of Jordan: Jordanian television and radio, which are monitored in the West Bank and Syria, gave people access to Iraqi views. The impact of Jordanian television on Syrian public opinion may have been critical to the formation of what many scholars and journalists believed to be a pro-Iraqi sentiment. It was probably this issue more than any other that brought Jordan under extensive criticism from the United States and its Arab allies.

Still, public opinion does not automatically affect either public behavior or state policy; issue importance is a key indicator. The patterns of public and state behavior in the Arab world indicate that two measures are useful in this regard. The first is the priority rankings of the issues among the Arab governments, informed by strategic calculations; the second is the priority rankings of the issues among the Arab publics informed by the proximity of a given Arab polity to one of two conflicts—the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian Gulf conflict. The further removed from the Gulf an Arab polity was, the less bothered it was by the violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty; the closer it was to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the more supportive it was of Iraq, in the hope of linkage.

Indeed, one interesting feature in the evolution of Arab public opinion is that, once the war was over and international intrusions into Iraq increased, Arab public opinion in states like Egypt, where the pro-Iraqi sentiment was muted before the war, became more sympathetic to Iraq. The liberation of Kuwait removed the primary justification for opposing Iraq but left all the elements that had brought Iraq sympathy even among its opponents.

The opposite is true among those who were the strongest supporters of Iraq (Palestinians, Jordanians, North Africans): the devastating

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tances who took a different stand." (Muhammad Salim al 'awwa, *Al-'abath bil-Islam fi Azamat al-Khalij* (Cairo: Al-Zahra' lil-I'lam al 'arabi, 1990), 9.

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defeat of Iraq, while it remains a serious source of resentment, stifled public opposition. Two factors account for this: the new image of Saddam Hussein as a leader who let them down and the movement toward an Arab-Israeli peace.

American and Arab policy makers understood that part of Saddam Hussein's popularity in the Arab world stemmed from his promise to deliver militarily what his colleagues could not do through diplomacy: justice for Palestinians and Arab independence from foreign influence. But they believed that support based on such a promise would dissipate when it appeared to have been a hoax; people generally don't support losers. Saddam's failure, despite what now appears to have been real military potential, led many to blame him for the failure.

The United States' long active role since the war in seeking a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict has raised hopes for a peaceful settlement of the very conflict that the Iraqi leader used to rally support. Adding to the relative quiet of the Arab public is the fact that key Arab states appear to be coordinating their policy and going along with this process; the external cue for most Arabs is the collective Arab position—an element that also contributed to the relative public quiet during the war (since Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were all on the same side).

If the Arab coalition falls apart and the Arab-Israeli peace process fails, the Arab public is likely to be mobilized again. And disagreements over the Gulf War (hidden feelings of guilt and resentment) are likely to surface. It is a mistake to conclude that the worse repercussions of the Gulf War have already come to pass. The most serious public consequences of the Suez crisis in the 1950s took several years to be revealed.

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The Limits of White House Image Control

MARK J. ROZELL

Gerald R. Ford became president under the most unusual circumstances in United States history. Unelected, he ascended to the nation's highest office, never having sought that coveted position. In fact, he never sought to do more than to faithfully represent his constituents in Michigan's 5th Congressional District and perhaps to become the Speaker of the House. Before Richard M. Nixon chose him in October 1973 to be vice president, Ford had contemplated soon retiring from public life.

Fate dealt Ford a different future and presidential scholars a unique administration to study. This article focuses on the early stage of Ford's press relations—the euphoric post-Nixon honeymoon through the unpopular Nixon pardon—as seen through the eyes of key Ford White House media advisers.

The author interviewed Ford's media advisers to develop insight into an important transitional period in the relationship between the presidency and the press. The interview data show how administration insiders, as well as the president, perceived and responded to the unique situation they found themselves in after the Nixon resignation. That context must be emphasized in any effort to understand Ford's press relations. As a number of studies show, the Watergate era was a water-

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shed in the press-presidency relationship.[1] The press had moved decidedly away from a deferential posture to one of substantial skepticism, even cynicism, toward presidential pronouncements and activities. Ford and his media advisers had to respond to this unusual situation.

As the interview data make clear, the president's media advisers recognized well the context of the press-presidency relationship immediately after Nixon. They developed strategies to cope with that context. Ultimately, they could not succeed in their efforts to generate a favorable press for Ford, because the president misread in part the post-Watergate environment. He believed that presidential openness—as distinct from Nixon White House press relations—would alone provide an atmosphere for favorable presidential press relations. Yet this strategy could only work in the short term, because, as the Reagan presidency so clearly revealed later on, an administration must have a sustained public relations plan that is an integral part of its policy-making strategy. As the following case study makes clear, Ford failed to effectively link public relations with public policy.

Consequently, the analysis presented here seeks to enhance scholarly understanding of the importance of presidential management of the press. No president can afford to ignore the crucial task of media management, even when policy decisions are driven by nonpublic relations considerations. A White House must link a public relations strategy with a public policy agenda. Because of inept handling from a public relations standpoint of the decision to pardon Nixon, Ford and his media advisers lost control over the president's image and never recovered from the severely negative press and public reactions to that controversial decision. Ford's press officers make clear that whereas a sound news management strategy probably would not have convinced critics that Nixon deserved a pardon, such a strategy could have blunted the severity of the negative reaction and enabled Ford's presidency to recover from the controversy. The following case study reinforces the theory that presidential press strategy must be a part of an administration's policy-making process. The case of the Ford presidency (as well as Jimmy Carter's) reveals the important link be-

[1] Richard M. Pious writes that "the legacy of Watergate is wolfpack journalism" in *The American Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 417. See also, Gladys Lang and Kurt Lang, *The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press, and the Polls During Watergate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); David Broder, *Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News Is Made* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); William L. Rivers, *The Other Government: Power and the Washington Media* (New York: Universe Books, 1982).

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tween press relations and policy making—a link better understood and acted upon by the Reagan administration.

The question of how successful a White House can be in managing the news is of particular interest to political communications scholars. According to many, presidents have enormous leeway in their efforts to set the press's agenda. Consider the following observations by political communications analysts:

> As principal sources of news about an administration, the president, his closest aides, and the White House press office are certainly in a position to create their own favorable news coverage. This can be accomplished by supervising what is released, and the method or news medium through which key political interest groups and the general public are informed. In short, the White House can influence—if not completely control—the *content*, *timing*, and *methods of publicizing* the news.[2]

> Presidents use the media to get elected and, once in office, have a free pass to reshape the terms of the debate over national policy. They can redefine the political mainstream and put themselves in the middle of it. Every day we get a rich diet of news showing them in command.[3]

In addition to the above quotes, other political science studies contend that in the presidential-press relationship, the White House has the upper hand in getting its message out on its own terms. A content analysis of twenty-five years of presidential coverage in *Time*, *The New York Times*, and CBS-TV news quantifies a remarkably favorable media coverage of successive chief executives. Not only is the news coverage of presidents remarkably favorable, according to the study, it is generally stable and consistent over time. The authors conclude: "Knowledge of these patterns over the years has led presidents and their staffs to develop strategies based on the predictability and the uniformity of the press coverage of the White House."[4] Yet the study makes clear that the pattern of substantial press deference toward the presidency was interrupted by Watergate and the press's reaction in the immediate post-Watergate years. Other studies show that not until

[2] Harvey G. Zeidenstein, "News Media Perceptions of White House News Management," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 14 (Summer 1984): 391. (Emphasis in original.)

[3] Lewis W. Wolfson, *The Untapped Power of the Press* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 12. See also David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman, "Presidents, Power, and the Press," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 10 (Summer 1980): 416–426.

[4] Michael Grossman and Martha Kumar, "Images of the White House in the Media" in Robert E. DiClerico, ed., *Analyzing the Presidency*, 2nd ed. (Guilford, CT: Dushkin Pub. Group, 1990), 183.

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the Reagan years did the press once again become deferential to the president.[5]

The ability of the White House to manipulate news coverage through public relations strategies and gimmicks has long been a matter of concern to political scientists, media analysts, and journalists. Consider the comments of two political scientists:

> One of the more disturbing elements in the growth of the Presidential establishment is the development and the recent enlargement of a huge public relations apparatus.[6]

> Modern presidents, particularly during the long cold war, have been notorious for their attempts to "manage" news.[7]

In the post-Reagan era, there is increased scholarly and journalistic concern over the news management controversy. Based on his comprehensive content analysis of news coverage of Reagan's presidency, Mark Hertsgaard concludes that the Reagan White House scripted its own news coverage and suggests that future administrations will follow suit. In his words:

> The Reagan model worked so well that the relationship between the White House and the press will never be the same again. Long after Ronald Reagan has left the White House, the model of news management introduced during his tenure will remain behind, shaping news coverage and therefore public perception.[8]

Presidency scholar Samuel Kernell makes a similar point in *Going Public*:

> As exceptional as the Great Communicator's record appears today, there is good reason to suspect that it harbingers things to come. If individualized

[5] Mark Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1988); John Anthony Maltese, *Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 179–214; Mary E. Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-In-Chief* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991), 114–124.

[6] Thomas E. Cronin, "The Presidency Public Relations Script" in Rexford G. Tugwell and Thomas E. Cronin, eds., *The Presidency Reappraised* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 168.

[7] Harry Kranz, "The Presidency v. The Press: Who Is Right?" in Aaron Wildavsky, ed., *Perspectives on the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 208. Journalists often express the same dislike of presidential attempts to manage the news. See, for example, Arthur Krock, "Mr. Kennedy's Management of the News," *Fortune*, March 1963, 199–202; David Broder, *Behind the Front: A Candid Look at How the News is Made* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), esp. chap. entitled "Reagan's Way – and a Better Way"; Sam Donaldson, *Hold on, Mr. President!* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1987), esp. chap. entitled "Covering the President."

[8] Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, 7.

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> pluralism is indeed ascendant, an era of presidents who routinely go public is at hand.[9]

And news media analyst W. Lance Bennett writes that: "The art of 'message management' was never carried to a higher form than during the Reagan years in the White House."[10] Confirming Hertsgaard's thesis, Bennett notes that the Reagan White House skillfully employed the best tricks of the public relations trade: simplify the content of the message, adopt a "line of the day," enforce uniformity in the presentation of the message, repeat the message often.[11]

Presidents and their media advisers are less likely to see themselves as endowed with enormous advantages in their dealings with the press. More likely, they perceive an independently powerful and often cynical press corps capable of undermining the White House's efforts to lead. At the least, the White House press officials see larger forces at work—what could be called contextual factors—influencing the presidential image. For example, contrast the understandable scholarly concern over media manipulation with the following observation by Ford White House press secretary Ron Nessen:

> . . . the ability of the White House to manage the image of a president, to manipulate the press, is wildly exaggerated. . . . The fact is that a president who is doing the right things in a substantive way and is popular because of what he is doing or for what he stands for is not going to have a lot of press problems and is not going to have a worry about his image in the press. A president who is doing things that are unpopular, or the economy is bad, or his views are not fully accepted, he's going to have problems with the press. There's only a marginal, small impact that any sort of media management or image making can have on this relationship.[12]

Nessen offered his observation in reaction to my question of what he and other leading communications people in the White House tried to do to build up President Ford's press image. He emphatically told me: "No White House can do much about a president's image."[13]

The contrast between Nessen's comments and the scholars' assessments of Reagan's press relations can be explained by the different contexts of the Ford and Reagan years. Ford's press relationship is

[9] Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1986), 139.

[10] W. Lance Bennett, *News: The Politics of Illusion*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1988), 90.

[11] Ibid., 90–91.

[12] Author interview with Ron Nessen by telephone, 5 July 1990.

[13] Ibid.

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important to study because of the historical location of his administration in presidential press relations. The Ford years represent a transitional period between the era of press cynicism toward the presidency to one of greater press deference to the presidency, as represented by the Reagan years. As Martin Linsky makes clear, presidential-press cooperation largely prevailed prior to Watergate. That watershed event resulted in "cynicism on the part of the press" toward government. Ford became the first president to have to deal with the legacy of Nixon's deceits and to develop a press plan in a period in which a "bald marketing campaign" by the White House would not succeed alone.[14]

We can learn much about the post-Watergate press-presidency relationship by studying the Ford White House's early press relations as seen through the eyes of Ford's press officers. Their retrospective assessments confirm scholarly interpretations of the crucial link between presidential imagery and presidential success. Their comments make clear the need for presidential-press management generally and more specifically the need to link a public relations strategy with a public policy agenda. Ford's press officers also establish that contextual factors play an important role in the development of a presidential image. In Ford's case, they point out that the president had several unique public relations disadvantages to overcome. For example:

- An unelected president, Ford lacked a public mandate and a loyal constituency, two powerful devices that can help shield an administration from harsh criticism.
- Lacking a national campaign, Ford also did not have a loyal group of reporters who typically get assigned to the White House beat after having covered the successful candidate's campaign.
- Ford did not have the usual eleven week transition period to plan an agenda and press strategy.
- Ford had to deal with a press corps left cynical and combative by the Watergate scandal.

With all of these disadvantages, the Ford White House still needed to do what all White Houses do—try to devise a viable strategy for effecting a positive press relationship. The retrospective comments of key Ford White House advisers provide insight into how the adminis-

[14] Martin Linsky, *Impact: How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 45, 47.

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tration initially tried to deal with the press and how the pardon of Richard M. Nixon profoundly changed Ford's press relationship. Their comments make clear that an administration cannot ignore the element of press strategy in its decision-making process, as Ford did in pardoning Nixon. Although there is no guarantee that press strategy can turn a potentially unpopular action into a popular one, carefully priming the press and the public can make a controversial action at least more palatable than it would be otherwise.

To develop an understanding of Ford's early press relations and the pardon's impact on his image, I interviewed the following Ford White House members: Gerald R. Ford (president of the United States, 13 December 1989); Robert Hartmann (counsellor to the president, 15 December 1989); William Greener (deputy press secretary, 23 January 1990); Larry Speakes (assistant press secretary, 6 February 1990); Gerald Warren (deputy press secretary, 15 March 1990); John G. Carlson (assistant press secretary, 2 May 1990); John Hushen (deputy press secretary, 14 May 1990); Margita White (assistant press secretary and then director of the White House Office of Communications, 7 June 1990); Jerald F. terHorst (first press secretary, 27 June 1990); Ron Nessen (second press secretary, 5 July 1990); Louis M. Thompson, Jr. (assistant press secretary, 20 November 1990); J. William Roberts (assistant press secretary, 27 November 1990).[15]

As Robert M. Entman explains: "The chief job of presidential press officers is precisely to obtain positive news slant and deflect negative."[16] The comments of Ford's press officers make clear that these people agreed with that definition of their role in the White House. Nonetheless, they emphasized the unlikelihood of being able to fulfill that role given the disadvantageous circumstances under which they operated and given the president's handling of the pardon decision.

[15] The author conducted these interviews either in person (Hartmann, Hushen, terHorst, Thompson, Roberts) or by telephone (Ford, Greener, Speakes, Warren, Carlson, White, Nessen). In each case, the interview was recorded with the consent of the interviewee. Questions were submitted in advance, although the interviewees were encouraged not to feel constrained to answer only the specific questions. Several chose to go beyond the scope of the interview agenda established by the submitted questions and elaborated on their own unique experiences or insights. Consequently, the interviews varied in time from fifteen minutes (Ford) to several hours (Hartmann, Hushen, Roberts, terHorst, Thompson). The interviewees were offered the opportunity to review and to edit—for purposes of clarity and grammar, not substance—the transcripts of their comments. Only terHorst, Nessen, Hushen, and Roberts chose to do so. The others preferred to be quoted exactly as they had spoken, no editing.

[16] Robert M. Entman, *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 65.

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In what follows, I examine the nature of Ford's early press strategy and relations, the effects of the sudden pardon decision on those relations, and what scholars can learn from the retrospective assessments of Ford's press officers.

Early Press Strategy

Becoming president under such unusual circumstances provided Ford with both opportunities and pitfalls in his press relations. For example, Ford's early press image clearly benefited from the fact that he was not Nixon. Ford reaped the benefit of the national euphoria that accompanied Nixon's departure from the White House.

Yet the sudden change in the nation's leadership denied the Ford White House an opportunity to plan a coherent press relations strategy. Jerald F. terHorst, the press secretary during Ford's first month in office, said that "we never sat down and consciously devised what is called a 'media strategy' or a 'P.R. strategy.' There wasn't time for it, for one thing. We had to walk in there and hit the ground running." TerHorst described his "transition" to office in this way:

> I had twenty minutes of briefing from [Nixon Press Secretary] Ron Ziegler, which was really, "here's the office, the men's room is around the corner, the safe is under my desk, here's the combination, if you need me give me a call in California—they're calling me to the helicopter now." That was the extent of the transition from one administration to another, as far as the press secretary was concerned.[17]

Deputy Press Secretary John W. Hushen and Assistant Press Secretary Larry Speakes also emphasized that the lack of a normal transition period made difficult the formulation of a press strategy:

> *Hushen*: One of the great complications for the Ford presidency was the fact that there was no regular transition period. Ford literally went from being Vice President of the United States to President of the United States overnight. So there was not time to give a lot of thought initially to press strategy.[18]
>
> *Speakes*: Ford being thrust into the presidency as he was, there was not the usual time available to sit down and to plan a strategy. I think that was largely responsible for Ford's inability to get a good press for his initiatives. The first thirty days in the White House press office in 1974 are often compared to standing by a railroad track and watching a freight train go by while trying

[17] Author interview with Jerald F. terHorst, Washington, DC, 27 June 1990.
[18] Author interview with John W. Hushen, Washington, DC, 14 May 1990.

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to read the words on the boxcars. . . . There was no structure. Usually, in other White Houses there had been an office of communications or somebody, a chief of staff for example, who had an interest in looking at long-term strategy. We just didn't have that luxury in the Ford White House. . . .[19]

Having served Ford and then as chief presidential spokesperson for Reagan, Speakes has an important vantage from which to assess Ford's press strategy. He pointed out a number of contrasts between the Ford and Reagan cases—one president was not very articulate, the other extremely charismatic; one tended to downplay press strategy, the other made it a focus of all of his administration's activities; one came to the presidency unexpectedly without a transition, the other mapped out a detailed "100 days" plan during the presidential campaign in case of election.[20]

Even without a regular transition period and a press relations blueprint, Ford White House advisers had ideas about how to get off to a favorable start dealing with the press. In the early days, the White House capitalized on the president's reputation for honesty and integrity—a major public relations asset in the wake of the Watergate scandal. To the extent that the White House had a press strategy early in the term, it consisted of the need to emphasize the change taking place in the nation's leadership and the attempts to project the open presidency theme. Each Ford White House staffer interviewed for this analysis emphasized these aspects of Ford's press "strategy." For example:

Greener: Generally speaking, the strategy was to be open and above board, and to answer [reporters'] questions as much as possible. And to make people available.[21]

Warren: If the Ford administration had any strategy at all, it was to impress upon the press corps that this was a different administration. That this was not the Nixon administration. . . . And there was a press strategy to try to humanize the presidency. You may remember the President fixing his own breakfast and other such activities. . . . The other strategy, as I understand it, was to try to be as forthcoming as possible on all questions raised by journalists.[22]

terHorst: We wanted to convey that this administration would be an open place in a democratic, American fashion. It was important to make people

[19] Author interview with Larry Speakes by telephone, 6 February 1990.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Author interview with William Greener by telephone, 23 January 1990.
[22] Author interview with Gerald Warren by telephone, 15 March 1990.

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> once again proud of their president and proud of the White House. . . . [Ford] understood the need for what we were trying to do. . . . He did want to establish himself as a change from Richard Nixon. He may never have stated that publicly, but that was his personal view of the situation.[23]

TerHorst noted a number of symbolic and substantive actions adopted early by the Ford White House to convey the themes of change and openness. Having been deprived for so long of a presidential press conference, members of the media clamored for an early Ford press conference. Ford agreed, and at terHorst's suggestion the president entered the East Room conference by walking down a long, open hallway to the simple podium that stood there before the press corps.

> I did not want Jerry Ford standing behind a huge bullet-proof podium with his back to the wall and that blue curtain, as Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson did. That setup made them look like caged men surrounded by cameras and reporters with the press in a feeding frenzy, almost like sharks. Jerry Ford agreed to let me fashion something that would be different, more open. . . . It did indeed look open! It worked. It was cosmetic, but it also was symbolic. It reinforced Ford's promise to be an open, accessible president.[24]

TerHorst also emphasized his accessibility to the president, another change from the practices of the Nixon White House. The press secretary wanted the press to be confident that when he announced a presidential directive or comment that the words actually came from Ford, not from some senior staffer speaking on behalf of the president.

> One of Ron Ziegler's constant press problems was, "Ron, have you seen the President? When was the last time you saw him? Or are you just talking with General Haig?" Which was often the case. . . . One of the first things I had to do was to demonstrate that I did have direct access to the President whenever I needed it so that questions could get answered. . . . We wanted to demonstrate that this President at least talked to his press secretary and the press secretary knew what he was saying. There was both an open door for the media through me, and an open door for me within the environs of the administration.[25]

TerHorst explained that the president directed him "to straighten out the press office." That meant taking off the payroll a number of Nixon White House "holdovers" who really did not work for the press secretary. It also meant clearing out of the press office such individuals

[23] TerHorst interview.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

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as Father John McLaughlin whom the press strongly associated with the Nixon public relations apparatus.

> I had firm instructions from the President that there was no room for him. We didn't have on my staff any room for such things as an "attack force" and a "defense force." I surely didn't need any of those offices. And I certainly didn't need those sorts of people. . . . The guard has changed.[26]

Ford adopted other symbolic changes to convey the theme of an open, unpretentious White House. These included replacing "Hail to the Chief" with the "Michigan Fight Song," referring to the White House as the "residence," and renaming the presidential plane "Air Force One" (rather than Nixon's usage, "The Spirit of '76"). Ford also dropped the name of the White House Office of Communications, Margita White explained, "largely because there was still a great deal of sensitivity to the impression of that office left by the Nixon White House. That office took on a very political role under Ken Clawson during the last days of Watergate."[27] Eventually the name "White House Office of Communications" resurfaced, but the initial dropping of that name again signified Ford's intention to convey that his presidency differed from Nixon's.

Despite the lack of a regular transition period and of a well developed press strategy, Ford received during the first month of the term what he described as "the kind of press coverage that every politician loves but almost never gets."[28] A comprehensive content analysis of Ford's press coverage during his first month in office confirms that assessment.[29] Journalists used such descriptions for Ford and his presidency

[26] Ibid. TerHorst noted that the press unrealistically expected the Ford White House to be cleansed of every Nixon Republican. From 1952 to 1972 Nixon had been on the Republican ticket as either the vice presidential or presidential candidate in every election, except 1964. Few prominent Republicans could claim no Nixon association. However, some Nixon loyalists who posed serious problems for Ford did not immediately leave. McLaughlin hung on until after terHorst left the White House. The next press secretary, Ron Nessen, wrote a memo to Donald Rumsfeld about the McLaughlin problem: "He is the major holdover problem from a public relations standpoint. There is absolutely no room for him in my operation and he must go as soon as possible." Memo from Ron Nessen to Donald Rumsfeld, 30 September 1974, Folder: "Press Office-Administrative Matters," Box 23, Nessen Paper, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Louis M. Thompson, Jr., who organized the Ford White House press office, confirmed the president's goal to remove those Nixon holdovers—such as Pat Buchanan and Kenneth Clawson, as well as McLaughlin—who were associated with the Watergate apologist role (Author interview with Louis M. Thompson, Jr., Washington, DC, 20 November 1990).

[27] Author interview with Margita White by telephone, 7 June 1990.

[28] Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal* (Norwalk, CT: Easton Press edition, 1987), 178.

[29] Mark J. Rozell, *The Press and the Ford Presidency* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992), 36–48.

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as "open and honest," "simple and candid," "fresh style," "nothing fancy, nothing contrived, nothing concealed."[30] Leading reporters, columnists and editorialists offered the following adulatory assessments during Ford's early days:

David Broder: Jerry Ford is the most normal, sane, down-to-earth individual to work in the White House since Harry Truman left.[31]

Tom Braden: He comes to us in pristine straightness.[32]

Alan L. Otten: He is a man of integrity.[33]

Chalmers M. Roberts: Integrity has been restored to the White House. Gerald Ford's first days in office . . . have heralded a total reversal of the secrecy, criminality and introversion of the Nixon years.[34]

New York Times: . . . the country's political prospects—to say nothing of its morale—have undergone a dramatic transformation.[35]

Clearly, circumstances contributed more to Ford's early favorable press reviews than any efforts at press management. As Robert Hartmann noted, at that early stage the press, not the Ford White House, effectively marketed the president:

During the first part of his presidency there was a national euphoria, a honeymoon that the press helped to create, all stemming in part from the fact that Ford was not Nixon and that he was a much more likeable personality meriting sympathy and support because of the difficult position he found himself in.[36]

A number of Ford White House staffers attributed the early media success as well to the president's personality. They contended that such a genuinely likeable and unpretentious person as Ford did not require slick packaging to be seen as a contrast to his predecessor. Commenting on Ford's first thirty days of good press relations, terHorst assessed: "I don't think that I had a lot to do with it. I think the best press secretary at that point was Jerry Ford himself. He made life very easy for me."[37] Larry Speakes added that "it was Ford's personality—from

[30] Ibid.

[31] David Broder, "Giving Mr. Ford a Chance," *Washington Post*, 14 August 1974.

[32] Tom Braden, "Welcome to the White House," *Washington Post*, 17 August 1974.

[33] Alan L. Otten, "Can He Do It?" *Wall Street Journal*, 15 August 1971.

[34] Chalmers M. Roberts, "Under President Ford: A Return to Normalcy," *Washington Post*, 15 August 1974.

[35] "Political Turnaround," *New York Times*, 25 August 1974. See also, "Mr. Ford's Open Door," *New York Times*, 24 August 1974.

[36] Author interview with Robert Hartmann, Bethesda, Maryland, 5 December 1989.

[37] TerHorst interview.

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toasting his own English muffins to this good guy, boy scout, eagle scout image – that carried him for the first thirty days. And, of course, there was the end to turmoil and the calmness of his demeanor."[38] Speakes has also commented in retrospect: "During those first days, President Ford pushed all the right buttons. . . . The stage was set to create a favorable public image."[39]

The Pardon and terHorst Resignation

The set on Ford's public image stage underwent a major change after he unconditionally pardoned Richard M. Nixon for the role that the thirty-seventh president played in covering up the Watergate scandal or any other criminal acts he may have committed while president. Press Secretary Jerald F. terHorst resigned in protest. Each Ford White House staffer pointed to these two events as the crucial turning point in Ford's press relations. And with good reason. The public responded to the pardon swiftly, negatively, and severely. Within one hour of the president's early Sunday morning 8 September 1974 announcement, phone calls running eight-to-one against the pardon inundated the White House switchboards.[40] The Gallup Poll reflected an immediate sixteen point decline – from 66 percent to 50 percent – in the president's public approval rating after the pardon announcement.[41]

The immediate press reaction to the pardon hardly could have been more negative. Between 9 and 12 September, *The New York Times* ran five editorials denouncing the pardon.[42] The *Times* referred to the pardon as a "blundering intervention," "an inappropriate and premature" act that "affronted the Constitution and the American system of justice" and was "profoundly unwise, divisive and unjust" as well as "unconscionable." A comprehensive content analysis of press commentary on the pardon reveals that the *Times's* severely negative response to that decision was not unusual.[43] Most damaging to Ford

[38] Larry Speakes interview.

[39] "Remarks by Larry Speakes: The Ford Image," Seventh Presidential Conference, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York, 8 April 1989.

[40] Jerald F. terHorst, *Gerald Ford and the Future of the Presidency* (New York: Joseph Okpaku Pub. Co., 1974), 222–223.

[41] *New York Times*, 13 October 1974.

[42] "The Failure of Mr. Ford," *New York Times*, 9 September 1974; "Pardon for What?" *New York Times*, 10 September 1974; "Nightmare Compounded" and "Growing Dossier," *New York Times*, 11 September 1974; and "Back to Politics," *New York Times*, 12 September 1974.

[43] Rozell, *The Press and the Ford Presidency*, 52–63.

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were assessments that he lacked trustworthiness and credibility, two values routinely attributed to him prior to the pardon:

> *George F. Will*: The lethal fact is that Mr. Ford now has demonstrated that he is just one of the boys: he doesn't mean what he says. . . . The effect of his precipitate action appears rather like the effect of what used to be called, in less polite times, a coverup.[44]
>
> *Joseph Kraft*: [Ford] is now seen for what he is—an ordinary pol who cannot be deeply trusted.[45]
>
> . . . it is hard not to suspect that there was some kind of deal between the former President and the man now in the White House.[46]

After discussing with me the enormous successes that Ford had those first days in office, Assistant Press Secretary J. William Roberts added:

> A month later came the pardon and it's back to Nixon. Even though we were different, from the press standpoint there was some kind of deal and they just didn't like it. Boy, did we have a brutal time. And the terHorst resignation really compounded the problem. . . . [F]or a long, long while the suspicion was there and you could really feel it in the questions that came and the attitude of cynicism and distrust. It was very painful for me because I knew we weren't operating that way. It hurt.[47]

From a press relations standpoint, did the Ford White House properly handle these events? Was the negative public and press reaction to the pardon inevitable or could the president have turned that decision into a public relations plus? On these questions, Ford's White House staffers offer valuable insights.

For the most part, these staffers agree that from a purely public relations standpoint, Ford did not handle effectively the pardon decision. Robert Hartmann attributed Ford's national press image problems in large part to "the surprise that Ford sprung on the press with the pardon, because it wasn't Ford's nature to do things by surprise, to keep little secrets. That particularly applies to the beltway press." Hartmann added:

> The honeymoon, the feeling of openness was sharply constricted by the pardon. Not entirely because the pardon itself was unpopular with the press, but because

[44] George F. Will, ". . . Who Has Eroded Respect for Law. . . ," *Washington Post*, 10 September 1974.

[45] Joseph Kraft, "Gerald Ford: 'An Ordinary Pol' . . . ," *Washington Post*, 19 September 1974.

[46] Joseph Kraft, "Prolonging the National Nightmare," *Washington Post*, 12 September 1974.

[47] Author interview with J. William Roberts, Falls Church, VA, 27 November 1990.

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> in his last press conference before the pardon he seemingly had said that he was not going to do that [pardon Nixon], at least for a while. He seemed to say in the press conference . . . that while he was not going to rule out pardoning Nixon that this was something a long way off and nobody should expect it next week, when in fact it was the next week. They felt that they were had on this because they were unprepared for it, and, of course, they didn't like it. They felt about Nixon the way many people now feel about Mrs. Helmsley – they wanted to knock him down, stomp on him, kick him, and then bury him alive. . . . So when Ford did this he lost some of the rapport he always had [with the press].[48]

J. William Roberts asserted that "to just spring it at that time and that way, everything was just wrong about it from a public relations standpoint."[49] John W. Hushen stated more bluntly that "we delivered it [the pardon] to the country like Pearl Harbor." He elaborated:

> The White House press corps . . . was caught completely flat-footed and went up in smoke. They were apoplectic that this "villain," as far as they were concerned, had been let off the hook and they took it out on Ford. The reporters were particularly angered by the surprise because they like to foster the belief that they know everything that's going on.[50]

The terHorst resignation made the situation even more difficult. Hushen became acting press secretary and had the unenviable task of explaining Ford's pardon decision. Ford kept his own press office out of the loop on the pardon decision, and neither the president nor Hartmann gave any directives to the press office as to how to communicate the White House's position. Hushen described the situation as "chaotic" and certainly not conducive to articulating a clear defense of the president's surprise action that would lay the groundwork for dissipating the severely negative press and public reaction. Hushen explained:

> One of the complicating factors was that the President said at a press conference in August that he would not inject himself into the judicial process until it had run its course. So we had the public leaning one way, and then out of the clear blue sky, or so it seemed, Ford issued the pardon. The White House press corps . . . was caught completely flat-footed. . . . The Press Office was kept in the dark about the planning going on regarding the pardon and that was a mistake. When the President decided that he wanted his General Counsel

[48] Hartmann interview.
[49] Roberts interview.
[50] Hushen interview.

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> Phil Buchen, to explore the legality of a pre-conviction pardon there were only four people who knew that the President wanted the option explored. . . . And nobody thought to say, "Well you ought to at least bring Jerry terHorst into this."[51]

Buchen held a background press briefing on the day of the pardon announcement and in response to a reporter's question contended that no pardon consideration would be given to any other Watergate defendants. Buchen wanted to end press speculation that Ford might consider pardoning other Watergate defendants. Hushen assessed that Buchen had wrongly placed the other Watergate defendants in a separate legal category, one in which these defendants would not be accorded a basic procedural right available to all convicted felons: the right to petition for a presidential pardon and to receive due consideration.

The press did not look at the pardon controversy on legalistic terms. Reporters seized on any evidence that Ford might pardon such Watergate figures as H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. Hushen held the first full press briefing two days after the pardon announcement and explained that the other Watergate defendants deserved to have the same procedural rights as any other person.

> . . . the press corps thought they were on to something. "The President is thinking about pardoning the other Watergate defendants," they thought, and they bombarded me with questions. I went to great lengths to say that there were no pardon requests on the President's desk, there were no pardon requests on the way to the President and that no applications had even been filed. All we were doing was looking at the question and trying to make sure that the Watergate defendants received the same treatment as anyone else.[52]

Despite these clarifications, the news travelled in a fairly typical Washington fashion after the discovery of a perceived big story. Reporters rushed to their desks to file their stories; editors got Capitol Hill correspondents to solicit legislative reactions. Congressmen expressed anger and disbelief at the prospect of wholesale Watergate pardons. White House phones started ringing furiously with public and official denunciations of the idea of granting more pardons. An emergency White House meeting was convened for damage control, and an official clarification was issued to put the controversy to rest.

[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.

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Hushen recalled that all of this "turmoil" exacerbated the angry press and public reactions to Ford's decision. In his words, "it was a very bumpy period which did not sit well with the media. The press corps expects the White House to run very efficiently. Despite their dislike of Richard Nixon, at least the trains appeared to run on time."[53]

Robert Hartmann's recollections indicate that the president and the close circle of advisers who guarded the decision to consider a pardon had much more pressing concerns than press strategy or public relations.

> TerHorst . . . was perfectly entitled to resign if he didn't like the pardon and if he felt hurt, as he should have, by being excluded in advance from this news so that, in effect, he had been made to lie. That was a mistake of the President's and I didn't bear down on it at the time, and neither did anyone else, because the decision was being so tightly held. And it was tightly held not to deceive the press but to keep Nixon from pulling a trick. What would have happened if Nixon had said, "Thank you, but I don't accept your pardon"? If Ford had announced earlier the pardon decision, and Nixon refused, then Ford would look dumb. . . . In retrospect, Ford should have earlier taken terHorst into his confidence. A press secretary had to have that. Ford's theory was that knowing that terHorst couldn't lie, it would cause a major dilemma for him if journalists asked if Ford planned to issue a pardon.[54]

Meanwhile, Ford had secretly dispatched attorney Benton Becker to San Clemente, California to negotiate a pardon acceptance statement from Nixon. Preferably, a statement of contrition that would help to mitigate the effects of any negative reaction to the pardon. Former Nixon press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, steamed "contrition is bullshit" and proceeded to offer statement after watered-down statement on behalf of Nixon accepting the pardon but refusing to be contrite. The Nixon statement finally agreed upon failed to mention any wrong doing or regret, except for not having managed the Watergate crisis more effectively. As some of Ford's press office staffers commented, Nixon's statement only added fuel to the fire over the pardon:

> *Hushen*: President Ford's only condition in giving Nixon a full pardon was that Nixon accept it. There were no other strings. Nixon didn't have to make a statement, didn't have to say anything, in fact. He did issue a brief statement, but it didn't do anything to help our situation. . . . We got no help from Nixon. No statement of contrition.[55]

[53] Ibid.
[54] Hartmann interview.
[55] Hushen interview.

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terHorst: We had not even prepared Richard Nixon for accepting the pardon. It was only much, much later that he finally got around to saying "thank you," in effect. How do you pardon somebody who is not even contrite or asking forgiveness? . . . President Ford wasn't getting any of that from San Clemente.[56]

TerHorst's assessment of Ford's handling of the pardon from a public relations standpoint is worth quoting at length. As the presidential press secretary who chose to resign rather than explain a decision he could not accept, and as a long-time White House press corps member, terHorst offers important insights about this controversy:

I think the one failing—and it was a serious one—that President Ford made, in terms of the press and the presidency, was that he did not consider the public relations aspects of granting the pardon. They were considered from a legal basis and from a political basis, but not from the standpoint of convincing the American public that it was the right thing to do at that time. . . . [T]here was this glaring omission of any constructive work about "how do we convince the American public that Richard Nixon deserves to be pardoned?" That was not done. A brief speech on a Sunday morning, when people are going to church—the whole thing had so many downsides to it that it was no surprise to me that the country reacted as though someone had just torn the scab off of Watergate. That put us right back into the mess again. To this day people suspect that there was a deal.[57]

Ford's press office staffers identified the pardon as the crucial turning point in the president's press relations. Yet, as Gerald Warren pointed out, a negative press atmosphere already existed. The press loved Ford before the pardon, but reporters had not forgotten about Watergate. According to Warren, an underlying cynicism toward public leaders and "a lack of civility" still afflicted the White House press corps during Ford's term. He added:

Then the negativity was enhanced, immeasurably perhaps, by the pardon of Richard Nixon. That really had an impact on how the press viewed President Ford. And especially as regards the terHorst resignation. And whether or not there was a deal struck between Haig and Ford before the resignation. That really added a lot to the negative atmosphere.[58]

A number of Ford White House staffers emphasized terHorst's resignation as severely damaging to the president's public image. They noted that this event had a particularly damaging influence on White

[56] TerHorst interview.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Warren interview.

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House efforts to explain the pardon decision as a justified action. Robert Hartmann assessed:

> So, by quitting on the same day that the pardon was announced, so that this became the second line in every story about the pardon—"President Ford today issued a full and unequivocal pardon of former president Richard Nixon, and Jerry terHorst, one of Ford's closest aides, resigned in protest." That set the tone for the rest of the press corps, from whom terHorst had not withdrawn completely.[59]

Gerald Warren reflected:

> I think the resignation of Jerry terHorst really hurt Mr. Ford. Especially coming at the time that it did. . . . And I wish it hadn't happened. I told Jerry later that it was a good time to go to the White House staff and say, "Look, we have a real problem here. One of you told me that nothing was working on a pardon. And I went out, faithfully reported it to the press corps and it turned out to be inaccurate. Now the President has authorized me to tell you that if that happens again somebody is going to be in serious trouble, and it's not going to be me." I think he could have done that. . . . And the White House would have been better for it. Then if Jerry still felt that the pardon was a mistake, he could have picked a more decent time to resign. Resigning at that time because of the pardon and blaming the pardon for the resignation I think really hurt his president. I think it was a big mistake.[60]

According to Larry Speakes, terHorst hurt the president in two important ways: by resigning at such a difficult time, and by later trumpeting the incident in the news media.

> I think what he did was wrong. Ford had picked him to be press secretary because he was a friend. And now, in Ford's most difficult moment, terHorst was abandoning him and making a public show of his disagreement with Ford's decision to pardon Nixon. Moreover, terHorst said he wasn't going to give any interviews, but he quickly turned up on the morning talk shows, and he granted interviews to a number of reporters. I always felt that Jerry let Ford down . . . by going out and talking about [the pardon]. My feeling was if you felt you had been done terribly wrong, you kept your mouth shut and left in your own good time, but you never torpedoed the President.[61]

[59] Hartmann interview.

[60] Warren interview.

[61] Larry Speakes, *Speaking Out* (New York: Avon Books, 1989), 67, 229. Speakes contends that terHorst wanted to leave the position of press secretary for reasons other than the pardon and just used Ford's decision as "a convenient excuse" and then "present[ed] himself as a martyr." Deputy Press Secretary William Greener said that "frankly I think he quit more because he, as a columnist, had no idea that [being press secretary] was twenty hours a day, seven days a week. It was a great shock to him. It was harder than he wanted to work." (Greener interview)

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Hushen agreed that "terHorst's resignation made the whole thing so much more difficult. Jerry showed me his letter that day. . . . I said, 'Jerry, you can't do this.' But he did and I thought, 'Now I know how Truman felt when he said the weight of the world had fallen on him when Roosevelt died.' With terHorst out, I was the one going to be chewed out for this." Hushen elaborated:

> If he had stayed, we would have weathered the storm much easier. The fact that the President's press secretary quit over the pardon had a major impact on the story. There was a lot of suspicion that there was some kind of deal between Nixon and Ford, and when the public heard that the press secretary resigned in protest, it convinced many of those people that there really was something questionable about it. It was a real setback for the Ford White House.[62]

Hushen recalled that the press office devised a strategy to try to minimize the impact of terHorst's resignation. The plan called for Hushen to travel on Monday with the president while terHorst quietly cleaned out his office. On the return trip the resignation would be announced and then followed by a press briefing. Hushen and Tom DeCair met with terHorst at 2:00 p.m. on the day of Ford's announcement:

> I said, "Now, Jerry, are you sure you haven't spoken to anyone in the media." Earlier he told me he had not. Again he said no, except for Tom DeFrank of *Newsweek*. I said, "What did you tell him?" Jerry said, "I told him that I had submitted my resignation." Jerry thought it didn't matter because *Newsweek* didn't come out until Tuesday. I said, "Well now we have three hours and 55 minutes to come up with something before *Newsweek*'s story is filed with a 6:00 p.m. dateline.". . . So the problem that we faced is that we just didn't have the luxury to plan all this out. We were just flying by the seat of our pants.[63]

Even if the press office had the time, the luxury to plan a public relations strategy, would that have made a significant difference to the press and public reaction to the pardon of Richard M. Nixon? On this question the press office staffers differ. Some said that Ford actually could have emerged from the pardon decision with an image of decisive leadership. A proper public relations strategy, in other words, would have led to Ford being viewed as courageous and as-

[62] Hushen interview.
[63] Ibid.

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sertive rather than devious and incompetent, according to these persons. Larry Speakes wondered: "Why was the pardon of Richard Nixon, a bold step taken so that the nation could bind up its wounds, not depicted as an act of political courage worthy of a chapter on some future 'Profiles in Courage'?" Speakes maintained:

> A basic rule in the formation of public opinion is that bold, decisive, unexpected actions must be preceded by careful preparation of the landscape of the public mind before the seed is planted and nurtured—let alone reaping the harvest of favorable public reaction. The more unexpected these actions are, the more preparation must take place.[64]

In Speakes's view, the Ford White House failed to properly prime the press for the pardon decision. And he attributed the negative reaction to the pardon to that alleged failure. Speakes remembered:

> The Nixon pardon too was sprung on the public, and of course it had to be, but terHorst was left out of it and he resigned. And that left Jack Hushen and myself as the sole press people and we had no way of understanding Ford's thought process going into it.
>
> Had he issued that pardon at 11:00 a.m. on Sunday and then sat down with reporters from the wire services, the *Post* and the *Times*, and the networks and said, "Look, the President was devoting half of his time to Nixon matters and every time he looked up someone said, 'What about this, what about that,' the best that he could do for his job was to get rid of the Nixon thing and put it behind us." That probably would have been a good explanation had it gotten into that first wave of stories on a background basis, or whatever.
>
> We could have sat down with a Hugh Sidey, or someone like that, and get the piece in *Time* that would have been quoted and repeated in the press. Instead, it was just out there, the country was reeling from it and so was the press. There was all this press antagonism—"the big shots get off and the little guys have to pay."
>
> It was really an act of political courage, and he never got credit for that. It was pictured entirely wrongly. . . . If a press story gets off on the wrong foot, it's hard to turn it around. It's so important to lay the groundwork and proceed carefully.[65]

Jerald terHorst agreed with Speakes's assessment that Ford could have emerged from this controversy looking like a strong leader, in short, looking "presidential." In response to an inquiry as to how

[64] "Remarks by Larry Speakes: The Ford Image."
[65] Speakes interview.

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Ford could have avoided the severely negative reaction to the pardon, terHorst said:

> Well, he could have done it by asking questions. For example, if he had been candid in his press conferences rather than trying to avoid the problem. He could have said, "One of these days, folks, I have to address this question: If the former president is indicted should we proceed with the prosecution? Is that in the national interest? Do you think that's proper? What about the other issues that have to be addressed? This is taking up too much of my time, and I can't do what I want to do, and the national interest is not being served as long as this cloud is hanging over us. How can we remove the cloud? Should we pardon him? Should we not?" In other words, get the public thinking along with you about your problem. I think he might have generated a lot of understanding—if not agreement, at least some understanding. He might then have created a climate in which the opinion polls and the government could say, "This is what the American people want. They want Richard Nixon pardoned so the country can move forward."
>
> He could have looked really presidential. And that would have been in character for him too. He was not the kind of man who liked to drop surprises. That's not his political forte—going around surprising his constituents.[66]

It is noteworthy that only a few press office staffers said that a public relations strategy could have saved Ford from the severely negative response to the pardon of Richard M. Nixon. No doubt, of all White House staffers, members of the press office are the most likely to assess the president's handling of a policy decision on public relations terms. Nevertheless, the strongest rebukes of Ford's handling of the pardon came from terHorst, who quit because he could not conscientiously explain or defend that decision, and Larry Speakes, who later became President Ronald Reagan's chief press spokesperson and now has the perspective of the fortieth president's masterful command of public relations gimmickry. Because no spin control was tried in the case of Ford's pardon of Nixon, it is impossible to determine whether terHorst and Speakes are correct.

Most of the other press office staffers disagreed with the assessment that a public relations strategy fundamentally could have turned around the severely negative public and press response to the pardon. For example, Margita White commented:

> I know that some people will disagree with me. I remember some people in the Ford administration wanted to "blueprint" everything that was to be done.

[66] TerHorst interview.

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> To a certain extent it is very helpful to outline what you want to do before taking action. But if you think that it's going to come out exactly as you planned it then you're going to be surprised or disappointed. I don't doubt that the impact of an event such as the pardon could have been softened. But no matter what P.R. strategy was employed, we weren't going to change the negative press reaction to that decision.[67]

Even though he believed that the president and the few White House advisers aware of Ford's decision to consider a pardon for Nixon erred by not including the press office in the process and by surprising the press corps, John Hushen acknowledged that the negative reaction to the pardon probably was inevitable. In his words:

> Looking back, I don't know if there was any better way to handle it than simply drop it . . . like an atom bomb. . . . If the White House tried to send up a trial balloon the objections . . . would have been so loud that the president might have decided not to do it.
>
> How can you prepare them for a decision like that? . . . Calling the press in earlier would not have changed anything. In their minds, we were letting this villain off the hook. There was no way that they were going to be appeased. There was no way that we could have gotten the columnists and editorial writers to be sympathetic.[68]

The press office staffers agreed nonetheless that the pardon of Richard M. Nixon set the negative tone for Ford's press relations throughout the term. They agreed that with a public relations strategy, they could have at least "softened" the impact of the pardon. With some advance notice to press officers of the decision, combined with a concerted effort to explain it clearly and consistently, press critics still would not become sympathetic; but at least the Ford White House could have gotten its message out to the public and generated some understanding. Charles O. Jones points out that Ford came to office "very weak by all of the standard Neustadtian measures of presidential power. His one principal source of power was that derived from comparing his political ethics with those of Nixon, and this advantage was compromised when he pardoned Nixon."[69] Ford perhaps would not have been portrayed as Nixonian had he handled better the pardon decision. Ford's press image never fully recovered from the effects of

[67] White interview.

[68] Hushen interview.

[69] Charles O. Jones, "Presidents and Agendas: Who Defines What for Whom?" in James P. Pfiffner, ed., *The Managerial Presidency* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Pub., 1991), 204.

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that controversial decision. As Gerald Warren stated: "I don't think after the pardon there was much that the White House could have done to fundamentally change the nature of its press relations. I think the venom had to run out of the system."[70]

Conclusion

A president's press reputation usually is framed early—during the campaign and in the first months of his term. Even in the face of events and actions that seem to contradict the prevailing image, the press generally resists changing its view of the president's leadership.

Hence, the press framed early on a negative view of President Jimmy Carter's leadership—that of an amateur leader lacking a political sense. Such major policy victories as the Panama Canal treaties and civil service reform, as well as the Middle East peace process breakthrough, did little to change the overall perception of Carter.[71]

President Ronald Reagan fared so much better than Carter. Due to low expectations and some important early policy victories on the economic recovery program, journalists framed an image of Reagan as a master of public and elite persuasion—both a great communicator and a savvy political tactician. Even after significant failings—lengthy hostage ordeals, Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, stock market crash, Iran-contra—Reagan did not receive the kind of relentless negative press that Carter had received.[72]

These examples point up the need to get started well in press relations. In light of Reagan's relative image-making success and revelations of Michael Deaver's role in scripting the Reagan presidency, analysts have increasingly turned their attention to the news management controversy.[73]

The issue is much more complex than the ability of a White House to manage the news at will. To be sure, a White House that pays extraordinary attention to public relations (for example, Reagan's) will have the upper hand in image making over the White House that generally eschews public relations duties (for example, Carter's). The commentaries of Ford's press office staffers make clear the importance

[70] Warren interview.

[71] See Mark J. Rozell, *The Press and the Carter Presidency* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

[72] See Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*.

[73] Ibid.; W. Lance Bennett, *News: The Politics of Illusion* (New York: Longman, 1988); Don Fry, ed., *Believing the News* (St. Petersburg, FL: Poynter Institute, 1985); Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, *Mediated Political Realities*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1983).

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of the White House starting out well in its public relations and of the need to sustain a positive image by employing a sound, consistent press strategy. As Mark Hertsgaard's study demonstrates, by employing such a strategy—simplify the message, repeat it consistently, prime the press for big decisions—the Reagan White House succeeded at managing the president's press image through both good times and difficult times.[74] The public relations impact of controversial decisions and policy failures was blunted.

Regarding the Nixon pardon, Ford's White House failed to properly prime the press with a news management strategy that could have softened the negative press response to that controversial decision. Unlike Reagan's team, the Ford White House thought of public relations as distinct from policy making. An administration that fails to link public relations to its policy agenda plan does so to the detriment both of its image and its program.

What also becomes clear from this case study is that Ford fundamentally misread the political environment. To succeed at public relations, he believed that all he had to do was show how different he was from Nixon. As Ford explained in our interview, the key to White House success in press relations is "being as open and accessible as possible." To the extent that his administration received a fair hearing from the press, Ford attributed that to the "shift from the attitude of my predecessor to what we tried to do."[75]

But Ford's favorable hearing from the press, indeed due to the change in attitude from the Nixon years, was extremely short-lived. And it was short-lived because his administration lacked a sustainable press strategy that could be linked to its policy agenda plan. As the Reagan presidency later demonstrated: it is important to have a public relations plan that is a part of an administration's policy agenda strategy; and a president does not have to display openness and accessibility to get a good press. The Ford and Carter presidencies reveal that a policy of openness and accessibility creates expectations that a White House cannot live up to (as with the pardon) and provides the press with a greater opportunity to view and display White House foibles.[76]

The interview data reveal that Ford's public relations people understood these realities better than the president did. Of course, that was

[74] Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*.

[75] Author interview with President Ford by telephone, 13 December 1989.

[76] Rozell, *The Press and the Carter Presidency* and *The Press and the Ford Presidency*; Maltese, *Spin Control*, 117–178; Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-in-Chief*, 91–113.

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their job. But Ford's misreading of the context made their jobs so much more difficult than necessary. It is no small measure of the lack of priority that Ford placed on press relations that his press secretary not only was purposefully kept out of White House discussions of the pardon but that terHorst was lied to when he inquired as to whether a Nixon pardon was under consideration. The press officers understood the importance of public relations to an administration's program, but they were constrained in their efforts by the lack of leadership from the top on such matters. When I asked Ford about the importance that he attached to press relations, he immediately replied that his administration "concentrated on the substance of our policies, both domestic and foreign."[77] I followed by asking what his administration could have done better in press relations and his response again turned to policy: "I don't think there was anything that we could have done better. We thought that our programs at home and abroad were sound, and we did our utmost to approach the substantive issues affirmatively."[78]

The president made clear that although he did not dismiss the importance of press relations, he saw such matters as secondary to the pursuit of good public policy. He failed to connect the two in any strategic sense and explained that he perceived Press Secretary Ron Nessen's job as "try[ing] to put an affirmative spin on what we were trying to do both domestically and internationally."[79]

Ford cannot completely be faulted for misreading the environment and misunderstanding the ingredients for an effective press relations strategy. He was president during a difficult transitional phase of the presidential press relationship. Journalists were especially skeptical toward official pronouncements and actions due to the Watergate experience. In a sense, Ford was also trapped by circumstances over which he had no control. Although he did not have to pardon Nixon—any president concerned a great deal with public relations would not have done so—Ford could not do much that would have changed journalists' interpretations of how they had to do their jobs in light of Watergate.

Ford was not alone in this regard. His successor, Jimmy Carter, also drew the lesson from Watergate that the key to successful presidential press relations was a policy of openness and accessibility. He too

[77] Ford interview.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.

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experienced a difficult press relationship. Undoubtedly, the Ford–Carter years provided a good many lessons for the Reagan White House to draw from. Reagan and his press relations staffers understood well the relationship between press relations and moving forward a policy agenda. Through the Legislative Strategy Group, the White House coordinated its political and press strategies. As the White House Office of Communications director, David Gergen, explained: "We molded a communications strategy around a legislative strategy. We very carefully thought through what were the legislative goals we were trying to achieve, and then formulated a communications strategy which supported them."[80]

What separated the Reagan White House from its predecessors was the highly organized effort to coordinate public relations with a policy agenda. Unlike Ford, Reagan not only had the benefit of a sophisticated press relations plan, he had the communications skills and the conducive environment for press relations that a president needs to succeed with the press. In the complex presidential press relationship, therefore, several factors bear on an administration's ability to get a good press—specifically, the political context, personal skills of the president and his staff, and the White House media strategy. President Ford, a poor communicator, was thrust into the White House with inexperienced staff under extraordinary circumstances. Consequently, he had great difficulty effecting good press relations—a problem irreparably compounded by the unpopular pardon of Richard M. Nixon.

Postscript

It is hard to imagine now a better example of the importance of a president getting off to a good start with the press than that of the current occupant of the White House, Bill Clinton. At this early stage of the forty-second president's term, Clinton is suffering a press image problem that is making extremely difficult the achievement of his policy goals.

Two observations can be made about Clinton's press relations at this early stage: First, the White House has not done a good job of integrating a public relations strategy with a legislative agenda plan. Despite the claim frequently made by the White House that Clinton has derived his model of agenda development from the early Reagan

[80] Hertsgaard, *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency*, 108.

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years, there is little evidence that Clinton has shown a propensity to focus his policy agenda on few high priority items and then direct all of his public relations activity toward promoting those items. If anything, Clinton's insistence that numerous complex issues demand his immediate attention is reminiscent of the leadership approach that won few press plaudits for President Jimmy Carter.

Second, although it is unarguable that Clinton has poorly handled his press relations to date, the fact remains that the press has moved in remarkably—and I would suggest irresponsibly—rapid fashion to label the new administration as inept.[81] Much of the press criticism of Clinton emphasizes the stylistic aspects of his presidency, his administration's handling of the press, the lack of major legislative output in the first 100 days of the term, and, consequently, the return of executive-legislative "gridlock."

President Clinton is receiving much press criticism for not living up to some impossible measures of achievement. The expectation that a president achieve the bulk of his policy agenda in the first 100 days in office is one such impossible measure that persists in press accounts of each chief executive.[82] The frequent criticism of Clinton for not putting an immediate end to governmental gridlock reveals more about many journalists' understanding of the constitutional system of separation of powers than it does about Clinton's leadership acumen. It is also reminiscent of the press coverage that Jimmy Carter received when the Democratic-controlled Congress did not automatically march in step to the president's proposals. In both cases there is little press acknowledgment of the complexity of the policy process and issues that mitigate against executive-legislative cooperation even during a period in which one party dominates the government.

To Clinton's credit, he has demonstrated during his career a remarkable ability to recover from adversity. Nonetheless, he may be facing his strongest challenge yet. Once a president is defined by the press as not being effective, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get journalists to change their evaluations.

[81] Eleven days after Bill Clinton's inauguration, media critic Howard Kurtz summarized many of the negative media characterizations of the president's leadership. See his "Coverage Quickly Turns Sour As Media Highlight Troubles," *Washington Post*, 31 January 1993.

[82] To be sure, during the 1992 campaign Clinton promised that if elected he would ensure the enactment of major legislative reforms in his first 100 days in office. During the transition period he downplayed the importance of the first 100 days definition of his presidency. Journalistic accounts held Clinton to the standard that he articulated during the campaign.

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Lessons from the Failure of Perestroika

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The old Soviet Union, long the central preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy, has been swept into history. In its place are fifteen newly independent successor countries and a quite limited Commonwealth of Independent States. Unfortunately, the political and economic situation in virtually all these countries is one of instability, and even their boundaries are coming into question. There are clearly many new problems and serious risks. But there is also great opportunity. Sometimes it helps to glance backwards in order to see better how and where to move forward. At this critical juncture, we need to understand more clearly why and how the perestroika era—the final act in the history of the USSR—occurred and failed.

Why Perestroika?

The fall of Mikhail Gorbachev unleashed an ocean of dewy-eyed commentary on his place in history, as Man of the Year, the decade, and so forth. Gorbachev is indeed a very important figure of the twentieth

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century. But comparatively, the failure of perestroika is one of those major and rare historical sea changes that will influence the course of mankind henceforth.

Perestroika became Gorbachev's policy centerpiece because there was simply no other choice. Sooner or later, even without Gorbachev, Soviet leadership would have had to attempt a restructuring. The Soviet command economic system was profoundly corroded and corrupt by the early 1980s. Anticipated rises in production and Soviet living standards were not being achieved. Moreover, Soviet leaders were already concerned about their country's inability to compete with the West in many fields of scientific research and technological development—the foundations of Soviet military power. Well before Gorbachev's tenure, many Soviet leaders recognized the need for reform of some kind, but did not understand how rotten were the foundations of the Soviet economy.

Nor did Gorbachev understand how much trouble the economy was in during the first several years of his rule. Partly, this was because the Soviet economic system had not been without its earlier successes, although they were all Pyrrhic victories. There had been impressive growth in earlier decades; but it was forced by the center's brutal direction of the economy toward industrialization and collectivization and by scooping up the most readily available of the country's abundant natural resources with no regard for conservation or for the environment. Similarly, the vertically directed Soviet economy achieved strategic, conventional, and political superpower status, managed spectacular feats in space, and led the world in some impressive military-related technologies. The astronomical yearly costs to accomplish these feats, however, drained the economy as a whole and further weakened its wobbly structure. Even when the need to redirect resources away from defense to other sectors was clear, the Soviet military-industrial complex prevented significant corrective action. Rather, it became a wounded shark rapaciously devouring its own entrails.

Nevertheless, these ephemeral successes veiled the seriousness of the economic system's internal contradictions and the question of its long-run viability. Even in the last few years of the USSR's existence, only some Soviet leaders understood that the woes of the economic system could not be addressed simply by modernization and injections of western technology.

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The Seeds of Its Own Destruction

The Soviet economic system was first and foremost designed and constructed as an instrument of political control. In fact, as readers of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels know, their writings, including the monumental *Das Kapital*, contain little in the way of concrete economic prescriptions for communist society. The basic texts of Marxism are instead a detailed critique of nineteenth-century capitalism from the perspective of the discredited labor theory of value, not really blueprints for constructing an economic system.

Moreover, V. I. Lenin and his successors themselves had no precise economic ideology. What Lenin clearly believed, however, was that only control of the economic system could bring control over the political situation. Lenin and his party became enemies of private property because he understood that with it the citizenry could maintain an independent voice in the state; deprived of it, they would not be able to resist the centralized structure of power he was building. From this logic flowed Lenin's policy of taking control of the "commanding heights" of the Soviet economy, as well as many of Joseph Stalin's economic policies like land collectivization, which destroyed the peasantry.

Lenin and his successors, therefore, strove to establish central control over the economy as a means of perpetuating control over the political destiny of the ethnically diverse and vast territories of the old Russian empire. Even more than the KGB and other internal security and intelligence services, it was the design of the Soviet economy itself that kept the Soviet elite and Communist party in power. Until the end of Soviet history, the question of economic reform had profound political implications.

Virtually all economic mechanisms and policies were manipulated in order to maximize political control through economic means. There was no genuine money or real prices for decades in the Soviet Union. Money became an afterthought, merely an accounting device denied its normal resource allocation role. Prices were controlled. Enterprise profits were confiscated. Development of key market and financial institutions was severely restricted or prohibited. Centralized state institutions, particularly the State Supply and Planning Commissions, and the Party leadership made a priori decisions on resource allocations and investment. A black market naturally evolved and grew, but even it remained disjointed by the center's conscious policy of restricting access to information as a means of political control.

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Horizontal communication, even between enterprises physically located near one another, was and is extremely poor throughout the former Soviet Union. In fact, the English word "marketing" is now being used actively, because the concept of voluntarily providing information and doing business horizontally—with no orders from central authorities—is so alien that no adequate Russian word exists.

The design of the Soviet economy even reached down to straitjacket the individual. Short of exile to Siberia, the economic system offered a wide range of less extreme but potent measures to punish individual citizens. The state and the Communist party largely determined what city a citizen could live in or travel to, his employment, the kind of food and medical care he could get, what schools his children could attend, the quality of his housing, and so forth. Socialist intrusiveness and meddling in the affairs of others was encouraged, while traditional support structures like the Church and the family were either overtly attacked or coerced. The idea was to maximize individual dependency on the state and thereby further ensure control.

"The Limits of Its Possibilities"

Armed with a centralized economic system motivated largely by fear and insensitive to waste, the Soviet leadership was able to target tremendous resources at a limited number of goals. In the long run, however, the cumulative result of daily nonmarket resource allocations was progressively greater and greater inefficiency. Inevitably, such a nonmarket system also became more and more corrupt. A vivid class structure emerged, with Party elite and Moscow bureaucrats enjoying a wide-ranging system of privileges unavailable to an increasingly aware and resentful "Soviet Man."

The design of the Soviet economy also insured its fragility. Since competition was seen as unnecessary duplication in a planned economy, and interregional dependency was to be as binding as possible, the number of plants producing many key inputs was kept to a minimum. This is still true today. For example, the onset of the current energy crisis was due in part to the fact that a single plant in Azerbaijan did not deliver the planned number of compressors to Siberian and other Soviet oil fields in the early 1990s because of labor and ethnic unrest, and because of the Azeris' desire to use the plant for unauthorized military production. As a consequence, the cores of hundreds of wells in Siberia actually froze and are now out of production until

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they can be redrilled. In western countries, alternative domestic suppliers would obviously have been found or compressors would have been imported. Since the foreign exchange earnings of Soviet oil companies belonged to the state, however, those firms were not in a position to secure critical imports from abroad. As a result, whole sections of the Soviet oil industry collapsed like a house of cards. The damage is still expanding today in Russia and elsewhere as other industries and energy-dependent sectors are hit by rapidly falling energy availability and shortages of foreign exchange due to the sharp fall-off in Russian oil exports.

There were many other examples of such disastrous cascade effects elsewhere in the Soviet economy. They all illustrate how excessively taut the Soviet economy was. Such shocks, whether from shortfalls in planned production, bad weather, accidents, foreign exchange shortage, or whatever, always impacted more broadly and deeply than necessary due to the lack of markets, which act in western economies as shock absorbers. The Soviet economy's monopoly-producer structure, often run directly by Moscow ministries, also proved to be an easy target for the independent labor movement, particularly at many coal mines throughout the country.

It is also true that the new commonwealth countries are still artifically dependent on one another economically and will remain so for some time to come. Even the Baltic countries still feel the heavy economic ties that were designed to bind them politically to the old Soviet bear. Of course, that was the aim of the Soviet leadership that designed that system, and the economic efficiency of it was not the heart of the matter.

As Gorbachev eloquently said in his farewell address:

> There is plenty of everything: Land, oil, and gas, other natural riches . . . yet we live much worse than developed countries and keep falling behind them more and more. . . . The society was suffocating in a vise of the command-bureaucratic system, doomed to serve ideology and bear the terrible burden of the arms race. It had reached the limits of its possibilities.

Gorbachev's Dilemma

Despite his failure to foresee the August 1991 coup attempt and his loss of control of the direction of perestroika as a process, Gorbachev was a brilliant political chess master among the Soviet elite. However, he was not fully attuned to the plight of the common man and the depth

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of dissatisfaction with the government, especially outside Moscow. His understanding of the seriousness of the accelerating Soviet economic crisis improved with time, but as a noneconomist he should have relied more heavily on his best market-trained economic advisers (for example, Nikolai Petrakov and Oleg Bogomolov) for policy responses to try and check it. Instead, Gorbachev often studied the economic issues diligently and kept his own counsel. When presented with alternative economic policy options, Gorbachev usually selected incremental reform responses, often only marginal measures, which were neither comprehensive nor synergistic. Certainly, some of his hesitancy and introspection was due to the cacophony of advice he received on what to do on the economy both at home and from abroad. There was, however, a deeper concern.

The central conundrum facing Gorbachev was always this: genuine economic liberalization and transition to a market economy would risk undermining the foundations of Communist power. The expansion of private property and wealth combined with a restructured economy allocating resources more on the basis of money than fiat decisions would cause and enable neocapitalists to organize to further erode state economic control and inevitably challenge the one-party system. Economic power would become more decentralized and horizontal, a threat to the vertical control system of the center. Stalin undoubtedly recognized this danger and responded by stripping private wealth from the Kulaks and others and using it to industrialize the Soviet state. Similarly, for Gorbachev and perestroika, too much economic freedom would be at least as dangerous as political liberalization to central government and communist control.

On the other hand, without economic reform, the Soviet Union would find itself threatened with falling even further behind the West in general and the United States in particular in terms of science, technology, and the economic strength needed to continue the all-important military competition. The Reagan administration's arms build-up of the 1980s served to underline this point for a nervous Soviet leadership.

Moreover, the specter of slow, steady economic decline also raised the prospect of eventual internal political instability. Ironically, because the state had consciously stripped individuals, private groups, and institutions of economic power and decision making, the state became entirely responsible for providing minimum (and gradually improving) living standards. Honoring this social contract was the

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main claim of the revolutionary Communist regime to its legitimacy. In fact, the state more or less upheld its side of the compact for several decades. As the economic system deteriorated, however, the social contract between the regime and the people became more and more difficult for the state to fulfill. The mounting costs of the welfare system and political pressure to maintain vested interests constituted a growing barrier to economic perestroika. For Gorbachev, therefore, inaction on economic reform was not an option.

Radical Reform in Name Only

Gorbachev, therefore, initially adopted a very cautious approach toward economic restructuring. He tinkered. He called in 1985 for accelerating economic activity, intensifying research and development, and reducing production and consumption of alcoholic beverages to increase labor productivity. The first two policies produced no practical results, while the third resulted only in a serious reduction of revenues from vodka and wine sales that signaled the beginning of a disastrous series of state budget overruns eventually leading to the infamous and inflationary "Ruble Overhang." Excessive liquidity, eventually amounting to hundreds of billions of extra rubles, would become a major obstacle to introduction of market reforms, since efficient market institutions always require real money and prices.

The three-year period from 1986 through 1988 saw a series of limited moves to try to decentralize parts of the economy without giving up basic control of it. Some enterprises went on self-financing and self-accounting under a new law on state enterprises. There was also some decentralization of the banking system, and the government began schizophrenic experiments on very limited expansion of the quasi-private cooperative sector. There was also a disastrous attempt to improve the quality of goods.

Basically, however, the central structures of the Soviet command economy remained intact. Moscow's many ministries and committees continued to plan and run the infamous state order system. With increasing frequency, however, output targets were not met, which became an indicator of economic rot. The net effect of these limited reforms was to accelerate economic decline without setting the stage for any kind of recovery. Such tinkerings were like working on an old wheezing car engine without replacing anything. Some of the rust that caked the Rube Goldberg Soviet economic engine had now been

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disturbed, causing only more leakages and less compression. No new parts were available to replace that which was being removed. It was only when the futility of these superficial moves became apparent that Gorbachev and his advisers decided to attempt somewhat deeper reform measures.

The second major phase of economic perestroika involved a series of attempts in the late 1980s and early 1990s to construct a socialist market economy. The prime theoretician behind these so-called radical reform efforts was Academician and Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin, while responsibility for implementing this approach lay with Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov. Abalkin laid out an economic reform strategy predicated on the creation of a market structure for the economy, but mostly for new and competing forms of collective ownership. The state would also retain control and ownership of key productive and defense assets, Lenin's "commanding heights." Only a small place in Abalkin's scheme was conceded to private property in its traditional form. On other critical issues such as price reform, Abalkin went slowly, fearing social unrest. To his credit, he recognized that demonopolizing the economy and injecting much more competition in it ought to be very high priorities in order to encourage production and efficiency, as well as avoid hyperinflation as price reform was implemented. In fact, during this period and after the break up of the Soviet Union, many foreign economists oversold, to both the Soviet and Russian governments, rapid and risky price decontrol as an economic panacea without proposing timely financial steps to create a real ruble or without understanding such very important structural rigidities.

Abalkin attempted the intellectually doubtful task of designing a third option lying somewhere between western capitalism and the Soviet system. He sought to use market mechanisms to revitalize the Soviet economy while retaining basic state control over it, thereby ensuring the center's political control. The resulting documents and decrees were often murky in meaning and seldom implemented.

Out with the Old, But Leaving Only a Vacuum

Meanwhile, the new Soviet parliament established by Gorbachev in 1989 (the Supreme Soviet) began a vain attempt to legislate Soviet economic reform. It adopted enough well meaning economic reform legislation to fill a library, and the Soviet Council of Ministers under

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Ryzhkov added still more decrees. Almost all of these measures were poor in quality and were most often ignored.

A major part of the problem was the dearth of intellectual capital available after so many decades of socialist economics. There was much general endorsement of moving to the marketplace, but very few in any of these organizations knew the basic concepts of market economics and business. How and why market pricing works is still not understood widely. For example, after the New York Stock Exchange gave a triumphant seminar in the Soviet Union, even some of its more enlightened Russian attendees kept asking, "So, *who* determines the prices of stocks?" Throughout much of the Soviet history, a single committee set almost all prices in the Soviet Union. Price reform to them simply meant raising prices to a new set level. Price decontrol, however, was viewed as advocating chaos.

The result of all this executive and legislative bungling was an acceleration of the destruction of the old central lines of command and control, which had once given a crude kind of order to the Soviet economy, without effective market institutions being readied to replace the old system. All across the mammoth Soviet Union, plant managers and local bureaucrats, accustomed to receiving orders from above, found themselves without clear instructions and increasingly without needed inputs. Often such goods were simply being offloaded from the back of the truck, disappearing into the black market, or being withheld by firms for local barter.

The damage of output shortfalls, exacerbated by cascade effects, was soon felt. Republic, regional, and local governments began to look after their own economic interests. Local leaders began to seal off their districts and cities from the national economy with trade barriers or a wide variety of rationing schemes in the belief that economic autarky might protect local populations and their living standards from the consequences of the center's increasingly incoherent economic policies. In 1990 Leningrad went to a massive rationing system. The Ukraine used coupons to exclude non-Ukrainians from buying goods there. Oil workers even threatened to withhold energy supplies unless more food and supplies were sent to Siberia. The centralized distribution system was crumbling.

Republic and regional leaders quickly found that the center would yield its authority to set economic policy only grudgingly. A lengthy contest, fought with conflicting economic laws and decrees, began

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between central authorities and republic leaders. In particular, the Russian government under Boris Yeltsin's leadership took the lead in attempting to apply more market-oriented economic reforms on Russian territory, often against the will of the central government. Most importantly, the trend toward economic autarky also inflamed separatist movements in many parts of the Soviet empire, lending them mass support, in many cases for the first time. Nationalist leaders, based in both Russian and non-Russian ethnic groups, began to assert that only separation from the universally hated central government in Moscow (and its failed policies) would stabilize the economy and permit real movement toward the market place, although they themselves had little understanding of market economics. In the words of one Ukrainian member of that republic's legislature, "Gorbachev doesn't have enough energy to save the whole country from economic collapse, so the only way out is to allow the component parts to save themselves."

In 1990, living standards began to drop quickly. Across the old Soviet Union, separatists had a new and biting accusation—the center had violated its social contract with the people. It was now a personal economic crisis that even politically conservative and fearful citizens could not ignore. A growing independent labor movement had already been spawned at the coal mines in 1989 from precisely these kinds of bread and butter issues.

By the end of 1990, many enterprises and local leaders were ignoring Moscow's orders and doing whatever they could to try to check their falling living standards and reduce local shortages. Although the theme and warning of economic sabotage was repeatedly sounded by Moscow, no crackdown ensued. The center's command economy was now rapidly compressing, racked by the ripple effects of output shortages caused by local seizure and barter of goods. Compounding the problem were Soviet farmers who recognized systemic crisis in the command economy and decided to withhold and barter much of 1990's record harvest.

In sum, it can be argued that the growing separatist challenge faced by Gorbachev was largely caused by his repeated failure to put together an effective and viable economic stabilization and reform game plan. To be fair, however, the cumulative decay of the Soviet economic system in the decades before Gorbachev made the construction of such a program a Herculean task for him or for anyone else.

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Gorbachev's Final Crossroad

The failure of the Abalkin-Ryzhkov approach led Gorbachev to flirt with true radical economic reform for the first time. A dynamic Supreme Soviet deputy named Mikhail Bocharov began in early 1990 to speak and write in favor of radical reform programs, which he dubbed the 500 Days Plan. What Bocharov proposed amounted in many respects to a Soviet version of the Polish "shock therapy" strategy, for it advocated financial discipline and defense cuts, rapid price reform, quick privatization of state-owned property, and encouragement of private enterprise formation. Being an early and passionate Russian nationalist, Bocharov tailored his program for the huge Russian republic alone. Boris Yeltsin soon adopted many of Bocharov's ideas.

Yeltsin's election as chairman of the Russian parliament and the new economic reform ideas got Gorbachev's attention. Alarmed at the possibility that Russia, with 75 percent of the country's territory and over half its population, might go it alone on radical economic reform and thereby create a serious rift in the Union, Gorbachev agreed with Yeltsin to establish an expert group to develop an economic reform program for the entire USSR.

The new joint program, which Gorbachev initially endorsed, was mostly the product of two of the best liberal economists, Gregori Yavlinski and Stanislav Shatalin. It was also known as the 500 Days program and constituted a vast improvement over many previous Soviet attempts to construct a reform plan. It had, however, many flaws and probably could not have provided Gorbachev with the key ingredient he had lacked throughout perestroika—a comprehensive, synergistic, well sequenced economic reform program that could provide answers to the vital question of how to manage transition to a more market-based Soviet economy. More importantly, however, the joint program was a vital political link for Gorbachev to Yeltsin and many other liberals.

The experts had nearly completed their work by September 1990, and execution of the 500 Days program was to start by the end of the year. At this point, Gorbachev made what may have been the most important choice of his political career—and he chose wrongly. Under heavy pressure from increasingly vociferous conservative forces in the Communist party, the Soviet government and military-industrial complex, he decided not to implement the 500 Days program.

Those against 500 Days attacked its viability and warned that it

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would be economically and politically destabilizing. Abalkin and others designed a much more moderate program, advocating transition to an oxymoronic "regulated market economy." Another prominent Soviet economist, Abel Aganbegyan, tried squaring the circle by producing the short-lived President's Program, which was largely a watered down repackaging of 500 Days. Unmollified, the conservatives blasted the compromise attempt and Abalkin announced that enactment of 500 Days would lead to resignation of the Ryzhkov government.

Throughout this time, the conservatives argued with Gorbachev that 500 Days ceded too much power to the republics and Yeltsin. The conservatives thereby cleverly appealed to Gorbachev's strongest belief—his patriotism.

While Gorbachev could not have understood completely the economics of 500 Days, he had learned a lot in only a few years about market principles, particularly the importance of the role of money. He examined and considered 500 Days very carefully. He undoubtedly recognized that his position was a critical decision. Gorbachev, however, also saw a complex political chessboard. In particular, his support among the military-industrial complex, the party, and the conservatives would erode further if he chose 500 Days. But Gorbachev was never a coward, and he might have risked it all were it not for the fact that he feared such a course would undermine the sovereignty of the Soviet state. His deepest concern must have been that implementing 500 Days would result in a weak confederation of strong republics, with little real federative power. He wanted to restructure the Soviet Union, but he did not want to preside over the dissolution of it as a federation. Some observers in Moscow at the time dubbed Gorbachev's concern "the Abraham Lincoln problem."

After rejecting 500 Days, Gorbachev opted for a continuation of piecemeal, centralized reform efforts under yet another feckless program entitled "basic outlines." The role of planning and state orders was reasserted in new presidential decrees and statements. Particularly strong was the reassertion of Union authority over resources and economic activity claimed by the republics. A bitter Shatalin remarked, "[Gorbachev] says he cannot agree with private property. I cannot agree with [Gorbachev]."

Predictably, Yeltsin felt betrayed. By the end of October 1990, Russia was reasserting the supremacy of republic laws and decrees over those of the central government. Yeltsin and his allies adopted 500 Days as Russia's new reform program.

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The Center Struggles to Retain Power

Through financial mechanisms and other means, central authorities actively sought with frequent success to vitiate and circumscribe the Russian Republic's attempts to move more rapidly toward market reforms. Nevertheless, at least in principle, Russian decrees and laws usually went beyond central government reform efforts in areas such as privatization, freer pricing, land reform, and so forth. The central government, however, would sometimes attempt to compete with Russia by passing reform laws or decrees that went beyond what Russia had done. Russia usually responded with new, more liberal positions. It was hardly a competition that the center could win.

An embattled Prime Minister Ryzhkov soon was replaced in early 1991 by Valentin Pavlov, an economist who had served Ryzhkov and Gorbachev as finance minister. He was widely viewed by foreigners as being opposed to all economic reform. For instance, Pavlov tormented foreign businesses, accused the West of attempting a financial coup d'etat, and even threatened to conduct KGB-led financial audits of foreign firms. Actually, he was not a simple neo-Stalinist; he sought instead to take the Soviet Union along a kind of Chinese reform path, which would have attempted to put a tight hold on political liberalization while moving more toward state-managed markets. He once said publicly that the Soviet Union might draw "on the experience of China to some extent." Pavlov introduced legislation that allowed wholly-owned foreign firms to do business in the USSR and export their products and profits. Here again, reference to the Chinese model (or to the experiences of some South American countries) helps explain his otherwise schizophrenic behavior towards foreign firms.

By 1991, the USSR's last year, Soviet economic problems were of a fantastic nature. Pavlov sought to check inflation by a series of poorly designed monetary and fiscal moves, including a partial currency change-over. Ironically, as finance minister he had resisted the Soviet central bank's moves to achieve autonomy from his ministry, thus assuring monetary creation at an accelerating pace, since the central bank was forced to cover all government deficits. The Group of Seven (G-7), the top organization of the seven leading economic powers, prepared a study of the Soviet economy that estimated excess liquidity by the end of 1990 at about 250 billion rubles, with currency creation running over 20 percent per annum. Many Soviet estimates were considerably higher.

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Rising inflation spurred hoarding, wage demands, and strikes. From 1990 on, ever more rationing schemes appeared in cities and republics, a clear sign of systemic disarray. Barter and the shadow economy expanded as the ruble lost residual meaning. The economy compressed at double digit rates in 1991 as production shortfalls and supply disruptions cascaded upon one another. Among the people, especially outside Moscow, disdain for the Soviet government was about all that was palatable.

A Shaky Rapprochement

By the spring of 1991, with the economy in deep trouble, Gorbachev and Yeltsin began to inch back toward one another. Eventually in April, a tentative deal entitled the 9 plus 1 Agreement was made. Most economic power was ceded to the republics. By summer, however, Gorbachev was again attempting to limit concessions to the republics and, most of all, to preserve a genuine federative state. A new Union Treaty was to be the salvation of a new Soviet federation, but it was eventually rejected by Russia and other republics.

Gorbachev's brief rapprochement with Yeltsin and other republic figures not only worried conservatives at home but fired the imaginations of foreigners as well. The late spring of 1991 saw the redoubtable Yavlinski working with a Harvard-led group of American economists to create what they dubbed a Joint Program for Western Cooperation in the Soviet Transformation to Democracy and the Market Economy. It soon was known more succinctly as the Grand Bargain. It postulated deeper Soviet economic and political reform backed by western financial support. Its able authors hoped Gorbachev would use it at the July G-7 Summit in London. Although Gorbachev chose not to present the Grand Bargain in London, popular expectations in the Soviet Union were not easily deflated. When he did not bring back significant western assistance, Gorbachev's long sagging popularity took another blow, and the conservatives gloated.

The coup of August 1991 was primarily a last-ditch conservative and centrist reaction to growing separatist ferment strengthened by accelerating economic decline and to Gorbachev's ineffectiveness in dealing with either issue. Anger over the strategic concessions Gorbachev made to the West was likely a secondary factor, but only for some of the coup plotters.

The coup was also a classic Soviet power play, stemming from the coup plotters' knowledge that Yeltsin and Gorbachev and their camps

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(despite temporary rapprochements) remained fundamentally estranged after Gorbachev balked at the 500 Days program. Gorbachev's power base had therefore eroded sharply on both the right and the left, and the time looked ripe in August for the conservatives to bring Gorbachev down.

In the end, after the coup failed, a humilitated Gorbachev was even willing to sacrifice the Communist party in a vain attempt to fend off Yeltsin and save the union. But it was far too late.

There have already been many other explanations of this fascinating and critical moment of the twentieth century, and the account of this period in history will undoubtedly be revised many times in the near and distant future. Some scholars point to Gorbachev's weakening of the Communist party as the key reason for the USSR's collapse. Others insist it was his error in allowing Yeltsin to be elected president of Russia, while Gorbachev himself lacked such a popular mandate. Still other observers point to even more tactical reasons to explain the collapse, such as Gorbachev's attempt to conclude a new Union Treaty, which actually had been stymied before the coup.

Most of these events undoubtedly affected the timing of the end of Soviet history to various degrees. With the possible exception of the U.S.-led containment policy, however, it was the internal societal and economic flaws of the Communist system itself that condemned it and the Soviet state to the ash heap of history.

The Black Hole

The collapse of the Soviet Union amounts to a major historical gain for the United States and the free world, since the West no longer faces a powerful and fundamentally hostile superpower with all that that implies. On the other hand, there are already new strains in relations among western allies and Japan, since the major reason for the alliance and their acceptance of U.S. leadership is gone.

The continuing economic and political disintegration in the Commonwealth countries is unquestionably dangerous, spawning many new power struggles. The most acute risks are the possibilities of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology proliferation as well as that of chemical weapons. Conventional arms are clearly out of control throughout the region. Furthermore, with boundaries as artificial as those in Africa, the onset of ethnic violence, irredentist pressures, and civil war in some of these countries was inevitable. Less well recog-

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nized, however, is the present situation's enormous long-run commercial and strategic economic opportunities for the United States, particularly in energy, including the possibility of diversification away from Middle Eastern energy.

Historically, therefore, the monumental change that has occurred leaves the United States and the rest of the world in a promising but tough position. Some of the policies necessary to address this situation are now openly being discussed and debated, albeit very late, particularly for some western-oriented economic and political reformers like Russia's former First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar.

A critical reference point for the tough policy choices ahead must be clearer recognition of the enormity and unusual complexity of the ongoing economic decline in the troubled lands of the old USSR. This historically-based economic instability has become the vortex of a political black hole that has swallowed the Soviet Union. So be it. Unfortunately, it is still there.

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The Politics of the American Catholic Hierarchy

TIMOTHY A. BYRNES

The American Catholic hierarchy became very actively involved in the national political process over the 1970s and 1980s. They have been leading figures in an increasingly partisan right-to-life movement. They have published lengthy pastoral letters on U.S. economic and defense policies. And they have actively participated, both individually and collectively, in several national election campaigns. In part, these activities have been due to the bishops' adoption of a less defensive, less parochial approach to the political process, and to the development of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) as a vehicle of collective political action. However, the bishops' new activism, particularly in terms of their participation in the electoral process, has also been a function of the regime instability and renewed partisan competition that have characterized the American party system. Candidates and political strategists seeking to emphasize new issues that cut across party lines and to mobilize new political coalitions have sought the bishops out and tried to associate themselves with elements of the bishops' policy agenda. In this way the bishops have played a part in the redefinition of the national political agenda and in the dealignment of the national electorate.

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In the past, the bishops' political role consisted primarily of defending the Catholic Church and its members from a hostile, anti-immigrant culture. In some areas, in fact, individual bishops were important urban power brokers who represented and spoke for their church and people before local political officials. By the 1960s, however, the hierarchy's local, parochial role was undermined by a combination of events. Catholics became one of the most prosperous, well-educated segments of the American population.[1] They no longer needed apologists in clerical robes, and they no longer looked to their bishops and archbishops for political leadership and direction. At the same time, the federal government imposed its national authority on many issues of interest to the American church. The shifting of policy initiative on education, housing, discrimination, abortion, and other issues from local governmental bodies to Congress and the federal judiciary rendered individual Catholic bishops' relationships with local public officials less politically significant.

However, the same series of developments inside and outside the church that devalued the bishops' traditional activities also presented an opportunity for the bishops to adopt a new and broader role for themselves in the modern political process. Assimilation of Catholics into the American mainstream, for example, was accompanied by a marked decrease in anti-Catholicism. Catholics did not need the bishops' protection as much, but non-Catholics did not fear the bishops' participation in the political process as much either. Local politics offered fewer opportunities for action by individual bishops, but national politics offered limitless opportunities for action by the hierarchy as a whole, as long as the bishops could learn to speak nationally in a collective voice.

In the late 1960s, thanks to far-sighted leadership in their own ranks and to the authorization of the Second Vatican Council, the American Catholic hierarchy began to act on these new opportunities. The bishops set out to read the "signs of the times," to apply Catholic social teaching to the whole range of public policy questions, and to

[1] Andrew Greeley has extensively chronicled these developments. See Andrew M. Greeley and Peter H. Rossi, *The Education of Catholic Americans* (Chicago: Aldine, 1966); Andrew M. Greeley, William McCready, and Kathleen McCourt, *Catholic Schools in a Declining Church* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1976); Andrew M. Greeley, *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and Andrew M. Greeley, *American Catholics Since the Council: An Unauthorized Report* (Chicago: Thomas More Press, 1985).

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articulate these applications through a restructured and strengthened national conference.[2]

The bishops' participation in the contemporary political process is not adequately explained, however, by the bishops' adoption of a new approach to public policy and their development of a stronger national vehicle. The key to the bishops' contemporary political role is that these developments in the bishops' approach to politics coincided with the breakdown of the Democratic New Deal coalition that dominated American electoral politics from the 1930s to the 1960s. Both parties have developed policy platforms and electoral strategies designed to build a new majority to replace the New Deal coalition. The bishops' contemporary political activities have been shaped by the intersection of their evolving policy agenda with these platforms and strategies.

A critical election, according to V. O. Key's original formulation, is a "type of election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between the parties."[3] None of our recent national elections fits this definition strictly speaking, yet there is general agreement among students of elections that *something* important has been going on in the American party system over the last twenty-five years.[4] The decay of the once dominant Democratic New Deal coalition has introduced a new uncertainty and a greater degree of volatility into the national electoral process. The so-called New Deal party system has been replaced by a more fluid, more competitive structure in which both major parties have struggled to put together a durable majority coalition.

A by-product of these developments has been the rediscovery by political leaders of religion as a mobilizing and coalition-building tool. Modern political strategists seeking to control and benefit from

[2] The "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World" charged the bishops with "scrutinizing the signs of the times and interpreting them in the light of the Gospel"; the "Decree on the Bishops' Pastoral Office in the Church" called for "bishops belonging to the same nation or region [to] form an association and meet together at fixed times." See Walter Abbott and Joseph Gallagher, eds., *The Documents of Vatican II* (New York: Guild Press, 1966).

[3] V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17 (February 1955): 4.

[4] A sampling of the literature on realignment, from a variety of perspectives, can be found in Walter Dean Burnham, "The 1980 Earthquake: Realignment, Reaction, or What?" in Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, eds., *The Hidden Election* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 98–140; Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, "Critical Realignment? The New Politics, the Reconstituted Right, and the 1984 Election" in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Elections of 1984* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985), 1–25; and John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, "Realignment and Institutionalization" in Chubb and Peterson, eds., *The New Directions in American Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 1–33.

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shifting partisan alignments have appealed to voters on religious grounds, focused attention on religious issues, and debated among themselves the proper role that religion should play in American politics and public policy. Along the way, these strategists have also drawn a variety of religious leaders into the very center of the national political process. The American Catholic bishops have been one such group of religious leaders. In fact, for a number of reasons the American bishops have been of particular interest to politicians and party strategists.

First of all, of course, the American Catholic hierarchy heads the largest single religious denomination in the United States, whose members comprise more than one fourth of the national electorate. Moreover, Catholic voters, once a cornerstone of the New Deal coalition, emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as swing voters at the presidential level.[5] The bishops do not control these voters, to be sure, but the access that the bishops have to millions of Catholics still commands the respect and attention of national candidates. In fact, I have discovered in conversations with numerous strategists from both parties that many political actors continue to believe, or perhaps fear, that the bishops can still exert a substantial influence on the Catholic vote. That perception, given the vital role that Catholics play in the volatile contemporary party system, has been enough to lead many national political candidates to seek out and publicize areas of agreement between themselves and the Catholic hierarchy.

The bishops' political significance, however, involves far more than their access to or potential influence on Catholic voters. Whatever their relationship to the laity may be at any given time, for example, the bishops always have virtually unparalleled institutional resources at their disposal. "If you are a bishop," Walter Mondale's campaign manager remarked to me in explaining his own interest in the hierarchy, "you've got some pretty substantial organizational capabilities. . . . You've got a lot of people, you've got money, places to meet, you've got a lot of things that any good politician would like to have at his disposal."[6] You also, of course, if you are the Catholic hierarchy in a collective sense, have the ability to create or at least fortify powerful social movements in support of your preferred policy positions.

[5] For a discussion of the Catholic vote at the national level, see George Gallup, Jr. and Jim Castelli, *The American Catholic People: Their Beliefs, Practices, and Values* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 126–7.

[6] Robert Beckel, interview with author, 14 December 1987.

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The clearest example of this was the hierarchy's crucial role in the anti-abortion mobilization, particularly in its early days. The bishops gave the right-to-life movement money, visibility, and organizational support that were indispensable to the movement's enduring viability. However, these institutional resources are not limited to the anti-abortion effort alone. One of the reasons that the bishops' letter on nuclear weapons was taken seriously by the political community, for example, was the fact that the bishops had the ability to devote considerable resources to the nuclear freeze movement if they wished to do so. In an era of dealignment and shifting partisan loyalties, politicians have tried to use these resources for their own partisan purposes or failing that to prevent these resources from being turned against them. As a result, the bishops have found themselves in the middle of some of the most heated policy debates in contemporary American politics.

Finally, the bishops have been part of various political efforts to derive partisan benefit from the deep religious strain that runs through American culture. The United States is an unusually "religious" nation wherein 94 percent of the people believe in God, 69 percent belong to an organized church or religious community, and 41 percent attend religious services weekly. Moreover, Americans place greater confidence in their churches than in other institutions except the military, and 61 percent of them believe that religion can solve all or most of the problems facing their country.[7] As the New Deal party system has decayed, politicians and political activists have tried to associate themselves and their political programs with these religious beliefs and values. Republican candidates, for example, have appealed to traditional Democratic constituencies such as blue collar ethnics and white southerners on the basis of moral and religious principle rather than individual economic interest. In the language of realignment theory, these candidates have tried to "shift the axis" of political debate in order to appeal to voters on the basis of new issues that cut across old party divisions.[8]

Unlike their predecessors, today's Catholic bishops are rarely dismissed as un-American threats to the constitutional order. To the contrary, the bishops' readily apparent religious identity (brightly col-

[7] George Gallup, Jr., *The Gallup Poll: Opinion 1991* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1992), 237–240.

[8] James Sundquist, among others, has spoken of the party system shifting on its axis during critical realignments. See James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983, rev. ed.), 13.

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ored clerical vestments don't hurt) and their demonstrated ability to articulate morally grounded positions on national policy issues have made them attractive potential coalition partners to a variety of political forces. In fact, unlike leaders of the religious right, the Catholic bishops have not been exclusively identified with a single political program or electoral coalition. Instead, the bishops' policy agenda and related activities have spanned the ideological spectrum and cut across the prevailing cleavage of American party politics. As a result, the Catholic hierarchy has become deeply involved in a modern political process in which the axis of political debate has been purposefully shifted toward greater emphasis on religious issues and moral discourse.

In the remainder of this article I will examine the bishops' participation in the political process in greater detail. I will turn, in particular, to two national elections, 1976 and 1984, in which the bishops actively participated, and to one, 1988, in which the bishops' involvement was more marginal. In all three cases, both the extent and the nature of the bishops' political participation were shaped by the bishops' policy agenda and approach to the political process, *and* by the political dynamics of a shifting partisan alignment.

1976: The Politics of Abortion

The same Second Vatican Council document that called on the American bishops to read the "signs of the times" and vigorously apply Catholic teaching to the American social and political context also reaffirmed Catholic teaching that abortion is an "unspeakable crime."[9] Given this characterization of abortion and the bishops' renewed mission to apply Catholic moral teachings to their own political circumstances, it is difficult to imagine an occasion more likely to capture the attention and galvanize the efforts of the American Catholic hierarchy than the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in *Roe v. Wade* legalizing abortion. Indeed, the leaders of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops reacted sharply to the court's action, calling the decision, "an unspeakable tragedy for the nation" and recommending that "every legal possibility be explored to challenge the opinion of the United States Supreme Court."[10]

[9] See the "Pastoral Constitution," Abbott and Gallagher, eds., *The Documents of Vatican II*, 255–6.

[10] See "Statement on Abortion" (1973) in Hugh J. Nolan, ed., *Pastoral Letters of the United States Catholic Bishops Vol II* (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1984), 366;

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1976, of course, was the first presidential election year to follow *Roe v. Wade*, so the bishops approached the Gerald Ford–Jimmy Carter campaign with an anti-abortion policy agenda and with a commitment to advance that agenda through participation in the political process. The bishops called for "well planned and coordinated political action" by abortion opponents.[11] Through their conference president, Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, they publicly praised Republican support for an anti-abortion constitutional amendment and condemned Democratic opposition to one.[12] The bishops' vocal, collective opposition to legal abortion, however, was only the necessary first step in their active involvement in the 1976 campaign. The bishops' participation also resulted from the attention the candidates paid them, and by the efforts the candidates made to associate themselves with the bishops' moral agenda. The decay of the New Deal coalition, the crucial importance of Catholic voters, and the candidates' perception that the bishops could influence those votes combined to place the Catholic hierarchy at the very center of the national political process.

Catholics were one of the most important segments of the American electorate in 1976. In 1972 a majority of Catholics had abandoned the Democratic party and its presidential candidate, George McGovern. This shift, along with the defection of white southerners, had destroyed the New Deal coalition and swept Richard Nixon to a landslide reelection victory. Jimmy Carter, a former governor of Georgia, promised to return the white south to Democratic ranks in 1976. His fortunes among Catholic voters, however, were much less certain. In fact, many Democrats speculated that Carter's born-again Southern Baptist tradition would cause a so-called Catholic problem for his candidacy. Problem or not, Catholics were crucial both to Carter's hopes to rebuild the New Deal party after the shock of Watergate and to Gerald Ford's hopes to further the Democratic coalition's decline.

The Carter campaign, convinced the bishops could either exacerbate or ameliorate their candidates' Catholic problem, made a concerted

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and "Statement of the Committee for Pro-Life Affairs" in *Documentation on the Right-to-Life and Abortion* (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1974), 59.

[11] "Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities" in Nolan, ed., *Pastoral Letters, Vol IV*, 87.

[12] Bernardin called the Democratic plank on abortion "irresponsible" and the Republican plank "timely and important." See *United States Catholic Conference (USCC) News Release*, 22 June 1976; and *Origins*, 2 September 1976, 173. USCC News Releases were made available to me by the USCC Office of Public Affairs. *Origins* is the USCC documentary service.

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effort to avoid the appearance of a personal abortion rift with the Catholic hierarchy.[13] In fact, Carter spent a great deal of energy, resources, and political capital in a futile effort to reach an accommodation with the bishops on abortion. He solicited an exclusive interview with the National Catholic News Service, for example, in which he emphasized his moral opposition to abortion and tried to distance himself from his platform's explicit opposition to an anti-abortion constitutional amendment.[14] More importantly, Carter also sought a face-to-face meeting with the executive committee of the bishops' conference during which he unsuccessfully tried to paper over his abortion differences with the hierarchy.[15] On the whole, Carter did all he could to establish an "intimate personal relationship" with the bishops in the hope that such a relationship would facilitate his appeal to Catholic voters.[16] However, he succeeded only in raising the bishops' political profile and in drawing the media's attention to his intractable policy differences with them.

Gerald Ford, on the other hand, set out in the words of an aide "to exploit the cultural combativeness between Southern Baptists and Catholics."[17] To that end, Ford sought to emphasize Carter's distance from the bishops, particularly on abortion, and to demonstrate his own attentiveness to Catholic concerns. He brought the crowd at a Catholic Eucharistic Congress to its feet, for example, by declaring his dismay at the growing "irreverence for life" in American society.[18] He also chose the days immediately following Carter's public discussion of abortion with the bishops to publicly embrace a Republican platform plank that went well beyond his own rather modulated support of an anti-abortion constitutional amendment.[19] Finally, Ford

[13] One of Carter's top campaign aides told me that they were concerned about the bishops because "the bishops could affect the vote at the margin and it is at the margin, after all, that elections are won and lost." Stuart Eizenstat, telephone interview with author, 12 March 1987.

[14] Despite the fact that the abortion plank of the Democratic platform had been written by his supporters on the drafting committee, Carter told Jim Castelli of the National Catholic News Service that "the wording of the Democratic plank was, I think, inappropriate, and was not in accordance with my own desires." See *Origins*, 2 September 1976, 171.

[15] Carter's meeting with the bishops resulted in a statement by NCCB President Bernardin that the bishops remained "disappointed" in Carter's position on abortion. For details of the meeting, see *Origins*, 16 September 1976.

[16] This characterization of Carter's strategy is from Martin Schram, *Running for President 1976: The Carter Campaign* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), 224.

[17] Quoted in *Newsweek*, 20 September 1976, 16.

[18] *Washington Post*, 9 August 1976.

[19] *New York Times*, 9 September 1976.

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invited the NCCB Executive Committee to a meeting at the White House in order to contrast his agreement with the bishops' abortion position with his opponent's disagreement.[20]

The bishops clearly approached the 1976 campaign determined to publicly advocate a constitutional amendment overturning *Roe v. Wade*. The teaching of their church on the issue and their responsibility to advocate that teaching were both crystal clear. However, this teaching and responsibility did not alone account for the prominence and significance of the bishops' activities in 1976. The very uncertain nature of the partisan alignment that year and the crucial importance of the Catholic vote led both candidates to focus on the bishops' agenda, to engage the bishops in public dialogue, and to draw the bishops more deeply into the political process. The bishops' political role in 1976, in other words, was the result of a particular intersection of their responsibilities and agenda with the platforms and strategies of the national candidates and with a particular alignment of the American party system.

1984: Defining the Politics of Religion

The same was true eight years later during the 1984 presidential campaign. Several individual bishops spoke out on abortion and on the role that abortion should play in the American political process. However, the hierarchy's role in the Reagan–Mondale campaign was once again a function of the terms of the policy debate between the candidates and of the electoral strategies pursued by the major political parties. Specifically, a debate between the presidential candidates over the role of religion and morality in American public life sharpened and revealed to the public a similar debate within the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.

Throughout most of American history, the Catholic hierarchy had reflexively supported American foreign and defense policies in order to vouch for the patriotic credentials of American Catholics.[21] In 1983, however, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops released a pastoral letter that among other things called for a halt in the development

[20] Ford's hopes for the meeting were met when Bernardin said afterward that he and the other members of the executive committee were "encouraged" by Ford's position on abortion. For details of the meeting, see *United States Catholic Conference News Release*, 13 September 1976.

[21] On this subject, see Dorothy Dohen, *Nationalism and American Catholicism* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967).

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and deployment of new nuclear systems and virtually ruled out any moral use of the American nuclear arsenal.[22] *The Challenge of Peace* was a very clear indication of how far American Catholics had come from a time when their patriotism and loyalty had been routinely questioned. It was also an indication of how committed the modern American hierarchy was to the application of Catholic teaching to their own national circumstances and of how the NCCB could be used as a vehicle for the hierarchy's participation in national policy debates.

The bishops' letter had a kind of reconfirming effect on the already rather dovish views of American Catholics.[23] The letter provided powerful moral and institutional support to the burgeoning nuclear freeze movement.[24] However, the most politically significant thing about *The Challenge of Peace* was that it represented a substantial expansion of the bishops' policy agenda at a time when religion and morality had come to play a very large role in the American political process. Unlike 1976, when abortion dominated the bishops' agenda, the most prominent items on the bishops' policy agenda in 1984 cut across the major policy differences between the two party platforms.

In 1980, the Republican party had used its position on abortion and other social issues to identify itself with religious values and to broaden the base of a new conservative coalition.[25] In 1984, due to Ronald Reagan's efforts to reemphasize that identification, solidify that base, and effect a lasting realignment of the electorate, the campaign took on an unusually religious tone. On one level, the "religious issue" of the campaign concerned the propriety of using religious rhetoric and imagery to buttress fundamentally political arguments. Specifically, Walter Mondale accused President Ronald Reagan of blurring the lines of separation between church and state and of "trying to transform policy debates into theological disputes."[26]

[22] See *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* (Washington, DC: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1983).

[23] Catholic support for a nuclear freeze, for example, rose from 70 percent to 84 percent after the release of the pastoral letter. See Gallup and Castelli, *The American Catholic People*, 83. "It would appear," Andrew Greeley concluded on this subject, "that the American bishops provided Catholics with a focus for their concern that was not provided by any parallel agency or institution for American Protestants." See Greeley, *American Catholics Since the Council*, 96.

[24] One freeze leader credited "two establishments—the Catholic bishops and the medical community—with giving the new anti-nuclear movement its credibility." See Jim Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age* (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1983), 51.

[25] A. James Reichley has written, for example, that "the conventional wisdom in Washington is that the Reagan coalition is made up of conservatives, neo-conservatives, and the religious new right." See A. James Reichley, "The Reagan Coalition," *The Brookings Review* 1 (Winter 1982): 6.

[26] *Newsweek*, 17 September 1984, 24.

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On another level, the religious debate in 1984 was actually much more complex and more interesting than this. In truth, Reagan was right when he said that "faith and religion play a central role in the political life of the nation and they always have."[27] The important religious question facing the country in 1984 was not *whether* religion and Christian morality should influence public policy, but rather *where* that influence should begin and end. For Reagan, morality was primarily a matter of individual behavior; for Mondale it was a more collective or societal phenomenon. Reagan stressed issues such as abortion and prayer in schools, and he accused his opponent of being intolerant of religion. Mondale countered with accounts of his own religious upbringing and with an emphasis on the moral dimensions of his commitments to the amelioration of poverty and the reversal of the arms race.

The questions facing the American Catholic hierarchy in 1984, therefore, involved the scope of Catholic morality's relationship with the American political agenda. How should Catholic moral teaching speak to the contemporary public policy debate? How would the bishops' policy agenda intersect the religiopolitical debate between the presidential candidates? These questions elicited two very different responses from two segments of the hierarchy that revealed a split within the NCCB over the articulation of the bishops' expanded policy agenda. Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, for one, was concerned that as a result of this new agenda the bishops "would be severely pressured by those who wanted to push a particular issue with little or no regard for the rest [of the bishops' positions]."[28] He argued, therefore, that the bishops should approach what he called the human life and human dignity issues in a more or less even-handed fashion. Speaking in particular of the bishops' opposition to abortion and to nuclear war, Bernardin said in late 1983 that he was "convinced that the pro-life position of the church must be developed in terms of a comprehensive and consistent ethic of life. . . . I contend," Bernardin said, "that the viability of the [pro-life] principle depends upon the consistency of its application."[29]

[27] *Time*, 10 September 1984, 9.

[28] The quote is from a speech Bernardin gave at the University of Portland in 1985. The office of Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) made a videotape of this speech available to me.

[29] This quote is from a speech at Fordham University in December 1983. See *Origins*, 29 December 1983, 492.

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This consistent ethic approach was in part, as Bernardin claimed, a theological and ethical framework. However, it was also a political strategy designed to prevent politicians from identifying themselves with only one of the bishops' applications of the Catholic pro-life principle. In particular, the consistent ethic of life, if adhered to by the bishops, would prevent an exclusive emphasis on the bishops' opposition to legal abortion during the 1984 presidential campaign. The consistent ethic of life, in other words, would prevent the bishops from being identified with anti-abortion forces, such as the Republican national ticket, whose views conflicted with NCCB positions on a long list of other public policy issues.

Many members of the American Catholic hierarchy accepted both the moral logic and the political implications of Bernardin's consistent ethic of life. However, several rather prominent bishops did not. These bishops did not deny the validity of other pro-life concerns or even the need for the bishops to respond to them. However, they argued that it was fatuous to equate merely potential threats to human life such as nuclear war with the actual destruction of millions of human fetuses every year. Archibishop Bernard Law of Boston dismissed nuclear war as merely a "future possibility" and called abortion the "critical issue" of the 1984 campaign.[30] Archibishop John O'Connor of New York argued in a similar vein that "if the unborn in a mother's womb is unsafe it becomes ludicrous for the bishops to address the threat of nuclear war."[31] O'Connor also publicly asked how a Catholic could vote in good conscience for any candidate who supported legal abortion.[32] These bishops who advanced a single-issue, pro-life approach were not rejecting Bernardin's ethical framework as much as they were rejecting the political strategy it implied. Law, O'Connor, and their supporters believed that abortion should remain the hierarchy's top policy priority, and they were willing to accept the political ramifications of that position.

This debate was not primarily a dispute over the substance of the hierarchy's individual policy positions. Rather, it was a dispute over the way the bishops' agenda would be articulated and advanced during the 1984 campaign, given the fact that its major components (pro-arms control and nuclear freeze, *and* anti-abortion) cut directly across the

[30] *Origins*, 20 September 1984, 217.
[31] Wayne Barrett, "Holier than Thou," *Village Voice*, 25 December 1984.
[32] See "Archbishop Contends Abortion Is Key Issue," *New York Times*, 25 June 1984.

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prevailing cleavage of American national politics. The debate within the National Conference of Catholic Bishops was not a reaction to any internal inconsistency in the bishops' moral agenda itself. It was a reaction to the way that the agenda might intersect with the platforms and strategies of the political parties and their national candidates.

The debate among the bishops in 1984 was politically significant because both of the proposed relationships between Catholic teaching and public policy carried inescapable partisan implications. To be sure, Bernardin's consistent ethic retained an implacable opposition to legal abortion that was directly at odds with the Democratic party platform. Nevertheless, the argument that abortion was one of many important life issues at stake in 1984 meshed rather readily with the general Democratic approach to the role of religion and morality in American public life. Like the Democrats, supporters of the consistent ethic stressed the societal, collective dimension of morality. Like Walter Mondale, they argued that issues beyond abortion and individual behavior had to be assessed in light of moral and religious values. Fr. J. Bryan Hehir, for example, a top official of the bishops' conference and a strong proponent of the consistent ethic, framed the American moral agenda in a way that was virtually identical to the Democratic response to President Reagan's religious rhetoric. "We should remember," Hehir admonished in 1984, "that fairness in economics and restraint on nuclear arms control are moral and religious issues too."[33]

The codification of the bishops' multi-issue agenda into a consistent ethic of life and that codification's inevitable deemphasis of abortion as a single-issue political litmus test, were particularly attractive to Catholic Democratic politicians. The consistent ethic allowed politicians like New York Governor Mario Cuomo and Democratic Vice Presidential candidate, Geraldine Ferraro, to argue more credibly that abortion was only one issue among many equally important moral issues that Catholic politicians and Catholic voters had to consider. The consistent ethic did not endorse these politicians' pro-choice views, of course, but it provided a broader moral framework in which those views could be weighed against other pro-life commitments.

The abortion-centered approach was more straightforwardly partisan in its effect, given the political realities of 1984. To call abortion the critical issue of a campaign pitting a candidate who agrees with your position on abortion against one who does not comes very close

[33] *Newsweek*, 17 September 1984, 35.

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to expressing a preference for a candidate. In fact, an off-hand remark made by John O'Connor during the campaign clearly revealed the inescapable implications of the abortion-centered policy agenda. Taking the podium at a right-to-life rally immediately after the playing of a taped message of support from the president, Archbishop O'Connor asked the crowd: "I didn't tell you to vote for Ronald Reagan, did I?"[34] No, he did not, but he didn't have to.

While the consistent ethic offered a kind of moral cover for pro-choice Catholic politicians, the abortion-centered approach focused particular attention on Catholic candidates' and their abortion views. Implicit in Geraldine Ferraro's candidacy for the vice presidency, for example, was an argument that while Catholic teaching and Democratic policy differed on abortion, that difference was compensated for by the many other pro-life issues on which the Democrats and the bishops agreed. For bishops who emphasized abortion over all other issues, however, this argument was wholly unacceptable. In 1982 Ferraro added her signature to a Catholics for a Free Choice letter that said "the Catholic position on abortion is not monolithic." Two years later, in September 1984, Archbishop O'Connor accused Ferraro of saying "things relevant to Catholic teaching which are not true. . . . She has given the world to understand that Catholic teaching is divided on the subject of abortion. . . . As an officially approved teacher of the Catholic Church all I can judge is that what has been said about Catholic teaching is wrong."[35] The point of Archbishop O'Connor's challenge of Ferraro's position was to make clear that he and several other influential bishops would not accept national Catholic candidates who disagreed with the hierarchy on the question of the legal status of abortion. The public criticism of Ferraro was another way of making clear to both Catholics and the broader political community that *The Challenge of Peace* and Bernardin's consistent ethic notwithstanding, abortion was still the number one political priority of a vocal and prominent segment of the American Catholic hierarchy.

My aim here is not only to point out the partisan implications of the two sides of the bishops' debate in 1984. It is also to make the more fundamental observation that the very terms of that debate and the various activities that grew out of it were shaped by the terms of the political debate and the nature of the partisan competition. The

[34] "O'Connor Critical of Ferraro's Views," *New York Times*, 9 September 1984.
[35] See *New York Times*, 9 September 1984.

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bishops' participation in the 1984 campaign grew out of the expansion of the bishops' agenda and the tensions that resulted from it. However, the bishops' participation in the 1984 campaign also grew out of the fact that their policy agenda cut across the partisan lines of a campaign in which the scope of religion's role in American public life had become a major national issue and the Democratic party ran a pro-choice Catholic for the vice-presidency of the United States.

1988: Bishops on the Sidelines

In 1986 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops continued the expansion and diversification of its policy agenda through the release of *Economic Justice for All*, a pastoral letter on the U.S. economy.[36] Written over a six year period, it decried the maldistribution of income in the United States, termed the persistence of poverty in a nation as rich as the United States a social and moral scandal, and called for a greater degree of governmental involvement across the spectrum of American economic life. *Economic Justice for All*, though it followed a long series of economic statements that had been produced by the American bishops over the years, was emblematic of the bishops' modern approach to public policy problems. Most of the major economic statements made by the bishops in earlier eras had had a large parochial element to them in that a substantial segment of the American poor were Catholic. Historian Thomas McAvoy, for example, argued that the reasons for the bishops' defense of the Knights of Labor in 1886 and the "Bishops' Program for Social Reconstruction" in 1919, two of the bishops' major economic efforts of the past, were "about the same; most Catholics were in the wage earning classes."[37] By 1986, however, the views expressed in *Economic Justice for All* could not be interpreted as efforts to defend the interests of American Catholics. They were simply the American hierarchy's self-confident, collective contribution to the national debate on the future of American economic policy.

In political terms, however, the bishops' pastoral letter did not involve the bishops in the political debates and processes of 1988. Just two years after the Catholic bishops called for a radical reordering

[36] See *Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy* (Washington, DC: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1986).

[37] See Thomas T. McAvoy, *A History of the Catholic Church in the United States* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 388.

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of American economic priorities, George Bush and Michael Dukakis conducted a presidential campaign in which both the bishops and their policy agenda played limited roles. The bishops' own perceptions, trepidations, and decisions led them to the political margin in 1988. But so did the primary policy disputes between the candidates and the fundamental electoral strategies pursued by the political parties.

On the whole, the American Catholic hierarchy approached the 1988 national election with a good deal of wariness. The leaders of the bishops' national conference were anxious to prove that the hierarchy was not given to partisan political maneuvering. These anxieties, combined with fears that the activities of church affiliated anti-abortion forces could jeopardize the church's tax exemption, led the hierarchy's legal staff to warn the bishops about the possible consequences of involving themselves in the 1988 campaign.

"During an election campaign," the bishops were advised, "[tax] exempt organizations remain free to address issues of concern to them and their membership, even when such issues are relevant to the campaign. However, such discourse must focus on issues and not personalities."[38] In addition, the bishops' legal counsel suggested that individual bishops refrain from participating in political rallies and from placing themselves in circumstances that could lead the public or the press to conclude that they were officially identifying themselves with a particular candidate or political party. A few bishops, nevertheless, did meet with Vice-President Bush during the campaign; Archbishop John Whealon of Hartford publicly renounced his membership in the Democratic party to protest its position on abortion.[39] On the whole, however, the Catholic bishops sought to be less actively and less controversially involved in the 1988 electoral process than they were in either 1976 or 1984.

But the bishops' hesitation does not completely explain their quietude in 1988. Had the bishops, either collectively or individually, wanted to take a more active role in the campaign, they would have found political circumstances relatively inhospitable to such a role. The presidential candidates could have made a number of political decisions that would have pressured the bishops to become more involved than

[38] See "USCC General Counsel's Memorandum on Tax-Exempt Entities and Political Campaign Activities," *Origins*, 1 September 1988, 185.

[39] On Bush's meetings with individual bishops, see "Campaign Courtesy: Bush Calls on Bishop," *New York Times*, 30 October 1988. For a discussion of Whealon's actions, in particular, see *National Catholic Reporter*, 14 October 1988, 2.

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perhaps they wished to be. Politics, in short, bypassed the bishops in 1988. The economic issues that sharply divided the parties did not focus attention on *Economic Justice for All*. In fact, the bishops' call for more resources for social programs and for greater governmental intervention in the economic process rang decidedly hollowly in a policy context dominated by Reaganomics and enormous budget deficits. In 1984 the bishops had been associated with the nuclear freeze, a potent political symbol. What symbols were they to be associated with in 1988? Social democracy? Higher taxes?

In 1984, the hierarchy's internal debate between bishops favoring a consistent ethic of life and those favoring a more abortion-centered approach only took on political significance in light of the partisan political debate over the scope and character of religion's proper role in American politics and public policy. In 1988 religion played a less prominent role in the general election campaign, despite the presence of Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson in the nomination struggles of their respective parties. The muted religious tone of the 1988 campaign meant that the bishops' debate over their policy agenda and political priorities was less closely tied to the strategies and rhetoric of the presidential campaign. The bishops' debate was by no means over, but everyone from the presidential candidates to the national press to the bishops themselves paid less attention to it in 1988 than they had four years earlier.

Abortion, which had structured the bishops' participation in 1976 and 1984 more than any other issue, was less prominently featured in 1988 than in those earlier campaigns. Bush and Dukakis, to be sure, disagreed over abortion, and each sought to reap political benefits from his position on the issue. However, in 1988 other symbolic, emotion-laden social issues took center stage. Bush successfully used Willie Horton and the pledge of allegiance as symbols of Dukakis's purported softness on crime and lack of patriotism. But neither of these symbols focused attention on the bishops or drew the bishops into dialogue with the candidates.

Unlike Jimmy Carter, Michael Dukakis did not approach the bishops as a route to Catholic votes. Unlike Ronald Reagan, George Bush did not set off a debate over religion's role in public policy that would have drawn attention to the bishops' own discussion of the same issue. It is difficult, of course, to explain a nonevent. Nevertheless, an adequate explanation of the bishops' role in the 1988 campaign must take into account developments that took place both inside and outside the church.

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Conclusion

A number of factors internal to the hierarchy itself led the Catholic bishops to become more actively involved in the American political process in the 1970s and 1980s. The Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), for example, challenged the bishops to apply Catholic teaching to the American context. It also offered the bishops a policy agenda of "problems of special urgency" under the headings "fostering the nobility of marriage and the family," "socio-economic life," and "the fostering of peace and the promotion of a community of nations."[40] The strengthening of the bishops' national conference and the development of a sense of collegiality among the bishops, both of which were also furthered by the Vatican Council, allowed the bishops to add their collective voice to a series of national policy debates. The appointment to the episcopacy of activist, pastorally oriented men in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and then more conservative, traditional men during John Paul II's papacy drove both the development of the bishops' agenda and the tensions associated with its relationship to the political process.

However, these developments within the American church do not fully account for the Catholic hierarchy's more active participation in the contemporary political process. Politics has also changed, and at times these changes have drawn the bishops into the center of American electoral politics. The breakdown of the Democratic New Deal coalition has ushered in an era of shifting partisan alignments in which both parties have scrambled to find issues and strategies that will result in a new enduring majority. These efforts have led politicians to focus attention on the Catholic bishops and to try to associate themselves with the bishops' morally grounded positions on major issues of the day. The bishops have not unilaterally imposed themselves on the political process. They have been sought out and drawn into the process through the actions, decisions, and strategies of secular political forces.

As we look to the future, we should be explicitly mindful of the political side of the mix of religion and politics. The American Catholic bishops will continue to develop their policy agenda and continue to debate among themselves that agenda's political implications. The bishops' actual role in the political process will continue to be shaped by the terms of the policy debate between the major parties, by the electoral strategies pursued by national political candidates, and by the evolving shape of an uncertain partisan alignment.

[40] See the "Pastoral Constitution" in Abbott and Gallagher, eds., *Documents of Vatican II*.

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British Mass Perceptions of the Anglo-American Special Relationship

JORGEN RASMUSSEN
JAMES M. McCORMICK

Immediately after World War II one of the most popular songs was entitled, "Seems Like Old Times." Nearly a half century later that title well characterized Anglo-American relations, which appeared to have returned to that earlier era. Despite the breadth of the coalition that the United States built to oppose Iraq, the chief U.S. acolyte was Britain. The French sent a tough, highly trained force, but their contribution was much smaller than Britain's and had initially seemed more hesitant. The Italian contribution was even smaller than the French. The Germans, preoccupied with reunification, hid behind constitutional niceties and just sent money, as did Japan. Once again the Anglo-Saxons, as Charles de Gaulle liked to call them, found that in a crisis they could count only on each other for whole-hearted, ungrudging support. Clearly, relations between Britain and the United States long have appeared to be "special" (in de Gaulle's view sinister); they differ in some intrinsic fashion from those that have existed between other pairs of friendly countries.

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Winston Churchill has been cited as the creator of the Anglo-American special relationship.[1] The earliest recorded usage of the term according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* occurred in a speech he made in the House of Commons when Prime Minister Clement Attlee was preparing to visit the United States late in 1945.[2] Interestingly, Churchill's reference embraced *both* the United States *and* Canada and concerned nuclear weapons.

The Special Relationship: Leaders, Elites, and Masses

Since Churchill's coinage, the term "special relationship" has been employed as shorthand for a broad and complex network of links between Britain and the United States. Bruce Russett's thorough and systematic study of Anglo-American relations early in the 1960s, for example, ranged across trade, investment, migration, communication flows, and military linkages, to name just some of his focal points.[3] A decade later William Wallace in a study of British foreign policy cited as examples of the relationship wartime joint British/American boards, informal meetings between political leaders of the two countries, close consultation by diplomatic personnel, military and intelligence service cooperation, and other instances of intergovernmental cooperation.[4] He saw the relationship as "built upon an existing network of economic, social, and cultural ties and upon the wartime identity of interests. . . ." Russett emphasized "capabilities for responsiveness," "trust, mutual consideration, and willingness to treat the other's requests sympathetically," which result in the ability to resolve differences fairly amicably, to collaborate in areas of common concern, and to assist each other when necessary.[5] For him the heart of the relationship was a "we-feeling" between the two peoples.

For analytical purposes, three levels of the special relationship should be distinguished: personal ties between leaders, elite cooperation, and mass sentiment. The first of these is the one most commonly

[1] Michael Howard in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., *The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations Since 1945* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1986), 387.

[2] "We should fortify in every way our special and friendly connections with the United States . . . we should not abandon our special relationship with the United States and Canada about the atomic bomb." 415 H. C. Debs. 1299, 7 November 1945.

[3] Bruce Russett, *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963).

[4] William Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain* (London: RIIA, 1975), 119, 217.

[5] Russett, *Community and Contention*, 25–27.

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mentioned. Michael Howard, for example, noted that the development of a special relationship between Britain and the United States paralleled the personal one that flourished between Churchill and Roosevelt. Never subsequently have relations between British and American leaders been that warm—to the detriment of the special relationship between the two nations.[6] Similarly, Christopher Tugendhat and Wallace recognized the significance of leader affinity in saying that "the closeness of the Reagan–Thatcher dialogue has done much to maintain the special character of the US–UK relationship."[7]

Some might argue that the importance of personal ties between leaders was demonstrated again in the Gulf conflict. To cite these relations as the basis for the linkage of U.S. and British policy, however, is questionable. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher just happened to be in the United States on the day of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and thus became the first foreign leader that President George Bush consulted. A few days later, before she left the United States to return to Britain, they consulted again. Whether he would have been so solicitous in seeking her advice under other circumstances is debatable. True, Thatcher's replacement as prime minister by John Major did not cause British support for the effort to repulse Iraq to miss a beat, but by that point Britain was pretty well committed. In any event, Bush and Major had had little opportunity to develop close personal relations.

However important relations between any particular pair of leaders may be, accidents of leader personality compatibilities or clashes hardly are sufficiently enduring to provide a foundation for a "special relationship" between nations. If what is meant by the term is no more than that some leaders get on well together, then that is so commonplace in international relations as not to merit the label "special." Furthermore, top leaders remain in power only briefly; even someone as politically long-lived as Thatcher lasted only a decade. Ties between leaders are necessarily ephemeral; to be special, a relationship between nations must be enduring.

Should the specialness of the Anglo-American relationship be seen instead as residing in elite cooperation? Howard commented on this level as well. He even contended that the special relationship has "sur-

[6] Louis and Bull, *The "Special Relationship,"* 387–89.

[7] Christopher Tugendhat and William Wallace, *British Foreign Policy in the 1990s* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), 29–30.

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vived rather better" at the level of "officials" and regarded the persistent consultation and cooperation between governmental staff as the essential characteristic of this tie.[8] These linkages do not fluctuate as greatly over time because they are not affected by accidents of leader personality. Despite their stress on ties between leaders, Tugendhat and Wallace also referred to the warmth and importance the British political elite accords to the special relationship with the United States.[9] Russett's study had even broader concerns at this level, discussing not only interactions between the governmental elites but also between the attentive publics of the two countries.

While relations between top leaders are more highly visible than are the linkages between elites, the latter obviously are of considerable import. Nonetheless, to regard these as the essence of the special relationship is to mistake the effects for the substance. Such contacts are more examples or instances of the special relationship than they are the substance of it. The turnover of elites is less rapid than that of leaders, yet they too serve relatively short tenures. With their departure from positions of authority the linkages built up with their opposite numbers across the ocean may wither.

This discussion suggests that the third level — mass sentiments — must be the heart of any extraordinary stable and enduring linkage between countries. While the specific individuals that make up a country are changing continuously, the country as a society and a culture is more enduring. The values and attitudes of the country alter only slowly, despite the replacement of its population. Furthermore, the content of these values and attitudes is affected little by the coming or going of particular individuals. Such durability provides a bedrock on which to base a relationship deserving to be called special.

Once again, Howard's comments are apposite. As he concisely observed: "The relationship between Britain and the United States must therefore be seen, not as one between leaders or even elites, but between the societies which produce those leaders."[10] Also relevant is Russett's point that in a democracy mass perceptions cannot be ignored, that at the very least "mass opinion . . . set[s] certain bounds beyond which decision-makers may not go."[11] Mass sentiments are likely to constrain the behavior of leaders and elites.

[8] Louis and Bull, *The "Special Relationship,"* 389.
[9] Tugendhat and Wallace, *British Foreign Policy*, 26–27.
[10] Louis and Bull, *The "Special Relationship,"* 391.
[11] Russett, *Community and Contention*, 115.

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Over the past three decades several writers have sought to assess the strength of the special relationship. The contrasts in their findings appear to have been affected considerably by the level on which their analysis concentrated. Wallace faulted British foreign policy making for being clothed by guiding assumptions, like the special relationship, that "were long since threadbare."[12] Writing a decade later, he and his coauthor asserted that "the assumptions and *personal relations* on which it rested in the postwar years have faded." They urged Britain to "abandon the illusion that the special relationship is more than a set of limited arrangements, and [to] approach the UK–U.S. link with a more hard-headed calculation of the costs and benefits to Britain."[13] That is to say that they wished relations between Britain and the United States to be assessed exactly as relations between any two nations—hardly a "special relationship." They sought to move from sentiment to interests.

David Watt has made this point even more bluntly in asserting that "the underlying basis of the Anglo-American relationship has always been interest and not, in the first place, emotion."[14] Such a view makes relations between Britain and United States fundamentally no different from those prevailing between any pair of countries; the relationship would be ordinary, not special. Watt even went so far as to assert that "since the 1970s Anglo-American relations . . . have ceased to be very important or very interesting."[15] Similarly, contributors to another survey of British foreign policy also preferred to eschew sentiment for interests. They complained about the lack of benefits to Britain, and denounced British subservience to the United States.[16]

David Reynolds provides a more balanced view. On the one hand, he too saw a "need to reassess fundamentally the diplomatic traditions Britain has inherited from the 1940s and 1950s" and questioned whether "the bonds of the 'special relationship' now [are] a restraint on Britain's diplomacy."[17] Yet he also felt that the association between the two countries had been so enduring and unique that he was uncertain whether the bonds could easily be untied. Only in that comment

[12] Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process*, 275, also 217.

[13] Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

[14] Louis and Bull, *The "Special Relationship,"* 3.

[15] Ibid., 13.

[16] Michael Smith, Steve Smith, and Brian White, *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change & Transformation* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 40–41, 105, 141, 165–66.

[17] David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War," *International Affairs* 62 (Winter 1985–1986): 19, 20.

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is there some hint of an underlying mass sentiment that might constrain policy makers.

Russett's study of more than a quarter of a century ago differs in two important ways. One, his view of the special relationship is quite positive (perhaps because he is American, not British; perhaps because of the time period). He argues that throughout the twentieth century "at the elite level American and British attitudes toward each other have improved substantially."[18] Second, he specifically examines the mass level, as well; surprisingly, he did not find binding ties. At the mass level, particularly during the quarter of a century preceding his study, he found that the two countries had drifted apart.[19] While Russett felt that the lack of mass support had somewhat hampered the ability of the U.S. executive to respond to British needs in 1939–1941 and again in 1946–1949, his chief worry was developments in Britain. There "the decline in mass approval is particularly disquieting. . . . It threatens to prevent mutual responsiveness even in crises."[20]

Perhaps Russett's views could be dismissed as time-bound were it not for similar findings more recently. In a 1983 study with Donald DeLuca, Russett reported that British confidence in America's "ability to handle world problems" declined considerably from 1972 to 1982. Russett and DeLuca attributed this decline to the British public's loss of confidence in President Ronald Reagan as a "good president," presumably because the nuclear arms policy followed by his administration was perceived as threatening to world peace.[21]

Howard also has warned of a growing gap in mass perceptions in each country of the other. He worried about growing right-wing fanaticism in the United States; in Britain his concern was a rising counter-elite so obssessed with domestic affairs that it wants to escape foreign commitments. It resents the United States as the cause of these "with a dislike sometimes bordering on hatred."[22] Neither faction is yet dominant in its own country, but should they become so he feared disaster for Britain, the United States, and the world.

[18] Russett, *Community and Contention*, 143.

[19] Ibid., 139, 143.

[20] Ibid., 199–200. Despite his concern, Russett discusses opinion poll findings for only four of 221 pages. For other recognition of the tensions and dangers of contrasting mass and elite attitudes see Smith, Smith, and White, *British Foreign Policy*, 83–84.

[21] Bruce Russett and Donald DeLuca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Summer 1983): 184. The decline was *not* as precipitous in Britain as they suggest, however, because the data presented in their Table 3 is erroneous.

[22] Louis and Bull, *The "Special Relationship,"* 391–92.

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Another commentator on Anglo-American relations points out how little personal relations between leaders may matter in relations between nations. Despite the Reagan–Thatcher affinity, Dean Godson argued that "there can be no doubt that skepticism of—indeed, hostility toward—the closeness of the 'special relationship' has been heightened during the Reagan years. The president and his policies have achieved even less support among the general public than among the political and intellectual elites."[23] He concluded that "the common denominators governing perceptions of the transatlantic relationship have narrowed rather than grown. . . . Both presidential personality and the longtime absence of a coherent foreign policy have contributed to this state of affairs."[24] Thus Godson, twenty-four years after Russett also was warning that "the options for U.S. policymakers are *not* going to *improve* in the next few years."[25] In short, a quarter of a century had done nothing to remedy the constraints that British public opinion threatened to impose on Anglo-American relations.

This Study's Purpose

We assume that mass sentiments are a requisite foundation if any extraordinary linkage is to be constructed between countries. We wish to ascertain whether the long-term decline in British mass approval for the United States, which so disturbed Russett in the early 1960s, continued during the 1970s and 1980s, as Howard's and Godson's comments suggest. Clearly, British action during the Gulf conflict demonstrated that mass views did not have the effect Russett feared of preventing responsiveness in a crisis. Had the decline in approval reversed itself or did it, despite a lack of improvement or even a further decline, simply fail to constrain top leader responsiveness?

Second, we need to discover whether British mass perceptions of the United States have been relatively stable or volatile. Have they been sensitive to or impervious to current events? Are British views of the United States more a matter of political principles, values, or

[23] Dean Godson, "British Attitudes Toward the United States" in Martin Holmes, et al., *British Security Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990s* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey, 1987), 113.

[24] Ibid., 119.

[25] Ibid., 118. (Emphasis in the original.)

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mere preferences on topical issues?[26] Principles or values are broad, durable beliefs not rooted primarily in the confines of a current event. Topical issues, in contrast, are transitory and specific. Values focus on the ends rather than the specific means of public policy. The basic assumption of this study is that a linkage between countries that is singled out to be labeled "special" cannot be unduly sensitive to the flow of events, cannot be a topical issue. Instead it must be the outgrowth of a society's basic principles and values and as such should evidence a great deal of stability and durability. The existence of such mass principles and values would serve as an anchor for elite policy making. Whatever the incidental divergences in policy from time to time, the long-term tendency would be toward similarity of action with a country enjoying favorable perceptions among the mass population of the other member of the pair in the relationship. Such a relationship truly would deserve to be termed "special."

To assess the stability of British mass perceptions of Anglo-American relations two elements are required: a set of polling data consistent over an extended time period and a volatility benchmark. Attitudes toward British membership in the European Community (EC) will serve well for the second. Prior to Britain's joining the EC at the start of January 1973, views on membership fluctuated greatly from sizable majorities in favor to the reverse.[27] Despite the extensive discussion of this subject, it remained to a considerable extent a hypothetical issue. Public views had not solidified; membership was more a topical issue than it was a matter of principle or basic value.

Once membership became a fact, public opinion stabilized, despite the fact that the Labour party was committed to renegotiating Britain's terms of entry and scheduled a referendum in June 1975 to ratify the revised bargain.[28] In fifteen Gallup polls from January 1973 to April

[26] The contrast discussed here upon Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, *Voters Begin to Choose* (London: Sage Publications, 1986), 117–19; and *The Loyalties of Voters* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 91–93.

[27] See James Spence, "Movements in the Public Mood: 1961–75" in Roger Jowell and Gerald Hoinville, eds., *Britain into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC 1961–75* (London: Croom Helm, 1976), esp. graphs on 20, 24, and 30.

[28] For greatest comparability only Gallup poll results are used in this study. Data has been gathered from George Gallup, gen. ed., *The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain 1937–1975*, two vols. (New York: Random House, 1976); Gallup Political Index, July 1980, no. 239 through December 1989, no. 352; Gordon Heald and Robert Wybrow, *The Gallup Survey of Britain* (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Norman Webb and Robert Wybrow, eds., *The Gallup Report* (London: Sphere Books, 1981 and 1982); and information provided by Robert Wybrow of Gallup. Specific citations are available from the authors on request.

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1975, the proportion thinking that Britain was right to have joined the Common Market (CM) varied only from 28 to 43 percent. Except for the last poll, when the words "European Community" were inserted after joining, the question was: "Do you think we were right or wrong to join the Common Market?" In fourteen polls from January 1973 to February 1975 the proportion saying they would be sorry to hear that the CM had been scrapped ranged only from 19 to 28 percent. ("If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped, would you be sorry about it, indifferent or pleased?") Nonetheless, the proportion of the voters in the referendum supporting Britain's continued membership exceeded by 15 percentage points the proportion saying in an opinion poll only two months earlier that they thought Britain was right to have joined and by 30 percentage points those saying so only four months earlier. (The opinion poll results have been recalculated with the "don't knows" excluded.)

By the 1980s Britain's membership in the EC hardly was a live issue; few responsible politicians still were advocating withdrawal. Therefore, we would expect the pattern of opinion to have moved toward that typical of principles and values and away from the volatility typical of topical issues. At least it would be reasonable to require that the mass perceptions essential to undergirding any linkage termed a "special relationship" should be at least as stable as those that characterized British views of the European Community during the 1980s.

On sixteen occasions from April 1980 through October 1987, Gallup asked respondents: "If you were told tomorrow that the European Community (Common Market) had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent, or relieved." The standard deviation for the proportion saying very sorry was only 3.9 and for those selecting relieved was 7.5. (Fourteen similar polls in the two years leading up to the referendum on the EC produced similar results—standard deviation of 3.0 for those saying "sorry" and of 4.8 for those saying "pleased.") Another twenty-six surveys scattered throughout the 1980s found little more variation in response to the question: "Generally speaking, do you think that British membership in the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?" The standard deviation for those saying good was 7.1 and for those preferring bad 8.7. (Fifteen polls in the two years prior to the referendum showed even less variation on whether Britain was right or wrong to have joined the EC. Standard deviation for right was 3.9 and for wrong 5.8.) If, therefore, British attitudes toward the United States

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over a similar period of time have a standard deviation greater than 10 percentage points, they would hardly seem to constitute the principles or basic values required for a special relationship.

As for the other of the two requisites for this study, Gallup has asked persistently over the years several questions about Britons' views of the United States. Fortunately, the wording of some of these questions has altered little or not at all and thus can provide a reliable time series of British opinion. This study systematically analyzes these Gallup polls to ascertain whether a special relationship exists at the mass level in Britain. Does the British public hold perceptions of the United States that are exceptional? Are any such perceptions stable and enduring?

We focus on the problem from three perspectives. First, we deal with affinity (How close do Britons feel to the United States?), next with comparative judgments (How does the behavior of the United States in British eyes stack up to that of the Soviet Union?), and finally with evaluations (How much confidence do Britons have in the United States international actions?). A final section seeks to assess tentatively the impact of relations with the United States upon the popular standing of the British prime minister.

Feelings of Closeness

Scattered surveys over the last three decades have found that more Britons consider the United States their country's best friend than they do any other country. The United States also is regarded as the country that would be most trustworthy were Britain involved in a war. On the other hand, only about a tenth say that they like Americans a lot, and by the close of the 1980s more reported feeling closer to Europeans than to Americans.

In other surveys about a third of Britons have said that relations with the United States were too close, about half that British foreign policy depends too much on the United States, and about two-thirds complained that the United States failed to treat Britain as an equal partner in matters of common concern. Perhaps most striking are the several polls that found that Britons regarded the United States as a greater threat to world peace than was the Soviet Union. Such negative views were not just a reaction to President Ronald Reagan's "evil empire" phase. In the mid-1950s Leon Epstein noted a "recurrent national

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Graph 1

Impression of Recent Anglo-American Relations
March 1982 to August 1987



"Is it your impression that Britain and America have been drawing closer together recently or getting farther apart?"

uneasiness over the postwar American connection."[29] The United States seemed too aggressively anticommunist to many in Britain.

The 1980s seem likely to have been a time of testing for Anglo-American relations. Not only did the United States have a virulent anticommunist government, but the decade also saw the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the incursion into Lebanon, and the bombing (by planes stationed in Britain) of Libya. Furthermore, Britain was being increasingly integrated into the European Community, a development that could well weaken ties with the United States. About the only positive development was U.S. assistance for Britain during the Falklands war.

In twenty-nine surveys during the 1980s Gallup asked: "Is it your impression that Britain and America have been drawing closer together recently or getting farther apart?" The responses appear in Graph 1. (The data point for November 1983 is the average of four surveys during that month. The same is true for April 1986. August 1987 is the average of two surveys.) The most striking feature of this graph

[29] Leon Epstein, *Britain—Uneasy Ally* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 265.

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is the long-term upward trend. Despite all that had happened during the decade which might have adversely affected British perceptions of their country's relations with the United States, more Britons were likely to feel in the latter part of the decade that the two countries were getting closer than had held this view earlier in the 1980s. In nine of the first fifteen surveys (March 1982 to August 1984) more Britons thought the two countries were getting farther apart than closer together. In all fourteen subsequent surveys (November 1984 to August 1987) more thought they were getting closer together.

The second most striking characteristic is the variability of responses. The standard deviation for the responses of those saying the two countries were drawing closer together is 15.4, about twice as great as the largest fluctuation in European Community attitudes. Furthermore, the major shifts appear to be event specific. The first three data points show a substantial proportion of Britons thinking the two countries were drawing closer together. These surveys were taken during and immediately after the Falklands war. The positive effects of U.S. help to Britain wore off quickly: before the year was out only 20 percent (a drop of 30 percentage points) thought Anglo-American relations were getting closer.

The following year saw another sizable decline. Those perceiving closer relations declined from 36 percent in July to only 18 percent (the lowest in the entire series) in mid-November, the month after the invasion of Grenada and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. November 1983 also was the month for the scheduled arrival of the first Cruise missiles. Demonstrations against these in Britain had been underway since October 1981, when a quarter of a million turned out in London to protest. When Gallup specifically asked in three surveys during November for Britons' assessments of American actions in Grenada and Lebanon, only a third were found to approve.

Three years later another sharp drop occurred. The bombing of Libya is a likely cause. Surveys at the end of March and in mid-April found that half or more of the respondents disapproved of U.S. action in dealing with Libya. These negative views did not immediately affect perceptions of Anglo-American relations; over the next six months, however, the proportion perceiving closer relations declined by 25 percentage points.

Only once did Gallup ask respondents why they thought relations were changing as they thought they were. What is remarkable about the responses is the extent to which they personalized Anglo-American

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relations. Among the slightly more than a third who thought relations were getting closer, the overwhelming (71 percent) reason offered was that Thatcher and Reagan were the same. Similarly, among the quarter who saw the countries as drawing apart, the most common explanation (33 percent) was that Thatcher and Reagan were disagreeing. The results of a single survey should not be overemphasized. Nonetheless, the fact that regardless of one's perception of the direction of change in relations, the leading reason offered had little to do with specific American action or with any traditional links or common values, but with fortuitous complementary leader personalities.

On the one hand, Anglo-American relations not only survived the events of the 1980s, but managed to thrive. Britons did not feel any less close to the United States at the end of the decade than they had at the beginning. On the other hand, feelings of closeness varied considerably and seemed quite sensitive to American world actions. The pattern of opinion regarding perceived Anglo-American closeness provides only qualified evidence at best of any existence of a special relationship in the minds of the British public.

Approval of the Super Powers

If Anglo-American relations are something out of the ordinary, then we would expect Britons to have a more positive view of United States international actions than those of other countries. Watt cites the toleration of U.S. administrations toward British disagreement as one aspect of the special relationship.[30] Is the British public willing to give the United States the benefit of the doubt that it is unwilling to extend to other countries? Given the differences in international status, comparing assessments of U.S. behavior with those for Canada or Australia would be pointless. Comparing perceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union, however, should be instructive. Both have been superpowers and no one ever has suggested that shared values and interests along with elite interaction have given Britain a special relationship with the Soviet Union.

For many years Gallup regularly has asked respondents: "Do you approve or disapprove of the role the United States is now playing in world affairs?" This has been followed with the question: "What about the role of Russia?" Subtracting the proportion approving of the Soviet

[30] Louis and Bull, *The "Special Relationship,"* 6.

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Graph 2

Approval for U.S. Role Compared to USSR Role
August 1983 to February 1991

"Do you approve or disapprove of the role the United States is now playing in world affairs? What about the role of Russia?" ("Netapprv" is percent approving of the U.S. role minus percent approving of the Russian role.)

Union from the proportion doing so for the United States produces a net approval score, which is plotted in Graph 2 for forty-one surveys from August 1983 through February 1991. (The data point for November 1983 is the average of four surveys during that month. The same is true for April 1986 and August 1987. September 1987 is the average of two surveys. The findings of a few earlier surveys also are available. These include five from 1973, when the net U.S. approval rate ranged from 9 to 18 percentage points.)

In contrast to Graph 1, the striking feature of this graph is the long-term downward trend. The United States starts out with a moderate edge over the Soviet Union; for example, in August 1983 30 percent of Britons approved of the U.S. role in world affairs, while only 8 percent approved of the Soviet role. Although net approval for the United States had begun to erode in 1985, the chief drop occurred from October 1985 to March 1986. In October the United States enjoyed an approval lead over the Soviet Union of 18 percentage points. By early March it had declined to 12, and by the start of April the countries were virtually even, both with less than a quarter of

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Britons approving their role. The Libyan bombing may not have had an immediate impact on feelings of closeness, but seems to have produced negative assessments of the United States world role much more quickly. Net approval is likely to have been cut from the other direction by positive assessments of the USSR. It was at this time (December 1985) that Mikhail Gorbachev visited Britain, which led to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's famous comment that he was a man that she could "do business" with. To some extent Britons' prime minister had endorsed favorable views of the Soviet Union.

The U.S. lead over the Soviet Union remained in single digits for the rest of 1986. Then in all of the four surveys completed in August 1987 (the first done that year), the United States fell behind: more Britons approved Soviet behavior in international affairs than did U.S. actions. Even Reagan's departure from office could not restore the United States to a net positive approval, which lagged behind that for the Soviets for the first year and half of George Bush's presidency. In August 1990 the United States got a net positive score for the first time in nearly four years. Although the rating slipped back to negative the following month, in February 1991 it jumped to a net 14 positive—the best in five years.

The dominant international event from August 1990 through February 1991 was, of course, the Gulf conflict. One might have thought that this event would have produced a negative reaction in Britain and would have been regarded as another example of U.S. trigger-happiness. Four polls in August and October found from 77 to an astounding 86 percent of Britons approving Bush's action in sending armed forces to the Gulf. Six polls in January and February 1991 (after the air war had begun) found from 33 to 50 percent "very satisfied" with Bush's handing of the situation. (The top of the range is from the only poll taken entirely after the ground war had been launched.) Never did as many as a quarter say they were "somewhat dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied."

In the January and February surveys the question about Bush followed immediately after a similar one inquiring about the satisfaction with the British government's handling of the situation. Conceivably Britons' positive evaluations of their leaders' action could have colored their assessment of Bush's. In any event, the "very satisfied" responses for the government question ran 5 to 8 percentage points higher than for the Bush question.

One more bit of information is relevant, although it involves a question asked only once. In the first survey early in August, Gallup asked:

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"In sending British forces to the Middle East, do you believe the British Government is acting mainly in defence of British interests, or is it acting mainly to keep in with the Americans?" Most (43 percent) said to defend British interests, a quarter said to keep in with the United States, and slightly more than a fifth thought both reasons were true. In short, a lot of Britons saw the Gulf conflict as involving Britain's welfare and, therefore, welcomed American action. Had Britain been forced to take on Iraq alone, the cost would have been much greater. The Gulf conflict was *not* American adventurism. Thus not surprisingly, approval for America's role in world affairs leapt from approval by only about two-fifths of Britons in the first half of 1990 to over three-fifths in the second half. Meanwhile, turmoil and crackdowns in the Soviet Union tarnished its image and dropped its approval from 64 percent in September to only 48 percent in February 1991.

Much of what has been said to this point is relevant to the second striking feature of Graph 2—the variability of responses. The standard deviation (13.2) for shifts in approval of U.S.-Soviet international role is a good deal larger than for changes in British public opinion on the EC, suggesting views related to the special relationship are less stable.

As was true of perceptions of closeness, these poll findings are ambiguous. When the chips were down, the United States was seen as the country that could be counted upon to help Britain defend its interests, indeed, so much so that the legacy of Reagan's foreign policy that had led to greater approval for the Soviet Union than for the United States was reversed. But the net positive approval at the very end of the period analyzed was only about two-thirds as large as it had been early in Reagan's presidency. Furthermore, evaluations fluctuated a good deal and approval, like perceptions of closeness, proved to be very sensitive to current events. If on eighteen of forty-one polls the Soviet Union is judged more favorably than is the United States and if a shooting war felt to involve Britain's interests is required to reverse this situation, how can relations between Britain and the United States be regarded as different from those existing between another pair of countries?

Confidence in America as a World Leader

Thus far we have seen that British mass feelings toward the United States varied a good deal during the 1980s but did not cool. On the

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other hand, Britons increasingly thought better of the Soviet Union's role in world affairs than that of the United States except at the start of the 1990s, when they applauded American action against Iraq. Another series of questions helps to explain why British approval of American action was so low. Gallup regularly has asked respondents how much confidence they have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with world problems and has followed this with a question about shifts in this confidence.

One might search for evidence of a special relationship in the absolute level of confidence. In this case, the argument would be that Britain's relations with the United States were special because confidence never fell below some bedrock level, no matter what happened. Gallup's findings are not very reassuring in this regard. Only once in eighty-seven surveys from 1972 to August 1990 did the proportion of Britons expressing "very great" confidence in the U.S. handling of world affairs reach double digits. Furthermore, in sixty-five surveys the proportion having "very great" or "considerable" confidence totaled less than 33 percent. The other alternative responses were "little," "very little," or "none at all" (volunteered).

We lack an extensive set of responses to similarly worded questions in other countries that would enable us to ascertain whether even this apparently low level of confidence is exceptionally high. If we depart briefly from Gallup data, however, we can obtain an approximate idea. In fourteen surveys from 1981 to 1990 the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) asked respondents in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy during the same month how much confidence they had in the ability of the United States to deal responsibly with world problems. The average proportion saying a great deal or a fair amount was the same in the first three countries (means = 51, 50, and 49), while Italy was considerably higher (64). Note that Gallup's question inquired about the ability "to deal wisely with present world problems," while the USIA question asked about the ability "to deal responsibly with world problems." More importantly, Gallup's top two options were "very great" and "considerable," while the USIA's were "a great deal" and "a fair amount," both less demanding standards. Such problems of wording comparability are the reason that we have chosen, with this exception, to stick to the survey results of a single polling organization. British responses varied more (SD = 8.9) than did French (7.5) or Italian (5.9), but less than German (12.1). The correlation between the British proportion having confidence and that in the other three

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countries ranged from .67 to .82. The British responses do not appear to be at all exceptional, nothing about them suggests existence of a special, more favorable attitude toward the United States not to be found in other western countries.

One study, in fact, argues that Britain has had the least positive view of the United States. Comparing Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, Russett and DeLuca found that by the early 1980s the British were the least likely to have a favorable view of the United States and least likely to have confidence in its handling of world problems. Furthermore, Britons were less likely than Germans or Belgians to regard the presence of American troops in Europe as a deterrent to Soviet attack and were more inclined than French, Germans, and Belgians to regard the stationing of American missiles as likely to increase the chances of an attack.[31] However, Britain did not diverge from the others on attitudes toward NATO and neutrality across three different age groups of university-educated citizens, nor was the British public at large any less willing to resist Soviet domination.[32]

Since we are especially interested in shifts in mass perception, we prefer to examine in detail the responses to the question about changes in confidence: "Has your confidence in the ability of America to deal with world problems tended to go up lately, go down, or remain about the same?" If a country's behavior seems erratic, then a person's confidence in that country might well be shaken and (in the absence of any special relationship) likely to fluctuate. For comparability with the two preceding earlier sections, we have divided the surveys into two groups: 39 taken during the presidencies of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter and 49 while Reagan and Bush were in office. We have subtracted the proportion of respondents saying their confidence in the United States had gone down recently from the proportion saying it had gone up to obtain a net shift in confidence.

The net shift varied considerably during the 1970s (standard deviation 11.4) with no discernible trend. (The graph of these data points is not included.) What is remarkable is the consistency during the

[31] Russett and DeLuca, "Theater Nuclear Forces," 179, 183–84, 192.

[32] Ibid., 187, 189. European attitudes on defense and alliance issues are discussed in Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 65–70; and Richard C. Eichenberg, *Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe: Consensus Lost?* (London: Macmillan, 1989), esp. 103–104 and 124–125. Both studies make the point that Britain is not exceptional—not markedly different from its continental neighbors—in popular views on defense and security matters.

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Graph 3

Net Shift in Confidence Reagan/Bush Presidencies



"Has your confidence in the ability of America to deal with world problems tended to go up lately, go down, or remain the same?" ("Shift" is the proportion saying "up" minus the proportion saying "down.")

decade of more Britons reporting their confidence had declined than saying it had gone up. Indeed only once in the 39 surveys did the proportion saying their confidence had gone up exceed the proportion saying it had gone down. The point at which that occurred is remarkable—the first survey (early summer 1977) during the Carter presidency. Apparently Carter brought hope to Britons, as well as Americans, that the shady behavior of Nixon and the bumbling of Ford had been left behind. As for the absolute level of confidence in U.S. behavior, this same survey was the only one during the period in which more than half (54 percent) said they had very great or considerable confidence in the United States. Such optimism faded quickly. The next survey only a few months later found that replies had returned to the familiar pattern of more saying their confidence had gone down than saying it had gone up. During the rest of the Carter presidency, British views were about as jaundiced as they had been when Nixon and Ford were in office.

Graph 3 plots the net shifts during the Reagan and Bush administrations. (The data point for November 1983 is the average of three surveys during that month. April 1986 and August 1987 are the average of four surveys each, while September 1987 is the average of two.) The variability is slightly greater than it had been during the previous decade (standard deviation 14.8), and the net change even more negative. Despite the freeing of the Americans held hostage in Iran, Reagan's presidency did not begin with a positive net shift as had Carter's. Nor did he ever manage to achieve it during his eight years in office.

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Bush's entry into office did not manage to duplicate the Carter feat of encouraging confidence to increase among more Britons than to decrease. Subsequently, however, Bush did achieve what no other president had accomplished during this twenty-year period. From August 1990 through February 1991 in three successive surveys, more Britons said their confidence in the United States had gone up than said it had gone down. The level of confidence showed a similar surge. For the first time since Carter's first summer, half of the Britons surveyed expressed very great or considerable confidence in the United States. In April 1990 only 38 percent had done so, but late in August the proportion was 56 percent, and the following two surveys found proportions of 49 and 53 percent doing so. The reason is obvious; we have seen previous evidence of it in the shift in approval of the United States compared to the Soviet Union—America's role in the Gulf conflict. Once again, British mass perceptions of the United States are seen to be very sensitive to current events, not a stable evaluation. Just as we saw earlier that strong disapproval of American action in Lebanon, Grenada, and Libya could sour Britons on the United States, so strong approval in the case of the Gulf conflict could greatly enhance attitudes.

When Britons were fairly evenly divided on the merits of American action, their attitudes toward the United States were little affected. From the time that Bush became president through April 1990, in five surveys the net shift in confidence in the United States ranged from −4 to −9. This was the period and aftermath of the invasion of Panama. In a January survey, Gallup found that Britons favored this action, but only by a small majority—44 percent approved and 33 percent disapproved. Clearly opinion was evenly divided, and attitudes toward the United States were altered little by this event.

The Costs of an Elite-Based Special Relationship

This body of data provides little evidence that the British public possesses a set of principles and values that could anchor a special relationship with the United States. Attitudes wax and wane with the course of events. When the United States does things that Britons like, they applaud; when it does things to which they object, they boo. In short, they respond to the United States just as they would to any other country. There is no giving the benefit of the doubt; there is no steadfast support through thick and thin. The leaders of the two countries, their

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political elites, may well have exceptional feelings for each other, may provide assistance and consideration above that which typically occurs between such people of different nations. The British public, however, seems little inclined to share their sentiments of special attachments; for them the Anglo-American relationship is quite ordinary.

The apparent divergence between the British elite and the public on the nature of relations with the United States raises an interesting question of the extent to which foreign policy making can or should be democratic. Should British policy makers heed public sentiment and the concerns expressed by many academic analysts (some of whom we cited earlier) and abandon their behavior supportive of extraordinary links with the United States? Or should they ignore such views, believing that only those who have been involved in making policy can fully appreciate the value of a special relationship? Apart from that largely normative question, what costs might political leaders incur if they did choose to ignore the absence of any body of public sentiment in which to anchor their actions? The common wisdom would suggest that leaders have little about which to be concerned. Elections are won on economic issues; foreign policy rarely affects the outcome. Even after a number of years of dealignment, many voters in Britain still feel some ties to parties.

We have chosen, therefore, to explore the question of costs by looking not at voting intention, but at prime ministerial popularity. Analyzing such views seems even more appropriate because they are less likely than party preference to be affected by such influential variables as social class and parents' political preferences. The dependent variable will be the proportion selecting "satisfied" in reply to Gallup's regularly asked question of how one felt about the way the prime minister is doing her job (PMSAT). Although satisfaction with the prime minister fluctuates, the level at any given point is likely to be a function of what it had been the previous month. Therefore, we included as an independent variable the percent satisfied in the previous month's survey (PREVPM).

Six other independent variables were used in the analysis. In keeping with this study's interests, two of these were opinions on the United States. One is the proportion saying that they think Britain and the United States have been getting closer recently (CLOSER). The other is the proportion expressing very great or considerable confidence in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with world problems (CONFIUS). As we have seen, Gallup has asked these questions frequently at irregular intervals for some time.

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As a benchmark for the impact of such opinions, we included two variables that could be expected to have considerable impact upon views of the prime minister's performance. One is the rate of inflation (RPI) and the other is the number of adults (in millions) unemployed (UNEMPLOY). We also included two opinion questions relating to economic affairs. One is the proportion saying that they expected the financial position of their household to become a lot better or a little better during the next twelve months (PERSFIN). The other is the proportion saying that the government *is* doing enough to control the rise of prices (CONPRICE).

Data from the same month (previous month for preceding satisfaction with the prime minister) is available for all variables from March 1982 through August 1987 (23 cases). We would expect satisfaction with the prime minister in the previous month to be strongly related to current satisfaction. If any of the other independent variables still manage to contribute significantly to explaining variation in current satisfaction, it will have met a strong test. (Note that throughout the 1982–1987 period the president and the prime minister always were the same persons, so we do not need to be concerned about the effect of a change in office holder. Also, the period includes the significant events of Lebanon, Grenada, and Libya.)[33]

Analysis of time series data may be distorted by serial correlation, and we checked to see whether this might invalidate our findings.[34] The tests indicated that the analysis should not be distorted by a presence of autocorrelation. Although this seven-variable model performed well, some of the elements were quite weak. The two weakest performing variables were dropped to produce a model with five independent

[33] In a study of the causes of changes in prime ministerial popularity, William Mishler found that the Libyan raid had the greatest immediate impact of any variable—costing Thatcher 4.5 percentage points in popularity. This effect dissipated, however, in a month or two. "The Rise and Decline (and Rise and Decline, and Rise and Decline . . . .) of Margaret Thatcher" (Paper presented at American Political Science Association annual meeting in San Francisco, 1990), 22 and tables 5 and 6.

[34] First, we performed the standard Durbin-Watson test on this equation with the lagged variable PREVPM removed. Since the equation proved to be in the uncertainty zone—that is, we could neither reject nor accept the null hypothesis of no positive serial correlation—we used the more stringent Theil-Nagar test. We failed to reject the null hypothesis at the .01 level with that test—that is, we were able to assume an absence of serial correlation. Additionally, the first order autocorrelation for our model was only about half of Hibbs's recommended maximum. On these matters see Charles Ostrom, Jr., *Time Series Analysis: Regression Techniques* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978), Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 9.

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TABLE 1

Influences upon Prime Ministerial Popularity, 1982–1987

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Beta*	*T Ratio*
PREVPM	0.56	.53	4.425
CONPRICE	0.25	.17	1.734
UNEMPLOY	−18.00	−.33	−3.509
CLOSER	−0.14	−.24	−2.132
CONFIUS	0.50	.23	2.388

N = 23

variables.[35] The results of this model, which is highly significant, appear in Table 1.[36]

Our concern is not to identify all significant influences upon the prime minister's popularity but to ascertain the relative impact of attitudes toward the United States. Nonetheless, the fact that this model can account for 87 percent of the variance in that popularity is notable. As anticipated, the prime minister's popularity in the previous month is highly associated with current popularity. And the level of unemployment shows a strong negative association. Both the level of confidence in the United States and perceptions of whether Britain and the United States are getting closer together (the latter having a negative relation) prove to have a significant impact—greater, in fact, than beliefs about whether the government is doing enough to control prices (which is not statistically significant).

The results indicate that for every 100,000 more adults unemployed, PM satisfaction is 1.8 percentage points lower (the UNEMPLOY coefficient). An additional 10 percentage points in the proportion having confidence in the United States is associated with a higher prime ministerial popularity of 5 percentage points (the CONFIUS coefficient). (Of course, the reverse is true as well: lower confidence in the United States is associated with lower satisfaction with the prime minister.) Most striking is the impact of closer relations between the two countries. For every additional 10 percent thinking Britain and the U.S. are getting closer, satisfaction with the prime minister is 1.4 percentage points lower. This may not be the sort of shift that loses elections; nonetheless, the prime minister incurs a more than trivial cost in culti-

[35] The rate of inflation (RPI) and those expecting their personal financial situation to improve (PERSFIN) had T ratios well below 1.00.

[36] $F = 23.055$ and $P = .000$.

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TABLE 2

Dynamic Model of Prime Minister's Popularity

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Beta*	*T Ratio*
UNEMPLOY	−2.54	−.41	−2.153
CONPRICE	.29	.28	1.409
CONFIUS	.36	.34	1.743

N = 22

vating a special relationship with the United States, especially during a period of declining British mass confidence in U.S. international actions. Multicollinearity among the independent variables is not a problem.[37]

To this point the analysis has been static. A particular level of unemployment, for example, is related to a particular level of prime ministerial popularity. In view of the static model's success, we decided to try a more demanding dynamic model. To what extent might changes in the independent variables from one time to the next be associated with changes in satisfaction with the prime minister's performance? (We have retained the same variable labels as in the static model. Since satisfaction with the prime minister [PMSAT] now is a change variable, satisfaction the previous month [PREVPM] is not needed in the model.) In the full dynamic model three variables—expectation that personal finances would improve (PERSFIN), rate of inflation (RPI), and proportion thinking that Britain and the United States were getting closer (CLOSER)—had T ratios well below 1.00 and were dropped to produce a three independent variable model. Multicollinearity was no problem. UNEMPLOY correlates with PRICES at −0.30 and with CONFID at −0.016. CONFID and PRICES correlate at −0.223. The results that model obtained appear in Table 2.

This model just barely misses being significant.[38] The fact that it can account for only a third of variance in satisfaction with the prime minister is not of great importance, since doing so is not our main purpose. We are concerned with the effect of mass perceptions of

[37] The correlations among CONPRICE, UNEMPLOY, CLOSER, AND CONFIUS range from −0.196 to 0.316. PREVPM's intercorrelations are somewhat larger: CONFIUS (−0.033), CONPRICE (0.377), UNEMPLOY (−0.383), and CLOSER (−0.537). Even the largest, between PREVPM and CLOSER, however, is tolerable. In any event, PREVPM is in the equation largely as a control variable and should serve, if anything, to lessen the relative impact of the key explanatory variables.

[38] F = 3.027 and P = .056.

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Anglo-American relations. Unfortunately for our interests, changes in confidence in the United States proves to have only a moderate effect upon changes in prime ministerial popularity. Since the proportion having considerable confidence in the U.S. (CONFIUS) is not significant, we cannot make too much of its impact.[39] Nonetheless, the results are consistent with the static model. Changes in and levels of confidence in the United States are linked with changes in and levels of prime ministerial popularity. For every 10 percentage point increase or decrease in mass British confidence in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems, satisfaction with the prime minister's performance rises or declines by 3.6 percentage points.

While changes in the proportion having confidence in the United States lack the significance of changes in unemployment, their influence surpasses that of changes in mass beliefs about whether the government is doing enough to control inflation. Furthermore, the intuitively important variables of changes in the rate of inflation and changes in expectations about the future of one's personal finances proved to have limited impact. Thus, mass views on Anglo-American relations were more important than three of four economic variables we examined. So although the dynamic model is not as compelling as the static one in making a case for the importance of mass perceptions of the special relationship, it does not seriously weaken the argument. We need only point out that the absolute level of satisfaction with the prime minister's performance is more firmly linked with the absolute level of attitudes toward the United States than are changes in satisfaction with changes in attitudes. This may well be because dramatic events like the bombing of Libya occur only occasionally, and at other times changes in feelings about the United States are more haphazard.

Conclusion

At the level of British mass perceptions, the Anglo-American special relationship seems to be largely a myth. This study was unable to locate any set of stable fundamental values and dispositions upon which the British might base assessments of and orientations to the United States that would differ intrinsically from those they held toward any other country. Nor do Britons appear to take a more favor-

[39] Although it is not significant at the 5 percent level, it is at the 10 percent level.

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able view of American international action than do other Europeans. Furthermore, British public opinion regarding the United States appears to be event specific and, therefore, not unique or special. In this respect the British public contrasts sharply with the country's political elite. At the elite level the special relationship continues to flourish, despite criticism from academic circles. Whether foreign policy should be "democratic" could be debated at length and remains a key normative question. The more immediate empirical question concerns the costs that political leaders incur for diverging from the orientations of the public. Our analysis suggests that maintenance of the special relationship adversely affects the British prime minister's standing with the public. While the magnitude of this penalty varies over time, it does not differ greatly from the impact of some key economic factors. The cost does not seem to be trivial.

When John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as prime minister, he immediately altered Britain's stance toward the European Community. A few months later his government turned its back on Thatcher's key domestic policy, the community charge. In contrast to these two reversals, British policy in the Gulf conflict remained unaltered. Did Major, needing to establish support with the public, err in not distancing Britain as well from U.S. policy in the Gulf? No, because as we have seen, Major was fortunate that the first question of Anglo-American relations with which he had to deal was one in which not only did British and American interests converge, but also, unusually, the British public approved of American action. In contrast to events like Grenada and Libya, the Gulf conflict was seen by the British public as involving British interests. Therefore, the action of the United States was welcomed. A strong special relationship under those circumstances would be likely to provide a small bonus of popular approval for the prime minister.

A prime minister would be ill advised, however, to count on such serendipitous events in the future. The next U.S. international initiative might well strike the British public as another example of American adventurism, as seemed to be the widespread reaction to President Clinton's proposals for more forceful action in Bosnia. Should the next British general election bring the Labour party to power, the costs involved in support for American policy would be even greater. Anti-Americanism typically has been more prevalent in the Labour party than among the Conservatives. A Labour prime minister who sought to maintain the special relationship could lose popularity not

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only with the public but also see support within his or her party erode. While these comments are speculative, what is certain is that a relationship resting only on elite attitudes and actions is tenuous. Lacking a firm foundation in mass perceptions the relationship is much more likely to be ordinary than to be "special."*

* We are greatly indebted to Robert Wybrow, director of Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., who in this instance, as in so many other times in the past, has been extraordinarily helpful in providing the results of Gallup polls in Britain.

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Book Reviews

The Roosevelt Presence: A Biography of Franklin Delano Roosevelt *by Patrick Maney. New York, Twayne, 1993. 256 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $13.95.*

This new entry in Twayne's Twentieth Century American Biography series is an incisive introduction to the man whom historians and political scientists regularly pronounce the greatest president of the century. The author, who began his New Deal studies with an able biography of Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., provides both a succinct record of the career and a dispassionate assessment of the results. Born the year after FDR died and exempt from the hot emotions of the Roosevelt era, he brings cool judgment to bear on the best loved, most hated, most influential, and most enigmatic political personality of modern America.

In his introduction, Maney notes the conventional view of FDR as an exceptionally complex man but goes on himself to endorse Rex Tugwell's interesting point that what people took as Roosevelt's complexity was really his reserve, that he concealed basic simplicity behind an impenetrable sense of privacy. Perhaps that point might have been further developed in the narrative. In any event, whether through complexity or through reserve, Roosevelt's motives and intentions were often hidden; hence his continuing ability to fascinate—and to frustrate—historians and biographers.

The purpose of the Twayne series, I take it, is less to advance new interpretations than to summarize the best scholarship, and this Maney does crisply and thoughtfully. He is right, for example, to emphasize the role of Congress in the development of the New Deal. Partisan denunciations of rubber-stamp Congresses have tended to obscure the real contributions Congress made in the 1930s. Maney exaggerates only slightly when he writes, "If Roosevelt had not restrained some congressional initiatives, the New Deal might have had even greater impact on American life than it did" (p. 69). He is also right in observing that FDR, "despite his unquestioned skill as a politician . . . frequently displayed striking weaknesses as a legislative leader" (p. 176).

On one question that still perplexes scholars—did Roosevelt secretly scheme to pull America into the war, or did he believe, nearly to the end, that all-aid-short-

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of-war might be sufficient? – Maney argues, plausibly to my mind, that he probably "shared the public's hope that somehow, some way, war might be avoided" (p. 135). This was very likely the case at least until the autumn of 1941.

Maney's judicious account of Yalta defends Roosevelt against the charge that he sold Eastern Europe down the river to Stalin. He does think that Roosevelt might have attached conditions to wartime aid to the Soviet Union and that he should certainly not have "acquiesced" (p. 188) in Winston Churchill's sphere-of-influence agreement with Joseph Stalin in 1944. In fact, though Roosevelt did not repudiate that agreement, he took care at the time to distance himself from it.

Remembering the legendary ineffectuality of the Wizard of Oz, one must doubt the felicity of Maney's comparison: "Roosevelt, playing a kind of Wizard of Oz role, presided over one of the most creative and constructive periods in the history of American government" (p. 47). But in the main this is a model compact biography. Roosevelt's legacies, Maney concludes in a final chapter, were the enlarged role for the national government in the economy, the political coalition that endured for the next half century and the revitalization of the presidency. There is also an excellent bibliographic essay.

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War *by Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott. Boston, Little Brown, 1993. 474 pp. $24.45.*

As we are learning, the end of the cold war comprises several stories: Soviet reform and dissolution, American skepticism about and then embrace of the Kremlin's "new thinking" in foreign policy, large cuts in Eurasian arms, the collapse of the postwar European security order, and the outbreak of violent nationalism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Scholars will spend years untangling these processes. In the meantime, Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott skillfully recount the interaction among Soviet and American leaders during the Bush administration, the period when the two sides ceased to define themselves as adversaries. While written for general readers, who will appreciate the authors' lively anecdotes and access to top decision makers, the book has relevance for scholars as well.

One theme of interest to those who watch foreign policy is the impact of domestic politics on leaders' priorities and strategies. This point is hardly novel, but it is illustrated in many telling ways in this book. The authors' main conclusion is that because President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev put so much stock in their personal relationship, both lost touch with important currents at home that eventually undermined them. Bush only slowly saw the changes in Soviet behavior as genuine, but he thereafter became Gorbachev's champion to the chagrin of aides, who thought the relationship had become too

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personalized. Despite the soft landing that he helped engineer for the cold war, Bush was ultimately rejected at home for inattention to domestic issues. Gorbachev also paid for concentrating his eggs in the basket of an international constituency. Although he was preoccupied by domestic politics—the book describes extensively his maneuvering between left and right factions—he probably did not take Boris Yeltsin as seriously as he should have, because he could count on solid American support.

Readers may be especially interested in how Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze pushed through many key concessions to the West, often moving faster and farther than Gorbachev wanted. Showing great courage, Shevardnadze incurred the wrath of his military by first dealing with Washington largely on his own terms, and then getting Gorbachev to approve his bargains and present them to the Soviet military as a *fait accompli*. The hardliners eventually got even by hounding Shevardnadze from office. While Secretary of State James Baker faced fewer such impediments, he and Bush clearly would have preferred a more muted approach to Soviet behavior in the Baltics than the one they felt was needed publicly for internal reasons.

Beschloss and Talbott also discuss another issue of interest to students of foreign policy, the impact on policy of leaders' views of their external environments. Although some proponents of realpolitik models downplay the importance of individuals' images, ideas, and beliefs, these mattered critically in the Bush-Gorbachev relationship. Bush instinctively preferred order and gradualism to unpredictability and revolution, which explains both his initial skepticism about Gorbachev and why he later stuck with the Soviet leader longer and more firmly than some of his advisers wished. Bush even appreciated Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski's "steadying" influence after it was evident that Solidarity had triumphed. Likewise, Gorbachev continued to believe he could effectively occupy the center in Soviet politics after it had vanished. This emphasis on steady-as-you-go was neither totally unreasonable nor unproductive. As the authors point out, Bush and Baker gauged the issue of German unification correctly early on, insisting that Germany needed to be unconditionally in NATO while at the same time reassuring the Soviets that NATO would soften its profile and that their external security would not be compromised. Individuals' beliefs and personalities were thus assets as well as liabilities.

The authors do not provide a comprehensive history of the end of the cold war. Relatively little is said about events in Eastern Europe, for example; except for the issue of Lance Missile modernization in Germany, interactions within NATO once Bush did begin to bargain seriously with the Soviets are barely mentioned. It is both a strength and a weakness of *At the Highest Levels* that it focuses almost exclusively on Moscow and Washington. We can only guess how much the missing pieces mattered. A few editing errors aside, however, this book contributes usefully to our understanding of a critical period of twentieth-century history. It will entertain as well as inform.

JOSEPH LEPGOLD
Georgetown University

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Japan and Latin America in the New Global Order *edited by Susan Kaufman Purcell and Robert M. Immerman. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. 163 pp. $9.95.*

The sudden appreciation of the yen to the dollar in 1993 and the Clinton administration's bold demand that Japan curtail its trade surplus with the United States have made the Japanese people aware that the post-World War II international framework Japan enjoyed is now changing. No longer does a security policy based on anticommunism serve as a common basis for a friendly relationship between Japan and the United States. Today economic matters are becoming the major subject matter by which their future partnership will be determined. This book is useful not only as an information source on the topic of Japanese economic relations with Latin America, which is rarely treated in English works, but also as an excellent check list with which to assess the so-called U.S.–Japan global partnership.

The book, which consists of four chapters, is an outcome of three consecutive discussions held by American, Latin American, and Japanese specialists on international affairs. The first chapter by A. Blake Friscia traces the development of Japan's economic relations with Latin America in the post-War era. In the following chapters, Luis Rubio and Riordan Rostt evaluate Japan's relations with its two major partners in Latin America: Mexico and Brazil, respectively. The cowritten final chapter, "Japan, Latin America, and the United States: Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict" by Susan Kaufman Purcell and Robert M. Immerman provides an excellent insight into recent Japanese diplomatic maneuvering toward Latin America in relation to the United States.

The underlying question posed in this book is whether Japan will act strongly to challenge the U.S. presence in the region. Being the biggest creditor nation in the world, Japan presumably could be a dominant economic player in Latin America. Leon Hollerman, for example, has argued the thesis that Japan will replace the United States in Brazil, implementing Japan Inc.'s headquarters strategy.

In this respect, all four chapters are written objectively and realistically. Assessing the overall intensity of foreign trade, investment, and financial relationships, Friscia reaches the conclusion that "few well-defined and comprehensive policies [of Japan] can be discerned toward Latin America" (p. 60). Rubio and Roett support Friscia's contention in their analyses of specific partners, saying: "there is no such thing as a 'Japanese strategy'; rather, it is a matter of a lot of individual firm strategies" (p. 93). "Japan can be expected to be a significant but not dominant player" (p. 103).

My argument as a Japanese observer is that Japan has had clear and distinct interests, which varied according to time period, in its international relations with Latin America, although they were neither as comprehensive nor as political as those found in the U.S. strategy. Latin America was the first place that Japan massively invested in the postwar era. Japan looked to it as a stable source of

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natural resources (1970s); considered it a major lending market (late 1970s); and regarded it as a production base for export to third countries (1980s). The relationship became relatively inactive, especially on the business side from the mid-1980s, because of Latin America's debt crisis and Japan's greater focus on its domestic market rather than external expansion after the Plaza Accords of 1985.

Kaufman and Immerman discuss in this context the active role of the Japanese government in supporting debt-relief schemes and the democratization of Latin American notions, carefully distinguishing the government's actions from the behavior of private actors. According to them, Latin America has quickly become an important focus on the U.S.–Japan global partnership. However, they also remind us that such cooperation can be threatened by a sudden shift in U.S. government policies, by the U.S. ambivalence towards Japan's involvement, and by fear on the part of the Japanese private sector that the Japanese government might adopt a very high profile in the region.

KOTARO HORISAKA
Sophia University/Tokyo

The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order *by Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993. 504 pp. $29.95.*

On the day that a war ends, the parade of books analyzing it begins. The war in the Persian Gulf was no exception: within a year, dozens of popular accounts, political critiques, official histories, and personal memoirs appeared. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh's new book, however, is the finest existing study of the origins, conduct, and consequences of the Gulf War.

Unlike many histories of the conflict, this is much more than a blow-by-blow, tactical-level account of the crisis and subsequent fighting. The authors' highly detailed analysis focuses on the strategic calculations of the key actors, examining how diplomatic and military actions were designed to achieve political objectives. Much of the account, therefore, appropriately focuses on the efforts of the allied coalition partners and the Iraqi government to manipulate each other's expectations and beliefs, hopes and fears.

An important strength of Freedman and Karsh's analysis is that unlike many interpretations of the events, they do not assume that the international goals of the participants dominated over domestic political objectives during the conflict. Instead, their account highlights the many tensions existing between domestic and international priorities and demonstrates how domestic political requirements often negatively affected diplomatic and military bargaining. For example, they make a compelling argument that Saddam Hussein was convinced by Jan-

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uary 1991 that the American-led coalition was not bluffing and would attack and defeat his military forces. A humiliating withdrawal from Kuwait would severely weaken Saddam at home, however, paving the way for a coup or revolt by opposition forces. As Saddam euphemistically put it to a Soviet envoy: "The Iraqi people will not forgive me for unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait" (p. 431). The fear for his domestic power base similarly constrained Saddam's military strategy in the war, forcing him to keep key Republican guard units away from the "mother of all battles" to protect the regime from the anticipated domestic uprising after the war.

The domestic political constraints on George Bush are also shown to have been surprisingly strong. Given the need for oil and the egregious nature of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, it was not exceedingly difficult for the Bush administration to lead the United States into war. Even in November 1990, a majority of the American public supported the use of military force to compel a withdrawal from Kuwait, and both houses of a Democratic-controlled Congress voted to authorize the use of "all necessary means" against Iraq in January 1991. Yet, as the authors emphasize, many of Bush's tactical decisions, designed to ensure domestic support, damaged his international objectives. For example, after the November UN authorization to use force in the Gulf, Bush nevertheless announced his willingness to go the extra mile for peace, eventually sending Secretary of State James Baker to meet with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. This action was done, as Baker later acknowledged, primarily to show the U.S. public "that we left no stone unturned in the search for peace" (p. 235). Yet, U.S. allies were appalled over their not being consulted on this move ahead of time, and Saddam Hussein apparently interpreted the action as a "submission to Iraq's demand" for direct negotiations and a sign that the administration's resolve was weakening (p. 235).

In a book so rich in detail and analysis, individual readers will no doubt find room for disagreement. For example, I would place far more importance than do Freedman and Karsh on the desire to destroy Iraq's offensive capabilities (especially weapons of mass destruction) as a motive for the Bush administration's policy. Their argument, based on polling evidence, is that Bush's emphasis on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was designed primarily to impress the public with the need to attack. My interpretation, based on the fear expressed by a number of U.S. officials that Iraq might actually withdraw in January 1991, is that this was a very serious concern for U.S. policy makers. Given the number and complexity of motives involved, such disagreements are perhaps inevitable. Yet Freedman and Karsh have raised the level of analysis. This will be the standard text on the Gulf War for some time to come.

SCOTT D. SAGAN
Stanford University

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Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy *by Robert D. Putnam. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993. 288 pp. $24.95.*

This splendid book is model social science, but with several humanistic twists that, alas, are not typical of the scholarly production of our discipline. To begin with, Putnam writes with grace. So much is this his concern that he happily relegates statistics to footnotes and appendices, which, as the output of our profession will attest, is even a better place than they deserve. As for the graphic materials, they admirably pass the ink-to-information tests suggested by Edward Tufte. Indeed, the tables, charts, and scattergrams that do appear in the text are strategically deployed to assure that even the lazy reader will glimpse the powerful relationship between argument, evidence, and conclusions.

Equally arresting is Putnam's use of history, both systematically, where available data permit, and suggestively, where he must rely on the observations of others. Chapter 5, in which the author traces current patterns of civic community in Italy back to medieval times, is a dazzling exercise in historiography. Without it, this study would still qualify as a very impressive piece of empirical research. With it, the book takes us considerably beyond Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's classic, *The Civic Culture*.

This book is ostensibly about Italy's regional governments, which Putnam and his associates have studied for more than two decades and reported in earlier publications. Information gathered along the way, often from interviews conducted with the same persons over time, is prominently arrayed in these pages. We find in them an overwhelming confirmation that Italy's experiment with regional autonomy has systematically produced much more impressive results in the North and Central regions than it has in the South and on the islands.

But Putnam's major purpose is to explore the conditions that give rise to these differences—that is, to establish why the civic community develops in some places and not in others and, even more important, what seem to be the consequences of such variegated and uneven development. For this reason, this particular study of local government has implications that extend considerably beyond Italian borders. It tells us much about the probable paths that political development will take in the developing countries, as well as the areas of Europe that once constituted the Soviet bloc.

The key to the development of a civic community lies in the nature, over time, of relationships among individuals. If these are vertical and hierarchical, it is unlikely that norms of trust, cooperation, reciprocity, and other relationships Putnam defines as "social capital" will ever take root. If they are horizontal and pluralistic, exactly the opposite pattern will emerge. Other writers, in Italy and elsewhere, have made this point, but none as persuasively and as brilliantly as does the author.

Early forms of civic involvement not only encourage more of it in time; they also condition both the level of economic development that may occur later, as

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well as the performance of governmental and other social institutions. We are compelled by this study to rethink our theories of democratization and to discard as spurious any notion that it is economic well being that drives political development. As the author laconically puts it, ". . . economics does not predict civics, but civics does predict economics, better indeed than economics itself" (p. 157).

For those who aspire to or would craft pluralistic democratic systems, this book will have discouraging, even dismal, implications. Civic traditions not only have remarkable staying power; they are also almost impossible to change, even in the long run. Thus, the best predictor as to how well regional reforms will work within Italy would be the type and quality of each area's civic life a century, or even ten centuries, ago. Little wonder, then, that some of the regional leaders Putnam and his crew interviewed in the *Mezzogiorno* expressed concern lest the findings of the study reach those at Rome who have provided, often grudgingly, the laws and the funds for regional decentralization.

The author tries to take the edge off of this depressing conclusion by noting that institutional surgery can have some effect on political practice. Thus, the regional reforms did bring modest improvements in the Italian South. But, as he then adds, ". . . compared to the North, the southern regions are no better off today than they were in 1970" (p. 184), even if, in absolute terms, some improvement is discernible. This will be small solace to southern Italians, just as it will, unfortunately, confirm the stereotype held by so many northern Italians that "Italy, from Rome south, is really part of Africa." In any case, the study will reinforce the conviction of those in Italy who believe that, taken as a whole, the regional reforms of the early 1970s have been largely a failure.

I can't say with certainty, as have some reviewers, that this book deserves a place next to those of Max Weber and Alexis de Tocqueville. I can attest with unbridled conviction that it is the finest example I know of how fruitfully, in the right hands, comparative political research of the broadest philosophical and theoretical implications can be executed within a single country.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

The Road from Paradise: Prospects for Democracy in Eastern Europe *by Stjepan G. Meštrović with Miroslav Goreta and Slaven Letica. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1993. 204 pp. $28.00.*

Taking his cue from the disaster of former Yugoslavia and aiming his polemical shots at Francis Fukuyama and the other inebriated optimists of 1989, Stjepan Meštrović has written a first-rate defense of classical sociology and political theory, which is sometimes as craggy, anti-abstract, and disorderly as—in his view—those social thinkers that he favors, recommends, and defends. His pan-

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theon of theory includes Émile Durkheim (above all), Alexis de Tocqueville, Arthur Schopenhauer, Sigmund Freud, and, closer to Cambridge, Pitirim Sorokin and David Riesman. Not only does Meštrović tirelessly sing the praises of their "antimodernist" approach, with emphasis on the power of tradition and the influence of noncognitive forces upon human behavior, but he seeks to demonstrate how modern sociology, with its abstractionism, behaviorism, functionalism, and rational-choice theory missed the boat in Eastern Europe and has accordingly sunk in a morass of its own irrelevance.

As an historian of pronounced antibehavioralist biases, I am fully in Meštrović's corner, but I do not always agree with some of his larger conclusions. Yugoslavia is the case in point. True, the dominant social science nonsense of looking on the nationality relations in Yugoslavia under Tito as "cured" or as mainly "economical" deserves to be exposed (lest anybody forget), but it is not clear to me that the current conflict in Yugoslavia is antiutilitarian "as if the warring parties will not be swayed by irrational motives" (p. 59). First of all, the "warring parties" must be differentiated, their aims identified, and their interests discussed in terms of history and ideology. Meštrović does this to a large degree, but his polemical points are occasionally dearer to him than getting to the bottom of the South Slavic case, which is frequently an extra in the book's line of narrative. Meštrović is right to point to the "nonrationality of crime" as a source of many seemingly inexplicable developments in the Balkan war (the bombing of Dubrovnik, for example), but there are parainterests even in such seemingly irrational behavior. Nor am I persuaded that there is anything substantial in the derivative assemblage that Meštrović generously calls Franjo "Tudjman's theory of nationalism." The functionalist nonsense of current western theories on nationalism will not be undermined by Tudjman's pragmatically ideologized dissections of national being.

Meštrović was aided in his study by two prominent Croat sociologists, Miroslav Goreta and Slaven Letica. Collectively, the three authors have projected a far more realistic reading of the future of Eastern Europe than is the current mean. Based on their study of ex-Yugoslavia and a firm denial of any "universal or rational order to the social universe" (p. 161), they see in Eastern Europe the continuity of nations and states that will not follow the western model of market economy or democracy (though they may well devise their own models in these areas) but they may also fall into various forms of chaotic and marginalized existence and new totalitarianisms. All told, this is a highly provocative and enlightening work that will sharpen the scholarly debates not just over the current developments in Eastern Europe, but over a far wider map of theoretical, political, and ideological issues.

IVO BANAC
Yale University

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Hollow Mandates: American Public Opinion and the Conservative Shift *by Howard J. Gold. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1992. 214 pp. $35.00.*

As President Bill Clinton and a Democratic Congress struggle to shape a new direction in American politics, they must interpret the meaning of recent elections. Gold's broad study of public opinion and public policy since 1964 contributes significant insights into this issue. The book—originally a Yale dissertation—uses diverse materials to contrast institutional and electoral behavior. There was no mass ideological transformation toward conservatism during this period, Gold argues, and, therefore, no electoral legitimacy for the "Reagan Revolution." Among both Democratic and Republican elites, however, there was a definite shift toward de facto conservatism, as seen in nomination acceptance speeches, party platforms, and public policy in the Carter and Reagan presidencies.

To explain these shifts, Gold tests three popularized theories of public opinion: "cultural backlash" against the Great Society; "institutional malaise," increased popular discontent with the ability of government to solve societal problems; and a "sweeping mandate" for less government, reduced social welfare programs, less racial integration, and more traditional social mores.

Using opinion data (on whites only) from the national election studies and the General Social Survey, Gold finds support only for the "institutional malaise" theory. Republican presidential victories resulted from retrospective judgments that the Democrats could not handle the nation's major problems, while "the conservative party benefited from its image as a more competent manager of both foreign policy and the economy" (p. 147).

Changes in public opinion during this period did occur, but not in a consistently conservative direction. The electorate maintained its support of middle-class entitlements, grew more liberal in its racial and moral attitudes, and looked favorably on Democratic party ideology. At the same time, the aggregate public did take more conservative positions on such issues as crime and the size of government.

More significantly, conservatives and Republicans gained after Reagan's election in symbolic attachments, as measured by affect toward conservative groups, ideological self-identification and, critically, Republican party identification. Even this last change, however, is largely related to performance, not philosophy. As George Bush would discover, the lack of an ideological foundation left Republicans vulnerable in the face of poor economic performance.

Gold's book is well written, challenging, and generally convincing, although not entirely original. His arguments are paralleled by Stanley Kelley in *Interpreting Elections* (surprisingly, not cited), James Stimson in *Public Opinion in America* (frequently cited), and William Mayer in *The Changing American Mind* (a new book unavailable to Gold). However, this work has a breadth of subject matter and time period that make it particularly attractive.

While Gold's analysis is done very well, he disappointingly evades a basic theoretical issue of democratic theory implicit in his research—the viability of

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mass-elite linkages. How could a major revolution in public policy be accomplished without major support in public opinion? Gold's brief speculations on this issue are unconvincing, as he suggests explanations may be found in an astonishing elite misunderstanding of the public, or the alleged dominance of the Democratic party by conservative contributors, or the intellectual persuasiveness of neoconservative journals and foundations.

A better explanation might be found in further disaggregation of the trends in public opinion during this period. Salience and intensity are important aspects of public opinion, not only its distribution. Even if the total electorate resisted conservative ideology, important political effects still might be located, for example, among those groups who became activated and converted, such as white southerners, evangelicals, and anti-abortionists.

Having shown his mettle with this first book, Gold could further research this subject well. Until then, the Clinton administration should heed his concluding maxim: "The Democratic party must convince Americans that it can manage government and handle the economy, while simultaneously emphasizing its tradition of New Deal social welfare liberalism" (p. 160).

GERALD M. POMPER
Rutgers University

Hubert H. Humphrey: The Politics of Joy *by Charles L. Garrettson III. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction, 1993. 372 pp. $34.95.*

Literary genres offer only poorly defined pigeon holes. That failure is as true with nonfiction as it is with fiction, and the book at hand is evidence to the point. The author calls it a study in "the religious-political significance of an entire life" (p. 275); others would call it a study of the religious, ethical, and philosophical influences on a public man. It is also in part political biography; the main bulk of the book follows chronologically the events of Hubert Humphrey's life. And because it draws heavily on interviews with many of Humphrey's friends and associates, it is in part remembrance of a great man.

My own inclination is to say this is a study in the education of a public man with special emphasis on his moral development. Garrettson finds two chief influences in his life: Hubert Humphrey, Sr., the druggist of Dolan, SD, and the great theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr. Of Niebuhr we know much, but one would like to know more about Humphrey *pere*. Any man whose personal library included Edward Gibbon, William Wordsworth, Ortega y Gasset, Immanuel Kant, and Charles Darwin; who had his children memorize Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points; and who read them to sleep as they all clustered around easily wins one's admiration.

Niebuhr, however, seems to have had a greater long-run influence, Garrettson indeed describes Humphrey in Niebuhrian terms as a "nearly Christian Realist."

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I personally find a greater distance between the optimism of Humphrey and the pessimism of Niebuhr than does the author, but he does concede a substantial streak of the Social Gospel in the Humphrey philosophy. If the intellectual analysis, skillful to be sure, is not fully convincing, I suspect the problem is more with the subject than the author. Hubert Humphrey simply was more an activist than a philosopher, more a communicator and popularizer than a thinker.

Indeed, a public man such as Hubert Humphrey tests the limits of intellectual studies. Yes, basic values or principles animated the man; Hubert Humphrey was a man of principled vision. Garrettson is convincing about that. But the tie between those values and the development of political style and tactics, the means to his ends, is less obvious. Moreover, the search for base values tends to ignore political learning and the pragmatic imperatives of politics. It ignores as well the political psychology of the man; Humphrey was indeed a man of quick forgiveness, but did forgiveness spring from values or from his personal psychology?

Nevertheless, Garrettson accomplishes his analysis with conspicuous success. The book rests on a wide array of Humphrey's writings and especially on a broad base of very fruitful interviews. Despite his disinclination to reflect or introspect, HHH sustained the loyalty and friendship of many thoughtful, shrewd, and perceptive friends; their candid views give the book a special richness. Garrettson also writes well, lapsing only rarely into academic or theological usages. He has a favorable view of Humphrey, as certainly do Humphrey's former friends and associates, but there is at least a realism and a faithfulness to the whole man in their reflections. Given the history of mean-spirited writing about HHH both from the left and the right, few readers will begrudge his memory a kindly view.

What, finally, of the subtitle: the "politics of joy?" I was not clear about its meaning when Humphrey proclaimed it, and I am still not sure about it. Given Humphrey's ebullient and exuberant personal style, one is tempted to think rather of "the joy of politics." One can well understand, however, the author's reluctance to start down that path of associations.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

The Politics of Parenthood: Child Care, Women's Rights, and the Myth of the Good Mother *by Mary Frances Berry. New York, Viking, 1993. 303 pp. $22.50.*

Berry provides a sweeping overview of child care policy in the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She documents the persistence of the view that mothers should be primarily responsible for child care in spite of the dramatic increase of women in the labor force. The consequence of this "myth of the good mother" is that arranging child care is the mother's responsibility. If the care is less than perfect, it is the mother's fault for wanting to work. Berry

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seeks to change this presumption and in the process reorient the debate over child care and women in the labor force. Fathers should share responsibilities for child care either through adjusting their own schedules and career goals or through sharing the task of arranging outside help.

Berry's historical survey establishes the social construction of American motherhood over the period. She does an excellent job of showing how policy reinforced practice and of documenting the strength of the mother care presumption into the present day. The overview is distinctive in including African-Americans and Native Americans in its compass. The contrasting situations of white native-born women, white immigrants, blacks, and Native Americans enriches the discussion. Her detailed recital of the politics of child care in the last decade is a disturbing chronicle of the persistence of preconceptions that undermine and weaken the struggle for women's rights. One comes away from her discussion with a clearer understanding of why subsidized child care is such a divisive policy issue.

Berry claims that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fathers had primary responsibility for child care after the nursing period. This claim is problematic and, even if true, does not provide much of a model for present day reform. The "child" had hardly been invented. However biased current theories of child development may be, it seems unlikely that many people would want to import colonial American childrearing practices into the present day. Furthermore, the father's role was a reflection of his legal authority over both mothers and children, another legacy that fits poorly with the feminist agenda. In any case it is not obvious why historical examples should be persuasive to present day policy makers. Surely the argument that human sacrifice and slavery were features of past epochs would not count as an argument in their favor today. The main force of the historical claim is, however, the weaker one that mother care is not the inevitable result of biological hardwiring. We are free to consider a range of options, including a greater role for fathers.

Berry's book is essentially a polemic with a clear political message, but it is a polemic delivered by an historian. Thus, it is unusually well informed about the historical record of the past century. It is also a polemic delivered by a lawyer and activist. It is also knowledgeable about the workings of Congress and the groups most involved in the day care policy debate. To my mind, however, Berry does not emphasize enough the sharp, but often muffled conflicts between feminists and child development experts. In a world of scarce resources like the present, high day-care standards reduce the number of children and parents served with a fixed budget. High standards also mean that unsubsidized parents will be charged high fees. Instead of selecting a regulated center, they may then select an unlicensed neighbor. Only the children of the subsidized and the wealthy may be cared for in the regulated sector. The result may be segregation by class and race, and a policy that serves very few families.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
Yale University

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Passions and Interests: Political Party Concepts of American Democracy *by Gerald M. Pomper. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1992. 189 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $12.95.*

This is a study of the relationship between political parties and the theory and practice of democracy. Like others before him, Gerald M. Pomper believes that "the growth of political parties and the extension of democracy proceed along parallel tracks" (p. ix). The positive nature of this relationship has been obscured by the existence of a widespread distrust of political parties among the friends of democracy, who have only "grudgingly conceded" (p. 135) that such institutions are necessary in a democratic society.

Pomper thus sets out to show the true value of political parties for popular government. Political parties have made an invaluable contribution in the health of democracy, he argues, even when they are only playing a bureaucratic role as organizations charged with the task of getting out the vote. Through their assiduous efforts at political mobilization, these organizations have succeeded in "bringing new voters to the polls and new meaning to the vote" (p. 32). However, he concedes that in their role as a vote-getting apparatus parties have been most troublesome for democracy. Like bureaucracies everywhere, party organizations are commonly hierarchical in structure; and they have been justifiably criticized in many countries for the oligarchic distribution of power within their ranks, shutting out ordinary citizens from any significant share in decision making.

It might, therefore, seem somewhat insidious that the major national parties have in recent years become much more bureaucratized in the United States. They now employ a permanent and more specialized staff and provide back-up services for candidates throughout the country—not least of all, helping them to raise money. "This bureaucratic development," Pomper writes, "is probably the most significant change in contemporary American politics" (p. 26).

However, he is quick to point out that American political parties remain far removed from oligarchy as election organizations. They do not, for example, control candidate selection, and so the variegated and decentralized election system in this country is dominated by self-selected rather than party-designated nominees. Pomper thus provides reassurance that even in their bureaucratic garb political parties have not endangered the power of the voter in American politics.

He reaches much the same conclusion in his analysis of the role of parties as "ideological communities," where they help voters pursue their version of the public good. Here a political party has broader goals than the election victory it pursues as an organization. It seeks to serve the voters' passions as well as their interests. In American politics the performance of this role has been most clearly evident in the case of third parties, where political activity has often tried to reach beyond the limits of social and economic improvement into the lofty sphere of moral regeneration. Pomper cites the Populist and Progressive move-

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ments as the purest examples of this kind of ideological party in the history of American politics.

However, the major American parties are also becoming more ideological today. Policy activists are now much more prominent even in the grunt work of the Democratic and Republican party organizations. As Pomper puts it, "the passionate advocates of religious orthodoxy or nuclear disarmament are more likely to be knocking on doors than the fabled but absent party precinct captains" (p. 66).

Easily the most interesting aspect of the book is this analysis of the way in which American political parties have simultaneously become more bureaucratic and increasingly ideological, while still serving as an instrument through which ordinary people can participate in shaping the course of their country's political life. One wishes at the end that Pomper had spent more time with this topic, where he excels, and less with such well-plowed fields as party reform.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
Johns Hopkins University

Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs *by Robert W. McElroy. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992. 194 pp. Cloth $27.50; paper, $12.95.*

In this pathbreaking book, Robert McElroy establishes that U.S. foreign policy is sometimes motivated by universal moral norms. The argument can be summarized in three propositions: moral norms are universally recognized prescriptions governing state behavior, impartially applied to all parties; moral norms can influence policy through individual conscience, domestic public opinion, and international public opinion; moral norms sometimes triumph over considerations of national security or economic interest. In defense of the latter proposition, McElroy presents three case studies drawn from twentieth-century American foreign policy: famine relief to Soviet Russia in 1921, the renunciation of chemical and biological weapons in 1969, and the Panama Canal treaties of 1977. A fourth case study—the bombing of Dresden in 1945—illustrates limits to the influence of moral norms.

McElroy's claim for morality is striking, because his conception of moral norms is uncompromisingly deontological. This is clearest in his discussion of Hans Morgenthau, to whose views he contrasts his position. Avoiding the trap of misreading Morgenthau as a moral, culturally relativist, or "state moralist," McElroy presents him as a consequentialist who maintained that state behavior is and ought to be guided by the "national interest." Although McElroy exaggerates the indeterminancy of the Morgenthau's conception of the "national interest" by citing other authors (pp. 23–24), he correctly acknowledges Morgenthau's belief that the national interest has "moral dignity" because, absent a transna-

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tional moral consensus, its conscious pursuit results in morally justifiable consequences. Hence governments should not and, for the most part, do not seek to promote moral ends directly. McElroy challenges this view by demonstrating that state behavior is at times motivated by the direct application of universal moral norms shared by a transnational moral consensus, even when they run counter to the national interest, defined in self-interested or morally consequentialist terms. Moreover, although McElroy does not make as much as he might out of what is a decisive point, the effects of such policies appear to have been morally justifiable. This is a conclusion rarely encountered outside of the literature on international law.

McElroy makes an important contribution by introducing three mechanisms, drawn from Immanuel Kant and other liberal internationalists, by which norms can be translated into policy: individual conscience, domestic public opinion, and international pressure. To extend and sharpen classical liberal insights, he musters modern political science. Social learning theory establishes the plausibility of individual moral conscience, agenda-setting theory the plausibility of domestic constraints, and relational contracting theory the importance of maintaining an international reputation.

The case studies are convincing, appropriately selected to demonstrate the modest claim that universal moral norms can *sometimes* make a difference. In examining humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union and the renunciation of chemical and biological weapons, McElroy discredits alternative explanations based on self-interest. The link between the Panama Canal treaty and international moral outrage is more ambiguous, however, since alternative explanations are barely considered. Was United Nations pressure for decolonialization actually grounded in common moral beliefs or in the age-old desire of state elites to maintain political sovereignty, as Robert Tucker and Steven Krasner have long maintained? Were foreign critics of U.S. policy really concerned with the implications for future U.S. behavior, as the more utilitarian relational contracting approach seems to imply? Or were they simply outraged by the "last vestige" of American imperialism, as a purely normative approach would predict and President Jimmy Carter's own assessment seems to support (p. 136)?

McElroy's work suggests the need for further research seeking to establish the precise conditions under which morality matters. In the final pages of this book, McElroy briefly addresses the issue, offering two generalizations: where "vital security interests" are secure, leaders may act morally, and where negative moral *consequences* of an action do not outweigh its direct moral *value*, they may seek to pursue moral goals directly (p. 182–184). These are curious conclusions, for they return the analysis, unacknowledged, back to its starting point: the eternal verities of Realist statecraft, expressed in the writings of Hans Morgenthau.

If we take Liberalism seriously, as I believe we should, Realist maxims do not define the fundamental conditions under which moral action is possible. Liberal theory would recommend instead a closer analysis of the societal sources of morality, as well as political institutions and social practices through which soci-

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etal pressure is translated into state policy. In short, for Liberals, the key to moral improvement lies in state–society relations. For the analysis this assumption implies, Robert McElroy's new book provides an indispensable point of departure.

ANDREW MORAVCSIK
Harvard University

The Conservative Political Tradition in Britain and the United States *by Arthur Aughey, Greta Jones, and W. T. M. Riches. Rutherford, NJ, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1992. 175 pp. $35.00.*

"Conservatism" has proven a slippery term in political discourse. Even more than its linked rival, liberalism, it covers such a wide variety of beliefs and attitudes, some of which are directly contradictory to each other, that some political analysts as well as politicians suggest that as a label it has become almost useless. But, of course, no one trying to explain modern politics can get along without it.

The authors of this volume, political scientists at universities in England and Northern Ireland, set out to define and interpret conservatism as a single though complex phenomenon. They have not wholly succeeded, but their effort does much to illuminate a range of ideas, practices, and values that are at least related, and have crucial effect on contemporary political life.

In their first chapter, the authors offer a "working definition" of conservatism: "the 'inner vision' of the life of the state" (p. 20). This seems a bit murky. Just any state, including the late Soviet Union and Nazi Germany? And what about the considerable body of people calling themselves conservative who are determinedly antistatist? They never say. Perhaps it is part of the nature of conservatism to be murky. The authors compare it to "existentialism without the self-indulgent angst" (p. 19). Certainly, conservatives typically disdain the neat categories and fine-tuned abstractions that enthrall many liberals and socialists.

The book examines American conservative theorists such as Russell Kirk, Willmoore Kendall, and Richard Weaver, but generally treats these as pale reflections of such British heavyweights as Michael Oakeshott and Roger Scruton. Libertarian conservatives like Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick are hardly mentioned.

The roots of both British and American conservatism are traced to Edmund Burke. Many active conservative politicians in the United States have probably never heard of Burke, but it is true that Burkean values and ideas such as limited government, the essentiality of order, the authority of tradition, and the sanctity of property, have always been major presences in American conservatism. The problems with which Burke dealt remain those with which conservatives continue to wrestle. "The modern task of conservative politics," the authors write, "is to

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uphold a hierarchy of wealth and power and to make this intelligible and reasonable to a democracy" (p. 23).

The authors distinguish between mere traditionalism, which they identify with defense of the status quo, and true conservatism, which represents "the political recreation of the meaning of tradition" and "the ethical correspondence between the actions of the state and the values of society" (pp. 13, 22). The trouble is that the traditions on which modern conservatives draw are themselves diverse and sometimes conflicting.

The authors find contemporary conservative intellectuals divided between a Hegelian school, represented by Roger Scruton, and a Hobbesian school, championed by Noel O'Sullivan. (John Locke, the favorite philosopher of many American conservatives, is apparently consigned to liberalism.) The Hegelians hold that politics should be grounded in a pre-political social order. The Hobbesians deny the relevance of such an order and argue, in O'Sullivan's formulation, for pragmatic concentration on "the procedural considerations which confer authority" (p. 164). A partial synthesis is found in Oakeshott's coupling of "the historically-achieved character of the state" with "authoritative and legitimate rule" (p. 167).

Oddly, this book gives little attention to the great conservative revival of the 1980s, which brought conservative politicians to extended power in both the United States and Britain. Ronald Reagan is dismissed as "not a conservative but rather a populist" and Margaret Thatcher is termed a "counter-revolutionary" (p. 152, 153) without real roots in conservative tradition.

The authors do not pretend to have given the last word on conservatism. But readers of this book will find stimulation and broadened knowledge of a hugely influential modern ideology.

A. JAMES REICHLEY
Georgetown University

The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr. *by Burton I. Kaufman. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1993. 245 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

It is Kaufman's view that the contemporary image of the Carter presidency as an "administration in disarray and of a presidency that was increasingly divided, lacking in leadership, ineffective in dealing with Congress, incapable of defending America's honor abroad, and uncertain about its purpose, priorities, and sense of direction . . . was, unfortunately, all too accurate." In short, the Carter presidency was "a mediocre, if not a failed, presidency" (p. 3).

Writing a book about the presidency has its pitfalls. By definition, the principal figure must be the president; but in this case, definition skews reality. Kaufman carries the notion of Carter as leader too far, particularly in his assessment of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, whom he views simply as a "competent manager" and "good team player" (p. 37). On the contrary, Vance was the dominant figure

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in the administration whose views generally prevailed on foreign policy and strategy. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, consistently opposed and occasionally persuaded Carter to accept his views over Vance's but Vance formulated the agenda. True enough, Carter decided on policy, but he did not formulate strategy.

The central dilemma of the president, which arose in his first days in office, was how to respond to a major advance in Soviet missile guidance offering the prospect of a first-strike capability. The Soviet breakthrough came five to eight years before it was anticipated and raised fundamental questions about the strategy of détente and arms control that Carter was committed to pursue. In relation to this issue Vance and Brzezinski differed fundamentally in their views on virtually *every* policy.

Vance insisted that détente and arms control precede all else, while Brzezinski insisted equally firmly that containment be strengthened before détente could be feasible. Carter's fundamental inability to harness the differences of his two advisers largely accounted for the public perception of his administration as vacillating, in disarray, and without a sense of direction. But there is not an inkling of this titanic clash at the apex of the administration in Kaufman's book, despite the fact that he cites the memoirs of Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski, where much of the story is detailed.

Thus, one of the essential shortcomings of the book is the absence of strategic context, a lack of connectivity. Every event, it seems, is seen as if independent of every other event, connected only by chronology. This is less evident in Kaufman's treatment of domestic affairs, which constitute the best sections of the book. Indeed, discussion of domestic policy, from Edward Kennedy's feeble challenge for the party nomination to congressional difficulties to economic woes—oil, the energy crisis, the health care crisis, tax policy, inflation—is the book's strong suit. My only criticism is the incorrect assertion that there was an economic improvement in the fourth quarter of 1980. The opposite is true, as the Federal Reserve tightened the money supply and raised interest rates. By election day the prime rate was 20.5 percent, GNP growth was negative at −0.2 percent, and the unemployment rate stood at 7.1 percent.

Kaufman's treatment of Carter's foreign policy leaves much to be desired. While most of his chronicle is accurate as far as it goes, it does not go far enough beyond mere chronicle to an analysis of Carter's policies. Nor is there any discussion of the strategy the president sought to pursue, which also lends a sense of disconnectedness to the discussion. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations, China normalization, Iran policy, Intermediated Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations, Camp David talks, Nicaragua policy, for example, are all treated out of context as isolated phenomena.

Yet, the final stages of SALT negotiations and China normalization occurred simultaneously as war loomed in Southeast Asia between China and Vietnam, with clear implications for both policies. Camp David is portrayed as Carter's greatest foreign policy success, yet there is no mention of Carter's retreat from Camp David in the spring of 1979 on autonomy for the West Bank to gain Israel's

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signature on the peace treaty with Egypt. Nor is there any discussion of the consequences of that retreat in U.S.–Saudi Arabian relations – principally astronomically high oil prices. Similarly, the Cuban–Panamanian connection to Nicaragua is missed. Here, the Carter administration deliberately obfuscated the connection out of fear that both the Panama Canal legislation and SALT negotiations would be impaired by acknowledgment of Panama's and Cuba's roles in weapons supply to the Sandinistas.

Then there are events that are omitted entirely, such as the Mariel boatlift (April–September 1980), Nicaragua's effort to overthrow El Salvador, and Carter's unsuccessful and unwise attempt to salvage détente with Moscow in the spring of 1980, just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Finally, nothing is said of Carter's attempt to trade arms for hostages during the initial stages of the Iran–Iraq war; but, curiously, space is given to the completely discredited charges of former Carter National Security Council staffer Gary Sick regarding a Republican party deal with Iran to delay release of the hostages until after the election. Given these lapses and omissions, I must conclude that Kaufman labored for six years in the Carter archives only to produce a mouse.

RICHARD C. THORNTON
George Washington University

Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past *by Michael Schudson. New York, Basic Books, 1992. 282 pp. $24.00.*

This book is an admirably clear application of social construction of reality concepts to the Watergate scandal or to what might be called the turning point in American politics that did not turn. Schudson investigates how the collective memory of Watergate has shaped peoples' actions ever since, such as toward the Carter presidency, the Iran-contra affair, and the reemergence of Richard Nixon as elder statesman.

Collective memory is constituted not only by what individuals recall, but by the preservation of the past in practices that make it of continuing influence, such as in textbooks, rules of political ethics, literary trope, careers, opinion polls, and journalistic standards. Inevitably, because people remember things differently and because Watergate was irreduceably political and contested, there is more than one Watergate story that is recalled and brought to bear on subsequent developments. Four alternative interpretations persist, Schudson argues, because they represent lived experiences that people in different walks of life feel strongly about because they shaped who they are. Every culture and subculture is characterized in part by its shared understanding of its past. Even in the Soviet empire, subcultural readings of the past survived, as is only too evident in the new post-Soviet states. These cases also illustrate the limits to manipulating history into whatever myth politicians may find useful. *A fortiori*, Schudson argues that pluralistic societies are protected against hegemonic interpretations of history that only serve the powerful.

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Nonetheless, Schudson finds the "liberal" and "conservative" versions of Watergate are the most influential. Both share a focus on the constitutional crisis associated with the obstruction of justice and with the first article of impeachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee. They are distinguished from each other by emphasis on whether Watergate showed that the American governmental system worked or almost didn't. "Radical left" and "ultraconservative" versions interpret Watergate as a scandal of the political system associated with the abuses of power identified in the second article of impeachment. For the left, Watergate was a symptom of the imperial presidency created to manage America's global empire. The focus on the break-in and Nixon's resignation diverted attention from the real scope of the crisis. For the ultraconservatives, Watergate reflected a coup d'etat by an overweening media and liberal Democrats against a popularly elected president. Schudson is not concerned with which version of Watergate is right; rather, he demonstrates the prevalence of Watergate memories and their contribution to how Americans react to new situations of political crisis.

One example illustrates the strengths and limit of Schudson's approach. The Iran-contra affair was immediately interpreted in terms of Watergate by the Reagan administration, no less than by its critics. This shows the strength of the analysis. Memories of the destruction of the Nixon presidency guided the administration's public relations campaign, its call for an independent counsel, and the quick resignations of key participants. The Watergate "trauma" guided congressional leaders, who sought to avoid establishing a process that might lead to impeachment rather than simple investigation, although this reaction undermined the independent counsel's cases against Iran-contra principals. This shows the limit of the analysis: we care about the quality of our democracy, not just about what the powerful think about the process. The liberal-conservative failure to convict undermined a substantive debate about what the government is doing in the name of the people, which in turn has fed the ultraconservative version: Iran-contra, like Watergate, was an attempt to "criminalize" mere policy differences, as Richard Thornburgh, Robert Bork, and Elliot Abrams all have claimed. Although the process apparently worked in both cases, the scandal continues. After Schudson's book appeared and after the election, President Bush pardoned six Iran-contra participants.

STEPHEN AMBERG
The University of Texas at San Antonio

Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality *by Philo C. Wasburn. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1992. 179 pp. $45.00.*

When Americans think about important factors in the creation of public opinion, they rarely think of international radio broadcasting. Yet it has been, is, and will continue to be a highly significant factor in shaping the opinions of the

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world's people, especially in areas plagued by heavy government censorship of news or where illiteracy abounds. International radio broadcasting is the primary source of political information for hundreds of millions of people throughout the world. Often it is the only source for comprehensive and relatively unbiased news about national and international politics. Currently, it is supplied by more than eighty nations, which target international radio broadcasts to listeners outside their national borders. Philo C. Wasburn, who teaches sociology at Purdue University, chronicles the development of this powerful political tool.

Broadcasting Propaganda begins with a history of international broadcasting from 1915 onward. It covers broadcasts by various colonial powers to their colonies, propaganda warfare during two world wars, and propaganda efforts during the cold war era. Wasburn shows how propaganda campaigns were run, including the psychological strains they generate when broadcasters try to act professionally despite intense pressures to slant their messages to support their government's political objectives.

After sketching the historical background, Wasburn presents a theoretically grounded analysis of the nature of propaganda. He uses the term propaganda broadly, as the politically motivated use of symbols to change or maintain perceptions. He points out how difficult it is to evaluate it as right or wrong, truthful or distorted, because all messages represent a reconstruction of experiences by people of different cultures and diverse modes of reasoning. He considers social construction of reality perspectives and media system dependency theories most useful in understanding propaganda. Politics, he argues, is experienced indirectly for the most part through messages that reflect politically sanctioned perspectives. This socially constructed reality is then transmitted to media audiences who, it is hoped, will adopt it. Chances of adoption increase whenever audiences are dependent on media messages for learning about particular people and events.

Analysis of the nature of propaganda and the nature of news in general is followed by carefully crafted case studies of propaganda and counterpropaganda. The main focus is on Soviet and U.S. broadcasts to Third World nations and on South Africa's campaign to counteract the propaganda messages of its critics. The discussion supplies empirical evidence as well as ample contextual materials to evaluate the various situations and judge the effectiveness and merits of the propaganda campaigns. Unfortunately, in our rapidly changing world the lessons learned about contemporary propaganda efforts are already outdated.

The final chapter points out why international broadcast propaganda will remain a major political tool in the twenty-first century even without the cold war. Wasburn recommends that research efforts move beyond the study of the production, content, and impact of international propaganda messages. The new goal should be to discover means for transforming international propaganda into an instrument that produces greater understanding among the peoples of the world by supplying them with news that represents multiple perspectives. He believes that people who are aware of their differences are more likely to live peacefully and productively in their shared global environment. One could

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also argue the opposite: knowing the perceptual gulf that separates people may increase hostility. It is an intriguing visionary ending for an otherwise down-to-earth, fact-loaded, empirically and theoretically sober book.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy *by Kathleen Hall Jamieson. New York, Oxford University Press, 1992. 335 pp. $25.00.*

The title of the book suggests that Jamieson takes a very dim view of the way we conduct politics, or rather political campaigns. She attributes this to the kind of political ads (mostly attack ads) that are becoming increasingly common and to the media, especially television reporters who make these ads part of their news reportage. The loser is the public, which is presented with emotionally charged, visually reinforced soundbites instead of information and analysis on which to base its electoral decisions.

To document her assessment, Jamieson relies on detailed analyses of political advertisements and broadcasts (mostly from the 1988 campaign) and on focus groups she conducted over an extended time period in order to observe reactions and opinion changes in group members' responses to specific ads. The evidence from the focus groups (often with verbatim quotations) is particularly interesting in that it shows how quickly people absorb emotionally charged ads (especially when they appeal to fears and prejudices) and how people soon after come to perceive them as "news." One might have wished for more from the focus groups, because that information is, of course, unfamiliar to the reader whereas that on the ads is not.

The first two parts of the book focus on paid political advertisements, the third on the way in which these as well as other campaign events get covered in the news, and the last section offers suggestions for making newscasts more substantive and informative. Jamieson painstakingly examines a variety of ads but particularly the Republicans' famous or infamous 1988 Willie Horton ad attacking Michael Dukakis. She reaches the conclusion that most are short on truth, to put it mildly, and appeal to the viewer's emotions (especially fears) rather than critical faculties. By arousing a person's fears and prejudices, the ad hopes to deter the viewer or reader from scrutinizing the truth of the ad or reflecting on the possible strengths of the opponent. "Messages that induce fear dampen our disposition to scrutinize them for gaps in logic" (p. 41). Moreover, television's format with its heavy emphasis on drama, narrative, and visuals is increasingly shaping the format of political ads as well. Symbol is beginning to take the place of argument (the revolving prison door; the little girl with the daisy). These, of course, are not novel observations, but Jamieson carries them out with uncommon thoroughness and great sensitivity. They thus form a rich

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source for anyone interested in campaign advertising in particular or campaigns in general.

Much as she blames ads for trivializing campaigns, the media do not escape Jamieson's critique either. In the second part she analyzes how the media utilize paid ads. She notes that particularly evocative or controversial ads inevitably get wide and repeated television coverage with the net effect that "the power of the ad and its content were being magnified, not analyzed or undercut" (p. 137). Not only do the media thereby provide free advertising; what particularly disturbs her is that they fail to examine the truthfulness and relevance of the message, thereby failing in their task of providing information to the public and offering it the context from which to evaluate the ad. She believes that reporters have become fascinated "with pseudo-events and focus on strategy, outcome, and polls" (p. 154) in lieu of the substance of the campaign. She faults them for their unwillingness to discuss and critique (what she labels as "to engage") the candidate's past and planned performance in office.

In the last section, Jamieson offers suggestions for ways in which campaigns could assist voters in becoming involved and informed citizens, thereby restoring "the relationship between campaign discourse and governance" (p. 266). Many of these would indeed go a long way in making campaigns more substantive (such as her suggestions for more meaningful debates), but they seem long on idealism and short on realism. Until such a time as we have genuine campaign reform, it is highly unlikely that candidates and their managers will yield the control they now exercise over the process.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology *by Colin S. Gray. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1993. 248 pp. $29.95.*

Colin Gray has an uncanny ability to identify unwarranted assumptions that sometimes underlie the hopes, fears, theories, and prescriptions of nuclear strategies. In these essays, organized loosely around the theme that Americans are preoccupied with military technology, he comments on the nuclear future and the future of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Simultaneously, he criticizes several concepts initially welcomed as innovative but now labeled as misguided dogma: arms races, capability-based crisis-stability assessments, the offense-defense weapons distinction, and arms control.

Gray is at his best in showing how fact undermines theory. For example, he notes that arms control advocates can no longer ignore the observation that politics, not weapons, create international conflict, and that arms agreements emerge when least needed. START II is a case in point: this revolutionary agreement has generated virtually no analytical, congressional, or public interest. Significant arms control agreements between nations that lack mutual grievance

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or conflicting ambitions are possible, but they are not interesting or particularly useful.

By contrast, Gray sometimes encounters problems when commenting on strategic interactions. His discussion of the offense-defense weapons distinction is illustrative. According to Gray, as a global maritime power, the United States requires a force projection capability to preserve a balance of power in Eurasia. One could also add that the United States could not lead collective action to stop humanitarian abuses or more conventional military aggression without this capability. Yet, force projection capabilities, Gray would argue, are often mislabeled as offensive, a charge that hampers efforts to build a U.S. military able to serve national interests.

Since America's goals are benign, its military should be viewed as defensive; a nation's politics, not its weaponry, can only be offensive or defensive. But Gray introduces the notion that the threat posed by a gun is a function of which end of the weapon one faces: a nation's allies and adversaries also make judgments about the purposes of arsenals. Gray acknowledges that state leaders often see things differently, which raises several unanswered questions. If national perceptions of threat can vary, whose judgment matters? Since aggressive states cloak their ambitions in the rhetoric of defense, why should leaders accept at face value proclamations of benevolence?

What is particularly frustrating about Gray's work, however, is that even when contradictory, it still is insightful. A hypothetical scenario can best demonstrate Gray's underlying point about the offense-defense distinction and Americans' fascination with technology. If one adopts the ideas offered by the strategists of stable conflict, then an Iraq armed with survivable nuclear weapons capable of reaching the United States would demonstrate relatively benign intentions. An aggressive Iraq would divert resources away from survivability to maximize its ability to strike its opponents, since the only hope of winning a nuclear war lies in firing first. But it is unlikely that Americans would find this argument comforting. After all, Iraq could be banking on the stability-instability paradox (or in less ethnocentric terms, divine intervention or Saddam Hussein's political savvy) to open a path for limited aggression. Given Iraq's recent behavior, and Hussein's continued leadership, the existence, not the characteristics, of an Iraqi nuclear capability would drive threat assessments. As Gray would observe, intentions, not the specific capabilities of an arsenal, create international threats.

Weapons Don't Make War contains too many ideas to address completely in a single volume or realistically to organize into a sustained and coherent analysis. Gray is more interested in raising questions than in offering answers, in leveling criticism than in developing solutions. He often leaves the reader to trace the logic of his arguments beyond first principles. He is sometimes wrong, often insightful, and always provocative and worthwhile—a description that applies equally well to *Weapons Don't Make War*.

JAMES J. WIRTZ
Naval Postgraduate School

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Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America *by Richard K. Vedder and Lowell E. Gallaway. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1993. 336 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $16.95.*

I accepted the editor's invitation to review this book largely because the title intrigued me. As it turned out, the title was more than a little misleading, because the book does not deal at all with people who are out of work but rather with short- and long-run data on unemployment in the United States during this century. The subtitle, too, is imprecise. Although unemployment (data) is examined intensively, the book has relatively little to say about "government in twentieth-century America" other than that government's mistaken policies aimed at macromanagement of the economy have been the cause of differentially high rates of unemployment in critical periods of the nation's history such as 1920–1921, 1929–1933, 1937–1938, and 1981–1982. In the authors' view, "All of these periods of differentially high unemployment can be traced to the effects of faulty governmental actions" (p. 292).

My alternative interpretations follow: 1920–1921 was the direct outcome of the wartime and postwar inflationary excesses. President Herbert Hoover and the federal government did too little and the very things they did brought on the great depression of 1929–1933. FDR's timidity about federal spending contributed to the 1937–1938 decline. 1981–1982 was the price we paid for the Federal Reserve Bank's (Paul Volcker's) belated but determined effort to break the back of the inflationary spiral.

Another dissent: according to Vedder and Gallaway, the rise in ". . . the national rate of unemployment can be traced back to the Norris–LaGuardia Act, the Davis–Bacon legislation, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Social Security Act . . . and the whole apparatus of the modern welfare state. . ." (p. 292). Followers of F. A. von Hayek and the Austrian School, the authors believe that efforts by government to influence the macroeconomy rather than rely on the market are the root cause for the upward trend in the country's unemployment rate.

The heart of the authors' argument consists of the presentation of detailed data about unemployment in the nine decades of this century that they adduce to demonstrate that the "wages theory of unemployment" is the basic explanatory variable. When wages are above what the market determines to be their equilibrium rate, it is inevitable that unemployment will increase, if not immediately then shortly thereafter. That is what Austrian economics postulates and what the authors use for guidance. Theirs is a remorseless attack on John Maynard Keynes and all of his followers, from Alvin Hansen to Paul Samuelson, Arthur M. Okun, Walter Heller, and Robert Solow.

My training in economics predated the publication of Keynes's *General Theory*. I wrote critically about Hansen's stagnation theory. I never bought into the belief of most economists that the United States was likely to reexperience depression-level unemployment at the end of World War II. And I opposed the tax cut of 1964 on the ground that the recovery was underway and that although one could

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trust Congress to cut taxes in order to stimulate the economy, Congress could not be trusted with the obverse, to raise taxes when the economy began to overheat. I mention the above to make a simple point: I am not and have never been a committed follower of the Keynesian governmental interventionists in the management of the economy, but neither am I a follower of the Austrian School.

The late Kenneth Boulding for whom I have deep regard commented: "*Out of Work* is a book of great interest that should be taken seriously." Although I have many reservations about the authors' approach and conclusions, I am not willing to disregard the judgment of a colleague of Boulding's stature and learning. Any book that he said should be taken seriously warrants careful reading.

ELI GINZBERG
Columbia University

Britain at the Polls, 1992 *by Anthony King, Ivor Crewe, David Denver, Kenneth Newton, Philip Norton, David Sanders, and Patrick Seyd. Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1993. 256 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $17.95.*

The British general election of 1992 was remarkable in many ways. Not only were the Conservatives returned to office for a fourth consecutive time, but many of the old (and some new) certainties of British politics were resoundingly rebuffed. A government was returned to office in a deep recession; a moderate Labour opposition party could not get the electoral pendulum to swing far enough its way; multiparty politics in the electorate remained entrenched; the Conservatives could survive the dismissal of Margaret Thatcher as leader; and even the public opinion polls, including exit polls, proved unreliable in predicting the result. An increasing Americanization of the British election campaign was evident in the avoidance of major issues, dominance of personalities, and reliance on the media.

Here a well-known team of British academics engages in a nontechnical analysis of party politics leading up to the election and the partisan implications of the results. This is solid political journalism, especially useful for students and those not otherwise following political developments in the United Kingdom closely. The contributions range from Crewe's account of the ambiguous legacy of Margaret Thatcher through discussions of 1987–1992 developments in each of the three main contending parties (Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal Democrats) to considerations of the campaign (including a seven-month diary of events); an analysis of voting patterns and the failure of the polls; and finally King's treatment of what to expect from "dominant party government," in comparison to its functioning elsewhere in the democratic world, especially in Sweden and Japan.

The book focuses on mainland Britain and central tendencies, with little material on Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, or regional deviations from aggregate

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countrywide trends. Policy implications of the results are also not developed. The most tendentious chapters are those by Sanders and King. Sanders argues that a major factor contributing to the Conservative victory, as well as to the failure of the public opinion polls, was a late swing to the government based on "pocketbook voting," especially fear of what a Labour government's taxation plans would mean for individuals. Other analysts, however, have denied that a late swing existed. Furthermore, Sanders does not attempt to test for the alternative explanation of sociotropic effects, such as perception of general economic conditions of the country, nor does he recognize that sociotropic effects are the more prevalent explanation of economic voting in the United Kingdom.

King argues that continued Conservative one-party dominance can be expected "into the next millennium." Although not discussed in this book, the implications of redrawing the boundaries of parliamentary seats to reflect population changes, due before the next election, support such an assertion. But the bromides of post-World War II British politics have had a way of changing faster than the analysts recognize.

DONLEY T. STUDLAR
West Virginia University

The New York Approach: Robert Moses, Urban Liberals, and the Development of the Inner City *by Joel Schwartz. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1993. 375 pp. $35.00.*

In this history of urban redevelopment in New York City from the 1930s to the end of the 1950s, Robert Moses emerges as an evil genius—a genius because of his extraordinary skill in acquiring power and making things happen; evil because of the damage he did to the city, especially to its poorest citizens. In this respect, Schwartz's portrait coincides with Robert Caro's massive biography of "the power broker" and with other critiques of Moses.

But Schwartz reproaches his predecessors for not recognizing that "the liberals" in the city (an undefined set comprising New Dealers, civic and social reformers, planners, unions, religious leaders, journalists, academics, and others) bore much of the responsibility for what Moses did. He clearly believes liberal doctrine obliged its adherents to resist Moses's bulldozer approach to slum clearance and redevelopment, which inflicted hardship on the most disadvantaged and victimized residents of New York by destroying their neighborhoods and driving out the factories that employed them. Schwartz has no doubt that the liberals could have prevented these follies and abuses; Moses needed their backing to discredit charges of callousness and racism publicized by some victims and left-wingers, accusations that would have been fatal to many developments had he not had allies with impeccable liberal credentials to counterbalance the accusers. Indeed, Moses often made concessions to these allies, particularly in the form

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of public housing to shelter the people he uprooted. Mostly, however, the liberals went along with him compliantly. Schwartz sees them as accomplices.

The bulk of the book consists of historical case studies of selected redevelopment undertakings illustrating this thesis. By prodigious labor in a host of collections of papers and files, the author culls out evidence of liberal docility.

Why did the liberals fail to do what their creed dictated? At bottom, Schwartz says, they and Moses came out of the same traditions. The original "City Beautiful" planners allegedly had little sympathy for blue-collar dwellers in the slums; they were interested in "the worthy poor" and in the middle class, in gentrifying the slums and erecting grand monuments. "Much of what Moses accomplished rested on forty years of agreement about the future of the city" (p. 297); he and the liberals had more in common than either of them would have cared to admit.

The New York approach to redevelopment ended, according to Schwartz, when many public housing projects became as depressing and dangerous as the slums they replaced. Large-scale slum clearance lost credibility; only then did the powers-that-be recognize the deficiencies of this policy. Had they been more sensitive to the needs of the poor and the oppressed, had they heeded proposals to work on a smaller scale so that neighborhoods and factory jobs could be preserved, he believes much of the social and economic devastation wrought by Moses could have been avoided. For that havoc, the liberals must share the blame.

Few of them, however, will read this indictment, because this volume is not for the general reader. Full of detail about the bargaining over each development plan, it calls, despite maps and photographs, for a fair degree of familiarity with the characteristics of each of the areas and for a substantial knowledge of the governmental institutions and recent political history of the city. But dedicated students of New York will welcome the airing of the archival material uncovered here. Perhaps their discussions will eventually broaden the audience.

In any event, I hope they will examine the premise that more preservation and less replacement would have made New York a better place. It may be true. On the other hand, old neighborhoods and factories are sometimes romanticized; many were such dilapidated, dangerous, disagreeable, exploitative places that they may have been beyond rescue. Schwartz is as confident of his formula as an early generation was of its own. I wonder what the next generation will say.

HERBERT KAUFMAN
Yale University

To Be Mayor of New York: Ethnic Politics in the City *by Chris McNickle. New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. 403 pp. $29.95.*

New York City has been and still is the ethnic politics capital of the American political system. Mayoral elections in the city, and other citywide and statewide elections as well, are frequently analyzed in terms of ethnic and racial group

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loyalties to particular candidates and political parties, and the consequent voting patterns and electoral results that these loyalties produce. Chris McNickle's book offers a history of ethnic politics surrounding mayoral elections since the late nineteenth century to the present. McNickle's narrative focuses on the ethnic identity of candidates and power brokers in New York City electoral politics. His implicit hypothesis is that the ethnic variable is central to explaining mayoral elections and politics for well over the last century despite the changing ethnic and racial make up of New York. The author suggests that this openly acknowledged fact has influenced and still influences the behavior of political parties in choosing candidates for office in New York City. Throughout the book, McNickle attempts to explain why political parties and bosses choose particular candidates to run for mayor, as well as why mayoral candidates win or lose. In every case, the author presents ethnic group power and support as the key explanatory factor.

The author makes no attempt to apply sophisticated data analysis techniques to the electoral results he is discussing. Nor is there any attempt to systematically present each mayoral election in such a way as to invite comparative analysis across elections. While this was apparently not the intent of the author, the lack of even simple data analysis or systematic presentation of each election leaves some major questions unanswered. No one would take issue with the author's primary assertion that ethnic group political activity has been and continues to be central to mayoral elections and politics in New York City. Yet how does the ethnic variable fare when compared to issues of class or more recent hypotheses that economic development interests and the power of business have a far greater role in choosing the mayor than ethnic group political power? Has the role of ethnicity in New York City politics become more symbolic in the face of the power of economic development interests to veto unsympathetic mayoral candidates? If this is the case, is this a recent development or has the ethnic variable in New York City politics always been more symbol than substance. McNickle fails to treat these and other critical issues that might have been addressed by a more systematic use of voting, campaign, or demographic data.

Most of McNickle's book focuses on the power brokers pursuing the mayor's office or seeking to influence who will run for mayor. The strength of the author's narrative is his discussion of the evolving relationships between the principal political actors involved in mayoral politics in New York and the role of ethnic, racial, and religious group support in each actor's quest for power and control. The author does an excellent job in detailing the struggle for control of party leadership and the transition of party leadership among New York's dominant ethnic/racial groups. Particularly noteworthy is McNickle's treatment of the decline of the Tamany machine and the rise of the reformers in New York's Democratic party. While McNickle's lack of systematic analysis is disappointing, he has amassed a great deal of information about the role of ethnicity in New York City politics in a well written narrative. For this reason, the book should

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serve as a valuable source book for anyone doing research on the history of electoral politics in New York City.

BRUCE F. BERG
Fordham University

Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force *by Jerome H. Skolnick and James J. Fyfe. New York, The Free Press, 1993. 313 pp. $24.95.*

The 1991 police beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles created what seemed to be an army of experts in the field of police use of force, police abuses, police review systems, and the administration of L.A.P.D. in particular. Thankfully, two genuine experts in the field, Skolnick and Fife, have put together an authoritative compendium of history, theory, and research in this area. The book flows well and is particularly easy to read because the authors take the trouble to share real life examples with the reader. This tool is used throughout the work to educate the reader about the reality of police excesses at the street level while grounding discussion in analytical terms.

Part I begins with an explanation and analysis of the now famous King incident. This section includes an historical treatment of the vigilante movement, the third degree, and the realities of modern violence on the streets of America. All are linked in a causal relationship with police excessive force.

Part II continues this causal discussion by focusing upon ideas developed by numerous modern scholars, Skolnick and Fyfe included, which seek to explain police abuse. Through the use of sophisticated academy curricula, advanced in-service training programs, the inclusion of college educated officers, and integration with minority group members and women, modern police organizations have changed significantly. Why haven't police abuses vanished since the creation of this "new blue line"?

The authors discuss how the use of coercive force, the soldier mentality created by wars on drugs and crime, police paramilitarism, and the Dirty Harry syndrome all contribute to police misbehavior. Tying all of these together is a treatment of danger and authority as the two principle features of the police role that help to cause abuses.

The authors' discussion of the limits of reform is equally synoptic. It includes separate examinations of the solidarity of the police subculture, the severe limitations from which court sanctioning mechanisms (especially exclusion) suffer, and the pragmatic reason of why the local press is not particularly effective at holding the police accountable.

In Part III, the authors discuss some remedies for the problem. This section presents many interesting, cutting-edge ideas in practice today, specifically, community-based policing, problem-oriented policing, accreditation, civilian review boards, para-policing, and a particularly timely discussion of a cadet corps.

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The book is well written, thoroughly researched, and up to the minute in its relevance. In fact, its only shortcoming is that it does not supply us with "the answer" to the problem. But since no one has that definitive answer, we must be content to acknowledge that Skolnick and Fyfe have provided us with the most complete and timely collection of ideal remedies and operational experiments available.

The author's ideas are directly on point. They argue that we must end the war mentality within which we train police officers. We must cease to be enamored with statistical systems as indicative of what is good policing. We must focus upon the first line supervisor as the critical agent of change. Above all, we must pick creative, progressive, problem solving police chiefs. Chiefs must be given latitude and encouragement to be innovative and at the same time be held accountable for their actions and those of their subordinates. With this suggestion, Skolnick and Fyfe have correctly focused upon the most critical actor in American policing.

DOUGLAS W. PEREZ
Trinity College

American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass *by Douglass S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993. 292 pp. $29.95.*

The title is an ominous one, but so are its findings. African-Americans live in one of the most segregated societies in the history of mankind. Without integrated housing, the economic sojourn of many blacks is a cul-de-sac. For whites living in white neighborhoods, it is a road to such benefits as better schools, safer streets, low insurance cost, appreciating property values, and efficient public services. Housing has become a racist system for allocating social status and economic benefits. It is also a system most resistant to changes in racial attitudes.

Racially segregated housing is not as old as the Republic. In the nineteenth century Americans of all colors lived in the same neighborhoods. Hence, the present housing patterns are a twentieth-century invention. The isolation and segregation of blacks are the results of racial intimidation, block busting, steering, mortgage lending discrimination, restrictive covenant, and suburbanization. The imperviousness of segregated housing to changes in public policy, including the 1968 Civil Rights Act and other legal remedies, is testimony to its economic utility for whites. Besides serving a variety of white interests, segregated housing also serves black politicians. They also have a stake in maintaining a stable constituency.

According to Massey and Denton, segregated housing creates and maintains the underclass in our cities. They believe that segregated housing is the linchpin that holds the underclass to the bottom of the economic rung. With only limited

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opportunities to escape, poor blacks embrace a culture of segregation that promotes and perpetuates disfunctional and destructive behavior. Holding attitudes that devalue work, schooling, and marriage, poor blacks cannot compete economically with their white counterparts. How can we get the poor out of this housing and into the economic mainstream?

Massey and Denton are sanguine about eliminating housing discrimination. First, there must be a fundamental change in federal housing policy. They believe the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) has enough laws on the book to do the job but needs leadership and political support to enforce these laws. Second, there must be an increase of economic opportunities for the underclass. Massey and Denton conclude that: "Race-conscious steps need to be taken to dismantle the institutional apparatus of segregation, and class-specific policies must be implemented to improve the socioeconomic status of minorities" (p. 220).

After such a cogent descriptive analysis of deleterious effects of current housing policy, one expects the authors to present a more radical prescription for change. In calling for more investigation and prosecution of realtors and discriminating mortgage lenders, Massey and Denton convert a socioeconomic issue into a legal one. It is clear from reading their book that housing segregation survives because it allocates benefits to whites. This explains why whites of all ideological persuasions, including liberals, live in such neighborhoods. Therefore, if change is imperative, bold policies are necessary. A new policy that redistributes separate and selected benefits to those who choose to live in race and class integrated neighborhoods could reverse the current housing patterns and facilitate the dispersal of the black underclass.

Policy prescriptions aside, *American Apartheid* is an excellent addition to the literature on urban housing. It summarizes and updates most of the demographic research on housing segregation. Although the topic is of ongoing interest to economists, sociologists, and political scientists, this book contains crucial information for anyone who wishes to understand why blacks and whites live in segmented housing patterns and for those who mistakenly believe that government is innocent in maintaining this apartheid.

WILBUR C. RICH
Wellesley College

Race Against the Court: The Supreme Court and Minorities in Contemporary America *by Girardeau A. Spann. New York, New York University Press, 1993. 256 pp. $40.00.*

There have been a number of accepted truths in the contemporary law of civil rights. First, the Supreme Court's decision in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), which established the "separate but equal" doctrine was both a great moral and legal

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wrong. Second, the decision of the nation's highest court in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), which overturned *Plessy*, corrected that past injustice and set the country on the correct path toward achieving racial justice. Finally, it has been generally accepted that since the *Brown* decision the Supreme Court has played the central role in protecting the rights of minorities.

Spann rejects each of these propositions. He contends that minorities would be better off today had the Supreme Court not overturned *Plessy* but enforced the equal aspect of "separate but equal." Further, he maintains that the Supreme Court's rulings merely reflect the preferences of the white majority and that the *Brown* decision has not led to true equality for minorities. Finally, Spann argues that minorities in this country have achieved far more through the political process at the local, state, and national levels than they have through litigation in the courts. He especially criticizes the Supreme Court for making minorities dependents of the court and hence psychologically incapable of bringing about the needed changes in their own social and economic positions.

The arguments presented in this book are both complex and challenging. The summary presented above does not do justice to the rich intellectual quality of the work. Some sense of its innovative nature can be seen in the varied sources the author has drawn on to present his criticisms of the present state of civil rights in the United States. In addition to the conventional analysis of cases, Spann employs ideas taken from the critical legal studies and critical race theory movements, applies the approach of literary deconstruction to the examination of legal texts, and propounds arguments derived from black nationalist and black power movements.

While *Race Against the Court* is a provocative book, many of its arguments are overstated and ultimately unconvincing. Spann's view of American society as one divided between a white majority with an agreed upon set of values and a minority population with opposing values certainly oversimplifies reality. He fails to recognize the diversity of views that exists within the white and minority communities of this nation.

Other positions taken by the author are implausible. It is impossible to believe, for example, that minorities in the United States today would be better off had the Supreme Court continued to follow *Plessy* and not chosen the path set forth in *Brown*. While this nation may not yet have fulfilled the vision of racial justice set forth in *Brown*, it is surely a more noble vision than the system of legalized apartheid offered by the Supreme Court at the close of the nineteenth century.

Spann is also distressed that minorities in this country have accepted the goal of an integrated society rather than that of a separate but truly equal one advanced by advocates of black nationalism. He places the blame for this on the powerful influence of majoritarian values, especially as enunciated by the Supreme Court, failing even to consider the likelihood that separatism has been rejected by most members of the minority community because of its intellectual shortcomings.

WALTER E. VOLKOMER
Hunter College

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The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda *by Amitai Etzioni. New York, Crown Publishers, 1993. 323 pp. $22.00.*

With this book, Amitai Etzioni attempts to launch a moral and social crusade for the reorganization of American society. He wishes to create a grass-roots movement from above—that is, from the inside of the beltway. Etzioni has contributed a number of scholarly books in political sociology in the past, but the present work lacks scholarly merit and is a rather preachy sermon, a kind of jeremiad. This is followed by an appeal to set things aright through the agency of a communitarian movement that has just been launched by the author and his associates.

In the first part of the book the author enumerates some of the failures of contemporary American society, from the decline of the family and the high divorce rate to the disappearance of the neighboring spirit and the predominance of the "I" over the "We." He wishes to return from *Gesellschaft* to renewed moral *Gemeinschaft*. The communitarian manifesto expounded here does not propose many concrete remedies to our moral failings but attempts instead to rally good men and women to participate in the movement to be created by way of this manifesto. Strengthening families, schools that provide moral education, and the cleansing of political life stand high on the agenda of the renewed progressive movement that Etzioni calls for. The "radical individualistic" positions of, for example the Civil Liberties Union, can only lead to a suspicion of any and all government authority (p. 164). Hence "Self-discipline is a master key" (p. 92) and can be instilled through "a year of national service after high school which could be the capstone of a student's educational experiences" (p. 113).

Etzioni's communitarian movement, so he claims, offers something to liberals and conservatives alike. It stands for discipline and renewed order and will hence appeal to the conservatives. But it also stresses that revision of campaign finance laws is essential, thus adapting a standard liberal reform aimed at weakening the influence of money among law makers. Yet, taken as a whole, this book can only be read as a retreat by the author from his earlier radical-liberal convictions. Etzioni accuses the American people of a lack of moral fiber. This reviewer cannot help but feel that it is he who suffers from a serious failure of nerve.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Making Ends Meet: Congressional Budgeting in the Age of Deficits *by Daniel P. Franklin, Washington, DC, CQ Press, 1993. 260 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $19.95.*

The goal of this book is to make the budget process comprehensible by tracing it through its seasons. The author provides some sense of legislative life, how

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the process from September 1990 through October 1991 felt within Congress. There is a good section on pork-barrel politics and occasional anecdotes that might be useful to specialists.

Unfortunately, this book's major accomplishment is to prove its premise: the budget process is very difficult to understand. The author and apparently his reviewers misunderstand basic aspects of the budget process. There are far more factual errors than I could list in a much longer review.

These include dubious judgments of history and events. Even nonexperts in budget history might be surprised to learn that the commerce clause of the constitution was not very important before the Civil War (p. 13), given the fact that the tariff was at least the second most important issue of the era. Descriptions of the origins of the deficit and evolution of the process are equally flawed. For instance, he does not mention the transformation of reconciliation in 1980.

But errors in describing the budget process itself are much more damaging. The author totally mischaracterizes reconciliation, both as a process by which the House Budget Committee orders that "appropriations bills exceeding their targets be 'reconciled,'" (p. 33) and one in which, "the Budget Committee can select individual portions of legislation to be cut" (p. 43). Reconciliation's role in raising revenues is not mentioned.

He has heard of the difference between budget authority (BA) and outlays. But he misses the way different BA and outlay allocations shape appropriations behavior; he keeps referring to "budget authorities"—a plural term unique to this book. He reports that House Budget Committee members can only serve four years out of ten (p. 39) instead of six and that appropriations in the House are generally "considered under a closed or modified closed rule that forbids the exclusion of extraneous or minority sponsored amendments" (p. 138). In fact, minority amendments are common on appropriations, and the major constraints come from the 302(b) allocations and the underlying rule against amending separate titles. He even suggests that to avoid complex conferences, "many differences between houses are resolved through amendments on the floor" (p. 196). Not on budget bills, or many other places, either.

Sometimes a fact is wrong at one point and right at another. Thus the author provides contradictory descriptions of the effect of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequesters on defense vs. domestic programs (pp. 35, 57). Twice he refers to a constitutional rule that appropriations be considered first in the House (pp. 138, 174), but at another point he refers to that as a tradition (p. 168). Even uninformed readers might have caught such contradictions.

In short, specialists in budget process will find a few useful stories here. Anyone else is more likely to be misinformed than informed by this book.

JOSEPH WHITE
The Brookings Institution

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Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality *by Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard G. Niemi. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 174 pp. $34.95.*

The 1992 House elections produced momentous gains for blacks and other minority groups. A total of thirty-nine blacks now serve in the U.S. House of Representatives, an increase of thirteen. Moreover, for the first time since Reconstruction, blacks were elected in five southern states: Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. All of these new minority officeholders won in newly-drawn majority-black or minority congressional districts.

The creation of majority-minority districts, however, remains a highly controversial and litigated issue. In fact, further redistricting litigation is pending in several states. While civil rights activists and attorneys through the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and litigation under this act have worked to eliminate electoral barriers and arrangements that limit minority electoral success, social scientists have also played a leading role in facilitating the political empowerment of minorities. Indeed, testimony by social scientists helped establish the legal grounds on which minority vote dilution cases are decided. In *Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality*, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard Niemi explain how through social science testimony a vote dilution standard evolved in the courts. They also describe the methodology and standard techniques employed to determine minority vote dilution and discuss new issues in voting rights such as the creation of minority "influence" districts. All three authors have participated as consultants and as expert witnesses in a number of voting rights cases, including the landmark 1986 *Thornburg v. Gingles*. Their book is an important addition to the fields of voting rights, law, and political methodology.

Described in Chapters 2 and 3 of the book, the modification of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in its 1982 extension eased the burden of proof for those challenging electoral schemes as discriminatory. Minority plaintiffs no longer had to prove a discriminatory intent but still had to show that the scheme had a dilutionary impact on their vote. However, in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, the Supreme Court effectively established a vastly simplified, three-prong test for vote dilution. Writing for the majority, Justice William J. Brennan held that plaintiffs had only to establish the following relevant factors: as a group, they are "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of a single-member district"; the group must be "politically cohesive"; and "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate" (p. 49).

The demonstration of the second factor (political cohesion), but especially, the third factor (racial bloc voting) is when and where the social scientists enter. In Chapter 4 Grofman, Handley, and Niemi provide a clear explanation of the standard quantitative techniques and methodological issues involved in measuring racial bloc voting. They write that since this chapter is "largely technical,"

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readers "more interested in the law per se may wish to skip the most detailed parts" (pp. 2–3). Many readers will most likely view Chapter 4 as the book's most indispensable chapter. Readers wanting to understand the data and methods using in voting rights litigation now have a detailed and up-to-date reference and are no longer obliged to seek out obscure journal articles and review legal addenda to obtain such skills.

Because voters cast secret ballots, researchers have used ecological regression to estimate the extent of racialized polarized voting behavior in a given election. Such techniques, however, have been sharply disputed in voting rights court cases by expert witnesses for the defendants. Since inferences are made about individual behavior based on ecological data—leading possibly to what is called the ecological fallacy—critics assert that aggregate data cannot reliably estimate the voting behavior of minorities and nonminorities. Although the authors claim that in the wake of *Gingles* such methodological disputes have been "settled" (p. 82), outside of court they have not been. Survey data collected during exit polling, however, can also be misleading indicators of behavior if significant respondents misreport their vote, as was very likely the case in the 1989 New York election of David Dinkins. Grofman, Handley, and Niemi explain how to provide more careful and data-sensitive interpretations of results from ecological analyses. Indeed, their well written book should clarify misunderstandings regarding the purpose of the Voting Rights Act and its impact as well as reduce unintentional misinterpretations of race and voting patterns by political analysts.

KATHERINE TATE
Ohio State University

The Speaker and the Budget: Leadership in the Post-Reform House of Representatives *by Daniel J. Palazzolo. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992. 262 pp. $39.95.*

This is a useful study of an important and previously overlooked topic in congressional life. Still, Palazzolo could do more with his subject. Despite the theoretical trappings arrayed in the first chapter, the book is essentially a descriptive study of the behavior of Speakers in the budget process from 1974 to 1988.

Palazzolo helpfully identifies the various roles played by the Speaker during this time and also spotlights the salient features of the political environment in which the role playing occurred. The best chapters cover budgeting during the Reagan era, when things really got messy and the Speakership confronted constant political pressure. Both Jim Wright and Tip O'Neill performed the roles of opposition party leader and budget process manager, but in strikingly different ways. O'Neill, according to Palazzolo, sought "to protect and ultimately try to rebuild traditional Democratic programs," whereas "Wright's objective was to propose new solutions to prevailing public problems" (p. 173). O'Neill's "cautious

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middleman" style of leadership contrasted with Wright's "activist" style. Wright's aggressive and high-risk tactics on the budget reflected his overall approach to his job and contributed to his downfall.

Such analysis is original and useful, but in certain respects the book is a missed opportunity. The theoretical scope of the study is narrow, focusing mainly on the relationship of political leaders to followers. Broader institutional questions about the capacity of Congress to budget well and the appropriate role of the Speaker in this are only hinted at. The book suffers also from inadequate methodological organization. If its focus is the behavior of leaders and followers, a clearer statement of propositions and a means of confirming them would seem necessary here. In fact, the book contains no extensive discussion of the study's methodology.

Palazzolo instead relies on primary and secondary documentary sources and a small but fruitful group of interviews. The book becomes the story of the Speaker in budgeting with a certain depth of treatment resulting from the use of sources. The final chapter includes some useful generalizations about how the Speaker behaves in budgeting. Nevertheless, Palazzolo does not prove or disprove broader generalizations about leader behavior from this case, nor does he use the story he tells as an opportunity to discuss whether the role of the Speaker is well designed for the duties of congressional budgeting.

The book is best suited to libraries that can afford an extensive political science collection and is primarily of use to budgeting specialists.

STEVEN E. SCHIER
Carleton College

Talking Politics *by William A. Gamson. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 272 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $15.95.*

In his 1898 essay on "Conversation," Gabriel Tarde linked press, conversation, opinion, and action in a linear model of participatory democracy. The model has disintegrated, of course, having been displaced substantively by critical theories of hegemony and functional theories of democracy-without-citizens and methodologically by the separatist disciplines that have ghettoized its elements.

One hundred years later, William Gamson—plus some resources and people—has made a mighty effort to put these pieces together again. Gamson asks us to reconsider the possibility that citizens are politically awake, that they talk politics, that the media serve such conversations, and that the impetus to political action is alive. The study proceeds by very careful comparison of media treatment of four major issues with treatments of the same issues by thirty-seven quasi focus groups of four to six working-class acquaintances convened in Boston homes. A facilitator introduced the issues successively—affirmative action, troubled industry, nuclear power, and Arab-Israel conflict—and the groups spent twenty

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minutes discussing each and reacting midway to relevant editorial cartoons. Most groups were racially homogeneous, of mixed gender, and with less than college education.

Ingenious coding schemes identify the "frames" deployed for each issue by the media and in the conversations; the informational sources that entered the conversations (media, popular wisdom, personal experience); the normative themes (for example, self-reliance vs. mutuality) from which the framings derive; and, above all, the presence of the elements of collective action (a sense that injustice has been done, that there is an identifiable adversary, and that people like us can do something about it).

Because of its self-selective sampling, the study cannot really prove that citizens are "not so dumb" and "not so passive." What the study does show is that the nearly 200 discussants seem to keep up with the news. While they do not normally talk politics, they are quite capable of doing so. Their sense of efficacy is limited, their thinking is individualistic, yet conversation led many of the groups to entertain aspects of collective action.

The media influence these conversations, although pinpointing such influence is difficult methodologically. There are good examples of how the media stimulate interest in an issue that is otherwise remote, of how media frames are interpolated into conversation, or how they evoke (and are evoked by) popular wisdom and personal experience. The media offer frames to think with, says Gamson, rather than dictating what to believe.

The media are not messengers of the establishment, even if they may not be the working person's best friend. Their frames (runaway nuclear technology, feuding Mideast neighbors) resonate more with oppositional themes (harmony with nature, America First) than with official themes (technological progress, U.S. global responsibility). Moreover, the media abet certain injustice frames (anti-nuclear protests) while suppressing others (worker takeovers of failing industries).

The conversations, too, privilege counternormative themes, even if these do not readily translate into collective action. The rhetoric of collective action, concludes Gamson, is most likely to emerge in groups that interweave media framings, popular wisdom, and personal experience. In a backward glance at social movements theory, however, Gamson also notes that opinion and talk may follow rather than precede the experience of action.

Collective scientific action is the tribute that this prodigious initiative deserves. Volunteers are needed to join in the frustrating search for a more abstract typology of issues that will permit generalization beyond specific issues, a more generic typology of frames that will apply across issues, and better methods for sampling everyday talk and for detecting media influence.

ELIHU KATZ
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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After Wilson: The Struggle for the Democratic Party, 1920–1934 *by Douglas B. Craig. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1992. 405 pp. $45.00.*

Maintaining that previous scholars have cast 1920s intra-Democratic party conflicts too exclusively in cultural terms, Douglas B. Craig, lecturer at the Australian National University, seeks to correct the record by "examining the philosophy and activities of conservative Democrats within the party's national organization" and the "fierce struggle between conservatives and liberals" (p. 2) for control of the party's policies. He emphasizes the degree to which the struggle represented ideological conflict between the heirs of William Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson led by William Gibbs McAdoo and a newly-dominant pro-business and antistatist business element.

Craig's book is well researched and well written, with generous use of quotations. In organization, he intersperses his accounts of intraparty and electoral battles with brief political biographies of leading players including McAdoo, John Davis, Al Smith, John J. Rascob, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The national convention and election of 1920, he writes, marked the shift of power in the Democratic party from the Wilson reform wing to business types. Liberal leaders including Bryan and McAdoo, who "argued for the extension of government power to redress social wrongs and economic inequalities" (p. 6), were displaced by "a loose coalition of northeastern economic conservatives who won control of the national party's nominating process and organization in the years after 1920," (p. 3). Conservatives, including Al Smith, John Davis, and John Rascob, sought "the reduction of federal power in the social and political life of the nation, the return of powers lost to the states by two decades of Progressive reform, and the reassertion of individual liberties" (p. 277). Arguing that Democrats could win only if they could become more like Republicans, they changed the South-West strategy to one of allying the South to the cities of the Northeast. Craig brings this ideological conflict to life with depth and dimension.

Because Craig deemphasizes cultural conflicts and does not give much space to state organizations, he is less successful in his second goal, to provide "a coherent and inclusive treatment of Democratic party activities" in the period (p. 14). He recognizes that the rightward shift in the Democratic party reflected broad political and social trends. It was McAdoo's misfortune, he writes, "to be the leading progressive at a time when conservativism, both within the Democratic party and the nation at large, was on the ascendant" (p. 50). This created an atmosphere in which "demoralized and disorganized" party liberals were "unable to mount an effective challenge to the conservatives" (p. 297). However, Craig does not attempt to explain the causes of the broad social and political reaction which some scholars attribute to the effects of World War I.

The conservative leadership of the Democrats led the party to three landslide defeats. With the coming of the Great Depression, Roosevelt, who argued for

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"a more equitable distribution of income" and "a larger measure of social planning" (p. 211) became the chief liberal spokesman. In a changed social and political climate, businessmen, once so irresistible, were suddenly ineffectual in opposing Roosevelt's nomination and later, in the American Liberty League, in blocking his policies.

Whether or not other scholars have ignored ideology to the extent that Craig suggests, he makes an interesting and valuable contribution.

WESLEY M. BAGBY
West Virginia University

Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev *by Yegor Ligachev. New York, Pantheon Books, 1993. 369 pp. $27.50.*

Yegor Ligachev's promotion to the Politburo in 1985 was one of Mikhail Gorbachev's first acts as general secretary, but Ligachev soon became a symbol both at home and abroad of conservative resistance to perestroika. Indeed, his impact as a symbol may outweigh in historical importance his actual role in leadership politics. His forced retirement in 1990 gave him the time to write this memoir. It is not organized as a chronological account of one individual's activity; rather it jumps from year to year and from topic to topic. This relative lack of editorial control, however, strengthens the impression that we are dealing with a real person and not a ghostwriter.

At bottom this book is a cry of pain—both personal and patriotic. Ligachev knew Stalinist persecution at first hand and compares the accusations against him to Stalinist paranoia—even though he himself continually falls back on conspiracy theories that vaguely link the "pseudo-democrats" to hostile outside forces. An outburst by his wife Zinaida captures Ligachev's outlook: "Why am I doomed like this? Before, I was the daughter of an 'enemy of the people.' Now I have become the wife of an 'enemy of perestroika'" (p. 257). Most of the book is devoted to the major scandals associated with Ligachev's name during the perestroika years. On the whole, he is successful in presenting himself as a real person distinct from the demonic symbol created by his opponents.

Although Ligachev does not present a completely coherent analysis of what he thinks went wrong, the essence of his case is that the radicals hijacked the reform process and that Gorbachev didn't realize the power of the unleashed centrifugal processes until it was too late, since he himself had destroyed stabilizing forces such as the party. Ligachev's argument is a challenge to Americans, especially those who call themselves conservative, who tend to see any centrifugal force in the former Soviet Union as a force for liberation. We might seriously consider Ligachev's question: did it really benefit the cause of a civilized transition when glasnost went so far as to destroy any pride in the history of the last seventy years?

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Ligachev felt deeply that in order for the system to work, there needed to be "faith in the organizing role of the center" (p. 65). Although he now expresses regret that he did not protest more openly, overt leadership conflict would only have weakened this faith further. On the evidence of this book, Ligachev is still not fully conscious of the Catch-22 of conservative resistance: the logical contradiction of a revolt carried out in the name of discipline and unity.

Ligachev's book is valuable not only as a description of the politics of perestroika but also as a guide to the world of the party-state bureaucracy before the collapse of the late 1980s. There are many revealing details: the fetishism of the special-access telephone, the role of letters sent into the Central Committee as a source of information, and the impact of the foreign press on the personal relations among the top leaders. The one heartfelt reference to Lenin stresses not his revolutionary socialism but his great service in preserving the Russian state. All in all, this book reminds one of memoirs written after the Bolshevik revolution by tsarist bureaucrats, with their continuing devotion to an unworthy sovereign, their contempt for the liberal intellectuals lionized by the West, and their sadness at the scale of the national disaster.

The American edition is provided with a stimulating introduction by Stephen Cohen that puts Ligachev's career into context. On the other hand, the editorial notes provided by the translators are inadequate and sometimes misleading.

LARS T. LIH
Montreal

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

The Arkansas State Constitution: A Reference Guide *by Kay Collett Goss. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993. 253 pp. $65.00.*

The Churchill War Papers at the Admiralty, September 1939–May 1940, vol. 1 *by Martin Gilbert. New York, W.W. Norton, 1993. 1370 pp. $75.00.*

Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1947–1922: Committee Jurisdictions and Member Rosters *by Garrison Nelson, with Clark H. Bensen. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993. 1015 pp. $225.00.*

The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1992 *edited by George Gallup, Jr. Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources, 1993. 229 pp. $60.00*

Green Globe Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development, 1993 *edited by Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 271 pp. $49.95.*

The Historical Atlas of State Powers in Congress, 1790–1990 *by Kenneth C. Martis and Gregory A. Elmes. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993. 190 pp. $56.95.*

Margaret Thatcher: A Bibliography *by Faysal Mikdadi. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993. 269 pp. $85.00.*

A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx *by Iain Hampsher-Monk. Oxford, UK, Blackwell, 1993. 609 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

The Human Development Report 1993 *by the United Nations Development Programme, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 230 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $17.95.*

Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol. 3 *edited by M. Weller. Cambridge, England, Grotius Publications, 1993. 780 pp. $130.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 68, 1922–1924 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993. 627 pp. $59.50.*

The State of Working America, 1992–93 *by Lawrence Mishel and Jared Bernstein. New York, ME Sharpe, 1993. 502 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

Statesmen Who Changed the World: A Biographical Dictionary of Diplomacy *edited by Frank W. Thackeray and John E. Findling. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993. 669 pp. $85.00.*

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What Price Clean Air? A Market Approach to Energy and Environmental Policy *by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. New York, Committee for Economic Development, 1993. 96 pp. Paper, $15.00.*

Why Child Care Matters: Preparing Young Children for a More Productive America *by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. New York, Committee for Economic Development, 1993. 70 pp. Paper, $14.50.*

World Economic Outlook, May 1993: A Survey *by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC, International Money Fund, 1993. 197 pp. $30.00.*

The World Factbook, 1993–94 *produced by the Central Intelligence Agency. New York, Brassey's (US), 1993. 439 pp. $30.00.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

I must take exception to Carl Kaysen's failure in his review of my history, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963* (PSQ 107 Spring 1992), to disclose that he was a maker of the foreign policy criticized in my book. (He was a member of the Kennedy National Security Council staff and was called by the columnist Joseph Kraft "one of the really influential figures" of that administration.) Any reader of PSQ who did not know of Mr. Kaysen's role would have falsely presumed that he came to my book as a disinterested scholar with no axe to grind. That was unfair to me and your readers.

MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS

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

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



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